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FOREWORD 
When Chief Justice Marshall wrote for the United States 
Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison (1803) that the judiciary had 
the power to declar an act of Congress unconstitutional, he phrased 
the issue before the Court this way: "The question, whether an act, 
repugnant to the constitution, can become the law of the land, is a 
question deeply interesting to the United States; but happily, not of 
an intricacy proportioned to its interest." By assuming in this 
statement of the question that courts have the power to review 
legislation in order to decide whether it actually is repugnant to the 
Constitution and focusing instead on whether a la.w known to be 
unconstitutional nevertheless could be valid law, Marshall verbally 
sidestepped the truly hard question: why should courts have the 
power to set aside statutes acts enacted by a body, the legislature, 
that is presumed to be as loyal and subservient to fundamental law 
as the courts themselves? This truly is a question whose intricacy is 
directly proportional to its interest. It is a question that American 
constitutional lawyers ponder regularly as they endeavor to explain 
and to criticize the role of the courts in our constitutional system. 
Other aspects of American judicial review - for example, review of 
executive action and review of the federal constitutionality of state 
laws are now somewhat less controversial than review of congression-
al action - but any exercise of judicial power to nullify actions of 
popularly elected officials still is likely to cause some concern. 
Judicial review, if still controversial, is so well established in the 
United States that we often forget how special our concept of the 
judicial role is. In many countries throughout the world, there is 
neither a written constitution nor anything resembling judicial review 
of the validity of laws. In other countries a written constitution exists 
but judicial review of legislation under the constitution is not 
exercised. Yet, it seems that judicial review of some sort is more 
common today than ever before. In some places, a special constitu-
tional court performs this function. In others a court, more like ours, 
with broader jurisdiction, performs the task. Whatever the approach, 
more courts are entrusted with authority to assess whether law is in 
accord with fundamental or constitutional principles. 
What seems evident is that judicial review is not a uniform 
concept, even in one country. It is only in the last half-century, for 
instance, that the United States Supreme Court has been so strongly 
identified with the protection of personal liberty. In the early days of 
the nation, judicial review was more important in the effort to 
strengthen the union against the states and to recognize federal 
power to promote commerce and general welfare. It is only against a 
background of America's relative world power and economic prosper-
ity that judicial review to protect fundamental rights and vulnerable 
minorities has developed. 
This book compares judicial review and the role of the courts in 
the Republic of China with American ideas about the responsibility of 
courts. The authors describe the way in which courts function in the 
Republic of China, and in necessarily condensed fashion, how this 
came to be. They described and explain the Constitution of the 
Republic Of China and trace its roots. And they carefully detail the 
composition and· function of the Chinese equivalent of our Supreme 
Court, the Council of Grand Justice of the Judicial Yuan. 
The work of the Chinese court for the most part has not involved 
protection of personal liberties. This is not surprising. For some time 
concern about security against outside agression and the competitive-
ness of its exports in world markets have dominated public affairs in 
the Republic of China. Until political and economic security are 
assured, it may be that no judiciary is likely to stand in the way of 
legislative and executive officials responsible for the security and 
prosperity of the nation. Judicial review that entails the power to 
frustrate the temporary will of lawmakers and lawenforcers may be a 
luxury that a country only can afford when it is strong enough that 
any particular frustration of majority will is not likely to jeopardize 
its position- politically, militarily, or economically- in the world. 
Judicial review is still relatively new in the Republic of China. 
By watching how it grows with the economic prosperity of the nation 
and how it is affected by developments in the relationship between 
the Republic of China and the People's Republic on the mainland, we 
may learn much about the impact that political and economic forces 
have on the role of the judiciary. 
Stephen A. Saltz burg 
September 10, 1980 
PREFACE 
Following the Second World War, a conspicuous phenomenon in 
the legal systems of many countries has been the adoption of a 
system of control legislation. Judicial review, once characteristic 
solely of the United States, has spread to many parts of the world; as 
the system has spread, it has assumed a variety of forms. Particularly 
noteworthy is the rise of the European system, represented by West 
Germany and Italy; this system, in fact, is modeled after the Austrian 
system of 1920. By creating a special Constitutional Court, it stands 
in contrast to the American type in many respects. 
This development has made the comparative study of judicial 
review more meaningful. In this paper I examine the Chinese system 
of judicial review with two purposes in mind: one is to see how it is 
organized and functions; another is to analyze problems that it has 
encountered in the last three decades and the responses it · has 
proposed for settlement. This is a case study of an American judicial 
system operating in the foreign context of Chinese law and politics. 
This study owes much to many people. The untiring patience and 
numerous suggestions of Professor Stephen A. Saltzburg are warmly 
appreciated. I also thank Professor Saltzburg for his kindness in 
writing a foreword for this book. Acknowledged, too, is the help of 
Professor John Norton Moore, who arranged the necessary financial 
support for me from the Graduate Program of the Virginia Law 
School during 1977-1979. I also thank Professor Kenneth Redden for 
his valuable assistance throughout my work on this project. Professor 
Calvin Woodard also has my appreciation for his unprecedented 
decision to accept both myself and my wife as participants in the 
Graduate Program in 1975. 
My heartfelt thanks, long overdue, go to Professor Hundgah Chiu 
of University of Maryland School of Law, whose abiding interest in 
my scholarly activity during the past ten years is greatly appreciated. 
The good counsel- solicited and unsolicited- from Professor and 
Mrs. Shao-chuan Leng of the University of Virginia are warmly 
appreciated. I am also grateful to Mr. David Simon and Professor 
David Bogen of the University of Maryland School of Law for reading 
my manuscript and offering many constructive criticisms, to Mr. 
Mark Robson for compiling the index, and to Julia Fang for 
administrative work in connection of publication. 
Finally, I am personally indebted to my parents, whose en-
couragement and inspiration were never failing. My profound 
appreciation goes to Ming-ju~ Fa for her contribution to research and 
useful suggestions throughout. 
Jyh-pin Fa 
Taipei, Taiwan 
Republic of China 
September 15, 1980 
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AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
It is well recognized in the modern world that the doctrine of rule 
of law' is the best protection offered for individual liberty. The 
concept of the rule of law is the establishment of a hierarchy of 
normative rules in the political system. To be more specific, the 
regulations issued by the local government must conform to the laws 
of the state or province, and those of the latter to the laws of the 
nation. The decrees and resolutions of administrative organs should 
not overstep the limits imposed by. the statutes that provide for them. 
Further, the epitome of this concept is the notion that any law must 
be in harmony with a paramount constitution. It is from this notion 
that the theory of judicial review arises. According to Professor 
Abraham, judicial review is "the power of any court to hold 
unconstitutional and hence unenforceable any law, any official action 
that it deems ... to be in conflict with the Basic Law, in the United 
States its Constitution."2 
Judicial power to invalidate unconstitutional law represents a 
major shift of political development from the principle of majority 
1. According to Albert Ven Dicey, the internationally known British constitu-
tional lawyer, the rule of law "has three meanings, or may be regarded from three 
different points of view": controls are exercised through regular law instead of 
arbitrary power; the law of the land is administered by the ordinary courts of law 
equally for all people; constitutional law is not the source but the consequence of the 
rights of individuals, as defined and enforced by the courts, that, in short, the 
constitution is the result of the ordinary law of the land; see A. DICEY, INTRODUC-
TION TO THE STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTION 202-03 (10th ed. 1959). Because the 
last meaning is derived from the English tradition that ordinary law and a constitution 
cannot be separated, it is open to serious doubt that this may equally be applied to 
other countries. For a criticism of this definition, see W. JENNINGS, THE LAW AND 
THE CONSTITUTION 305-17 (5th ed. 1959). 
2. H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALY-
SIS OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, AND FRANCE 280 
(3d ed. 1975). 
(1) 
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rule to the principle of limited rule. Since provisions of a constitution 
are generally rather limited while their applications in particular 
circumstances are not certain, controversy will inevitably arise 
during the law-making process in the legislative or administrative 
government agencies as to whether these statutes are in conformity 
with the constitution. When they hagan the process of democratiza-
tion in the last century, almost of all of the European countries 
viewed the legislature as the suitable organ to guard the inviolability 
of the constitution.3 After independence, the United States took a 
different direction by arming the judiciary with the power to review 
the constitutionality of statutes passed by the legislature! 
3. Under the immeasurable influence of the volonte g~n~rale, Rousseau's version 
of popular sovereignty, continental European countries were hardly allowed the 
opportunity to use a legal check like judicial review. The sovereignty was transferred 
from the monarch to the people who in tum delegated to their representatives. 
Furthermore, judges in those nations traditionally did not enjoy independent status 
and served as an instrument of the monarch's exercise of cabinet justice. For a brief 
discussion, see Dietze, America and Europe - Decline and Emergence of Judicial 
Review, 44 VA. L. REV. 1233, 1238-41 (1958). 
Although as early as 1610, Lord Coke of England in Dr. Bonham's Case [8 Co. 
Rep. 113b at 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 at 652, C.P. 1610)], emphatically declared that 
"when an Act of Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or 
impossible to be performed, the common law will control it, and adjudge such Act to be 
void .... " For comment on this case, see Plucknett, Bonham's Case and Judicial 
Review, 40 HARV. L. REV. 30-70 (1926). The doctrine of the parliamentary supremacy 
of sovereignty nevertheless, was firmly established after the Glorious Revolution of 
1688. The opinion voiced by Blackstone that "what the Parliament doth no authority 
upon earth can undo" replaced Coke's dictum; see 1 COOLEY, BLACKSTONE'S 
COMMENTARIES, 161 (2d ed. rev. 1872). An oft-quoted metaphorical aphorism stated 
by De Lolme best illustrates this absolute doctrine: "Parliament can do everything 
except make a man a woman or a woman a man" quoted in E. CORWIN, THE 
"HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 87 
(1955). For the study of the supremacy of the legislature, see Mitchell, Sovereignty of 
Parliament- Yet Again, 79 L.Q. REV. 196 (1963). 
4. This is because during the American Revolution, the English Parliament, 
rather than the King, appeared to be the great oppressor. Its various acts, imposing 
discriminative treatment upon American colonies, thus constituted the major source of 
resentment of English dominance. Accordingly, the conditions existing in America 
differed from those in European nations and were conducive to the adoption of judicial 
review in America and its rejection in Europe. 
The greatest advocate for the adoption of judicial review in this new nation 
was Alexander Hamilton, who in his famous Federalist No. 78 laid out the reasoning 
that Chief Justice Marshall followed fifteen years later in Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. 
(1 Cranch) 137 (1803), the epoch-making decision in the history of judicial review. 
Another prominent American Founding Father, James Madison, the so-called "Father 
of the Constitution," also supported the adoption of judicial review; see C. WARREN, 
THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 740 C1937l. Even Thomas 
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Although the proposal of a court with authority to determine the 
constitutional validity of a statute is not a purely American idea,5 it 
cannot be denied that this system has survived over more than a 
century and constitutes the most striking feature of the American 
political structure. It may even be appropriate to say that the 
doctrine of judicial review is the most valuable contribution to 
political theory made by America. All agree that America became the 
model for those countries considering the establishment of a constitu-
tional government. 
Jefferson, who hardly could be classified as an admirer of judicial review, nevertheless 
favored some degree or type of judicial control. He wrote Madison from Paris in 1789, 
two years after the drafting of the Constitution, that one good reason for adding a Bill 
of Rights to the new Constitution was "the legal check which it puts into the hands of 
the judiciary." 14 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 659 (J. Boyd ed. 1950). 
Further, before and after acquiring independence, a number of state courts actually 
practiced the power of judicial review. For a discussion of state precedents, see C. 
HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 88-121 (2d ed. 
1932). Some scholars also asserted that most of the delegates at the Constitutional 
Convention in Philadelphia in 1787 favored judicial review; see C. BEARD, THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 46-79 (1912); E. CORWIN, THE 
DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 10-12 (1914); Beard, The Supreme Court -
Usurper or Grantee? 27 POL. SCI. Q. 1 {1912). However, a critique of these historical 
assertions can be found in L. LEVY, JUDGMENTS 25-32 (1972). 
5. Charles Warren in CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE SUP-
REME COURT vii (1935) argures that "just as a written Constitution amendable only 
by the people was wholly an American idea, so the proposal of a court with authority to 
determine when Congress had overstepped the bounds set by the Constitution and to 
curb attempts by Congress to amend or alter the Constitution was purely American." 
This is supported by C. Friedrich; see THE IMPACT OF AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONALISM ABROAD 92 (1967). However, a close examination of the historical 
material indicates that this conclusion seems doubtful. Some political philosophy in 
Greece and Rome implied that political rulers are and should be subjected to an order 
of higher law. The prevailing doctrine during the Middle Ages was the supremacy of 
natural law. Positive law was invalid and should not be applied by the courts if it 
conflicted with the former. For a survey of the theoretical background of the 
development of judicial review, see M. CAPPELLETII, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE 
CONTEMPORARY WORLD 28-44 {1971); E. CORWIN, supra note 3; C. HAINES, 
THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS (1930); C. MciLWAIN, CONSTITU-
TIONALISM OF ANCIENT AND MODERN (1947); Radin, The Judicial Review of 
Statutes in Continental Europe, 41 W. VA. L.Q. 112-30 (1934); Cappelletti & Adams, 
Judicial Review of Legislation: European Antecedents and Adaptations, 79 HARV. L. 
REV. 1207, 1209-10 (1966). 
These ancient and medieval political philosophies doubtless contributed to the 
emergence of modem judicial review even though there is not sufficient concrete 
evidence to attribute the development of the latter to the former; see Deener, Judicial 
Review in Modern Constitutional Systems, 46 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1079, 1080 (1952>. 
4 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
This viewpoint was much more obvious after World War II. 
Almost one-half of the nations of the world had by then officially 
adopted some form of judicial review. The bitter experience of most 
European countries with dictatorial regimes made them eager to try 
to find an effective way of dealing with the abuse of government 
power. Not only had legislatures been unable to prevent repressive 
actions from being carried out, but, ironically, repressive regimes 
often obtained their power through the legislatures.6 Hence, the loss 
of faith in the legislature's capacity to serve as a guardian of the 
constitution is understandable. 
Since the United States emerged from the war as a leading power 
and seemed to maintain a comparatively stable democratic system, it 
was quite natural for those defeated countries to view the United 
States not only as a military liberator, but as the best model of 
democracy and its virtues. One principal characteristic of democracy 
was its guarantee of fundamental rights; in the United States it was 
the great emancipator from majoritarian despotism. And judicial 
review was the fundamental aspect of the emancipation. Moreover, 
the United States made known its "expectations" that the defeated 
countries would reform their political and legal system. They took 
these "recommendations" seriously.7 
America also has been a model for newly emerging nations. Even 
as United States commercial law has been vigorously studied by a 
large number of foreign scholars as a result of her leading position in 
international trade and investment, so too can the lessons of her 
constitutional experience be easily identified in almost every consti-
tutional work of other countries. It is fair to say there is no other 
aspect of the American legal system that has been probed so deeply 
and extensively as her constitutional law. 
6. Hitler, Mussolini and Petain all received plenary power from their legislatures 
through the formal legislative procedure; see Dietze, supra note 3, at 1233, 1255, n.88. 
7. However, a German constitutional authority, Rudolf Katz, who was the Vice 
President of the Federal Constitutional Court until 1961, categorically denied that 
there was a necessary causal relationship between original Allied demands and final 
German action. Instead, he argued that the adoption of the judicial review was favored 
by all democratic parties and groups after World War II and thus it was the Germans 
themselves made up their mind; see Bundesverfassungsgericht und U.SA. Supreme 
Court, 7 DIE OEFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG 98 (1954), cited in Cole, The West 
German Federal Constitutional Court: An Evaluation After Six Years, 20 J. POL. 278, 
281-82 (1958). There is no concrete evidence to show the direct pressure exercised by 
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Nevertheless, each country has its own distinctive cultural and 
historical background; the political and social conditions of few 
countries are identical. Recognizing this diversity, no country follows 
the American example in all respects, although often the American 
form of judicial review is very influential. But it does not always take 
the form to which Americans are accustomed. One important 
structural difference lies in the fact that some countries separate the 
constitutional court from the hierarchy of ordinary courts. This is a 
significant development from the establishment of the system of 
judicial review, because it presents an alternative means of guarding 
the constitution.8 China adopted this alternative approach. The 
underlying reasons for creating this different system are many and 
will be dealt with at length in Chapter IV. The implications 
associated with this important departure are also covered there. 
Compared with the abundant material about the constitutional 
courts in West Germany, Italy, and Austria, with the Supreme Court 
of Japan and with the Constitutional Council of France (which is said 
only to possess rather limited review functions), the work of the 
the United States upon them to adopt judicial review as a way of promoting a 
democratic way of life. Henry Abraham maintained, however, that the establishment 
of the Federal Constitutional Court in West Germany was the result of the United 
States insistence; see ABRAHAM, supra note 2, at 299. 
In the case of Japan the conclusions reached by foreign and Japanese 
constitutional scholars are the same. That is, the present Constitution reflects the 
enormous influence of the American notion of constitutionalism. It might even be said 
that it was virtually drafted by the hands of the Occupation Authorities; see H. 
QUIGLEY & J. TURNER, THE NEW JAPAN 94 !1956); McNelley, The Japanese 
Constitution: Child of the Cold War, 74 POL. SCI. Q. 176, 185 !1959). For a vivid 
description about strong American pressure upon the Japanese; see C. WHITNEY, 
MacARTHUR: HIS RENDZEVOUS WITH HISTORY 250-52 !1956). It is thus natural 
that the doctrine of judicial review is explicitly recognized in article 81, which provides 
that "The Supreme Court is the court of last resort with power to determine the 
constitutionality of any law, order, regulation of official act." Williams, Making the 
Japanese Constitution: A Further Look, 59 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 665-79 !1965). 
8. Austria was the first country which established the archetype of this 
alternative according to her 1920 Constitution. The well-known Austrian jurist Hans 
Kelsen was the most influential figure in the drafting of this document. For a concise 
introduction to the Austria .. system of judicial review, see Grant, Judicial Review of 
Legislation under the Austrian Constitution of 1920, 28 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 670-76 
(19341; Kelsen, Judicial Review of Legislation: A Comparative Study of the Austrian 
and American Constitution, 4 J. POL. 183-200 (1942). 
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Council of the Grand Justices in China is entirely ignored. As a 
Chinese student interested in constitutional law, I hope to bring the 
work of the Grand Justices to the attention of international 
constitutional scholars. The Chinese experience will add to the 
richness of current inquiries about the legitimacy and proper scope of 
judicial review. 
The absence in the legal literature of an examination of Chinese 
constitutional law is explained by the recent development of Chinese 
judicial review. The terms "constitution" or "constitutional law" can 
be found in ancient Chinese books, which were published not only 
before Marbury v. Madison, but also before America had been 
dis~overed by Europeans. But it would be misleading to conclude that 
China was the pioneer in the establishment of constitutional 
government, because these terms do not bear modern meaning and 
significance. In ancient books the term "constitution" only designated 
various laws and ordinances promulgated by the Imperial Court. 9 As 
a matter of fact, law in traditional China never assumed a prominent 
role. After Confucianism was firmly established two thousand years 
ago, Chinese legal theories and practices in the dynasties that 
followed were virtually governed by the concept of rites, because 
Confucians advocated government by gentry and maintained that 
people should be governed by a system of ethics rather than by law. 
China, however, has had various legal codes during her long history, 
but never a constitution. 
Until the beginning of this century, the Chinese were totally 
unfamiliar with constitutional rules. This situation began to change 
in the beginning of the twentieth century when the last monarchy in 
Chinese history, the Ching dynasty, was forced by unceasing 
revolutionary movement and the world-wide trend toward constitu-
tionalism to overhaul its political system. Because the people were 
dissatisfied with the delay and the slowness of this political reform, a 
large-scale revolution erupted in 1911 and overthrew the Ching 
dynasty. Even after the establishment of the first republic in Asia, 
the following political development did not pave the way for 
9. In theory, the monarch in traditional China was the head of state whose 
authority was subjected to no limitations except those imposed by God. Thus, the 
limitation on the exercise of governmental power, which is the cardinal element of 
constitutional government, is absent. However, the emperor actually was under a 
number of restraints; this phenomenon may in some way approximate the meaning of 
modern constitutionalism. For those limits on Chinese royal power, see F. HOUN, 
CHINESE POLITICAL TRADITION 45-98 119651. 
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establishing a constitutional government in China. The existing 
conservative politicians and military simply did not believe in 
constitutional rule. They fought each other in every part of the 
country in order to seize as much power as possible. As many as three 
constitutions and four constitutional drafts were promulgated during 
the. next seventeen chaotic years. Since those drafts and constitutions 
either were drafted by the constitutional commission, whose members 
were backed by a warlord who happened to occupy Peking, or were 
never put into practice, their significance has been minimized by 
many students of Chinese constitutional law. 
Less than ten years after the unification of the whole nation 
under the leadership of the Nationalist Party in 1928, the short 
period of peace was shattered by the Japanese. Only after World War 
II did China,· along with other newly independent nations, have its 
first "legitimate" Constitution, which was made and promulgated by 
the National Assembly on December 25, 1946 and became effective 
as of January 1, 1947. The process of making this constitution was 
not a simple one and will be described i_n full in the next chapter. 
The power of judicial review was explicitly recognized and 
entrusted to a special organ, the Council of Grand Justices. 10 The 
Council did not, however, function until the Nationalist government 
moved to Taiwan three years later. Compared to the American 
experience, it is no exaggeration to say that judicial revi_ew in China 
is in its infancy. Thus, a study comparing Chinese institutions and 
those of the leading democratic countries has the potential to benefit 
China, because she can assimilate the wisdom that the experience of 
other countries has generated and avoid the problems in which some 
more experienced countries still find themselves entangled. 
In this paper I hope to contribute to the ultimate realization of 
this potential, but I recognize that China cannot borrow wholesale 
from other countries and other customs. If judicial review is to be not 
only transplanted to China, but is also to work, it must be adjusted to 
the local customs of the world's oldest civilization. It will be 
important in the remainder of this paper to see how the American 
concept of judicial review must be changed to suit Chinese culture. 
10. Article 78 provides: "The Judicial Yuan shall interpret the Constitution and 
shall have the power to unify the interpretation of laws and orders." The following 
article 79, paragraph 2 provides: "The Judicial Yuan shall have a certain number of 
Grand Justices to take charge of matters specified in article 78 of this Constitution, 
who shall be nominated by the President of the Republic." The functions and structures 
of Judicial and Control Yuan and other governmental organizations will be fully dealt 
with in the next chapter. 
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Also important is the question whether judicial review in its Chinese 
form has itself changed the culture of this ancient land. 
After tracing the historical development of the Chinese political 
and legal system and studying the influence on the current gov-
ernmental structure and the people's attitude towards the govern-
ment, I shall examine the organization and function of the co~stitu­
tional framework in which the Council of Grand Justices, ordinary 
courts, and also the administrative courts operate. Then I shall 
discuss the actual practice of, and some of the most far-reaching 
decisions rendered by, the Council. I will compare them with their 
American counterparts in the hope of discerning significant differ-
ences and the underlying reasons for them. Finally, I will deal with 
the impact of the constitutional decisions, a subject that is important, 
controversial and too often ignored in analysis of systems of judicial 
review. 
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CHAPTER II 
Background of the Chinese System of Judicial Review 
A. Confucianism v. Legalism 
It may be an exaggeration to say, as historians usually seem to 
do, that the best way to understand anything of importance about the 
present is to know everything about the past. Still, one cannot deny 
that some aspects of the past do influence, sometimes rather 
significantly, the contemporary life of every country. As China has a 
long recorded history of over three thousand years, a study of the 
legal thought and system prevalent in traditional China is absolutely 
necessary for a better understanding of the modern Chinese state. In 
addition, traditional Chinese legal practices and conceptions about 
law deserve special attention, since in many ways they sharply differ 
from those of other civilizations. It might even be suggested that the 
difference between China and other civilizations is nowhere so clearly 
manifest as in the domain of law. Accordingly, a few words about the 
theory, development, and special features of Chinese law are 
necessary before we discuss the practical administration of justice. 
Like its political philosophies, China's most influential legal 
philosophies, which signified conscious reflections on the nature and 
end of law, seem to have made their appearance, to have grown, and 
to have diversified during the sixth arid third centuries B.C. The 
period was characterized by the conflict between Confucianism's and 
Legalism's differing conception of government, the one espousing a 
belief in "government by men," the other trusting in "government by 
law." Because the Confucian school firmly believed that the people 
could be influenced through moral education exerted by someone at 
the top, ethics was the principal regulator of human conduct and 
virtue the chief requirement of the rulers.' In addition, the doctrine of 
1. E.g., Confucius said, "The people [are] like grass, the ruler like the wind, as 
the wind blows, so the grass will be inclined." THE ANALECTS OF CONFUCIUS, 
Book 12, ch. 19, at 168 (A. Waley trans. 1938). Mencius, the great Confucianist second 
only to Confucius, also said, "When the ruler is beneovolent, all will be benevolent, 
when the ruler is righteous, all will be righteous, when the ruler is correct, all will be 
correct," J. LEGGE, CHINESE CLASSICS II: 186 (1870). 
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the mandate of heaven2 and the right to rebellion3 all contributed to 
the emergence of the conception of "government by men," because the 
people were not bound to obey tyrants; that is, emperors' unwise 
behavior and bad fortune were taken as evidence that they had lost 
their celestial mandate to govern. Such principles called for a 
government of men rather than of laws. Legalists, on the other hand, 
denied that moral influence could determine the social order and 
could alone create order within the state. They strongly rejected any 
"government by men" principle, simply because it would be preca-
rious. What they wished to produce was a system of law before which 
all men were equal and through which proper social behavior would 
be inculcated by means of severe penal sanctions imposed by the state 
regardless of the person involved! 
2. This doctrine was said to have originated in the early Chou period (1000-771 
(B.C.)). As a border nation militarily dependent on the Shang state, Chou finally 
overthrew the latter and justified this conquest by invoking an elaborate doctrine in 
which the emperor retained his mandate from heaven by displaying virtue and the 
capacity to exercise a benign heaven's will. Once the emperor proved incapable of doing 
this, he would be responsible to heaven for the disturbance of the natural harmony. 
Consequently, the mandate would be withdrawn and might even be transferred to 
another. Heaven's will was made known by way of the saying: "Heaven looks 
accordingly as the people look and heaven listens accordingly as the people listen." 
This indicates that the "heavenly mandate" was not a family property to be inherited 
from one generation to another as was the general practice. It might become negated as 
soon as one's virtue waned. The saying also means that the virtue and the ability of the 
emperor were measured by the degree of satisfaction of the people under his rule. A 
letter by Kuang-we, founder of the Later Han dynasty, provides a better illustration of 
the impermanence of the heavenly mandate. Addressing King-sun Shu after having 
restored the throne which was usurped by Wan Mang from an infant sovereign of the 
Former Han dynasty, Kuang-we wrote that despite its recent restoration, the Han 
dynasty, like all its predecessors, would eventually come to an end since mandates of 
heaven are never meant to be permanent. F. HOUN, CHINESE POLITICAL 
TRADITION 8 (1965). 
3. The doctrine of the mandate of heaven obviously implied a right of rebellion. It 
was the last but effective resort of the populace against the tyrannical government. 
People justified their rebellion by claiming that heaven's mandate for the existing 
dynasty had been revoked. The success of their rebellion would thus legitimize the 
establishment of a new dynasty. We shall bear in mind that it is erroneous to say the 
right of revolution instead of rebellion. Centuries of authentic Chinese history have 
shown that when political disaffection developed it did not take the form of a demand 
that the system of government be drastically changed until 1911. In other words, the 
Chinese people were traditionally concerned only with the personal character of the 
rulers who held the reins of authority. Meadows, in his old but still valuable work, 
concluded that the Chinese are the least revolutionary and the most rebellious; see T. 
MEADOWS, THE CHINESE AND THEIR REBELLIONS 25 (1953). 
4. E.g., Han Fei Tzu said: "To put aside laws and to rely upon one's heart in 
governing would make it impossible even for Yao [the king in ancient time to whom 
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However, the concept of law employed by the Legalist differed 
from that of the West because the former had such a narrow view of 
human nature: in order to produce an effective system of law which 
was powerful enough to suppress feudal privilege at home and 
eliminate rival kingdoms abroad, only two motives needed to be 
reckoned with; namely, fear and profit. Thus, the Legalist's belief in 
the overriding importance of punishment and reward to ensure good 
government was inevitable.6 The idea of subjective human rights was 
totally unknown to these partisans of positive law, although they 
ardently advocated the equality of individuals before the law. 
Like many other reformers and great thinkers, Confucius was 
frequently ridiculed by people of his own day, and his lofty ideas were 
never given the opportunity to be put into practice. This may be due 
in large part to the constant warfare which many countries fought in 
order not only to preserve their own existence, but also to make 
themselves strong enough to subdue their neighbors. Society was 
disordered and the relationship between people and government was 
fragile. Under the circumstances, the moral ethics expounded by 
Confucianism were indeed unrealistic. Legalism doubtlessly was 
better suited to the needs of these rulers, for it required people to do 
everything to contribute to the strength of the state by clearly defined 
and impersonal commands and penalties. Hence, the Legalists held 
the advantage in the actual battles of that time. By adopting those 
dynamic and ruthlessly efficient programs designed by the Legalists, 
the Chin dynasty finally unified China. However, the excessive use of 
manpower to build the Great Wall and other magnificent buildings 
made the people intolerant. The infamous "burning of the books and 
Confucious attributed many virtues] to rectify a country." I W. LIAO, THE 
COMPLETE WORKS OF HAN FEI TSU 269 (1959). Also, the Lord of Shang said: 
"What I mean by the unification of punishments is that punishments should know no 
degree or grade, but that from ministers of state and generals down to great officers 
and ordinary folk, whosoever does not obey the king's commands, violates the 
interdicts of the state, or rebels against the statutes fixed by the ruler, should be guilty 
of death and should not be pardoned." J. DUYVENDARK, THE BOOK OF LORD 
SHANG 778-79 (1928). 
5. One leading contemporary philosopher, Fung Yu-lan, elaborated this by 
saying: 
In ruling the world, one must act in accordance with human nature. In human 
nature there are the feelings of liking and disliking, and hence rewards and 
punishment are effective. When rewards and punishment are effective, interdicts 
and commands can be established, and the way of government is complete. 
See Y. FUNG, A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY 162 (D. Bodde ed. 
1948). 
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burying of the scholars" in which Confucian classics were burned and 
scholars of the Confucian faith were buried alive led to a break with 
the intellectuals. Under the circumstances the Chin dynasty was 
short-lived and overthrown within twenty years by the Han dynasty. 
B. Confucianization of Law 
The failure of the Chin dynasty vastly enhanced the prestige of 
Confucian teaching. During the reign of Wu-ti, at the advice of Tung 
Chung-shu, Confucianism was exalted, to the denigration of other 
schools of thought. It is said that from that time until 1911 Chinese 
political and legal thought was dominated by Confucianism.6 This 
statement is based more on appearance than on fact. The Confucian-
ism which now became the accepted orthodoxy was subtly trans-
formed somehwat into an amalgam which included substantial parts 
of Legalism. Institutions of law and organizations with which 
Legalism was identified survived into the next Han dynasty and 
thereafter, in an exceptional symbiosis with those belonging to the 
classical Confucian order. This might be the result of the Confucian-
ists' realization of the necessity and advantages of the administrative 
machinery established by the Chin dynasty for the actual conduct of 
public affairs. This Chin structure was vital to the maintenance of a 
centralized government. 
The survival of the Legalist structures and laws also occurred 
because legal sanctions were never rejected totally by the Confucian-
ists from the very beginning; they only objected to replacing moral 
influence by punishment. Mencius succinctly pointed out, "Virtue 
alone is not sufficient for the exercise of government, laws alone 
cannot carry themselves into practice."7 As time passed, the sup-
plementary function of punishment was increasingly emphasized by 
the Han Confucianists. Wang Tu was quoted as saying, "When law 
and order are operating, there will be good government; when law 
and order are by-passed, the nation will be in disorder."8 Practically 
speaking, some economic policies adopted by the government such as 
"governmental monopolies of salt, iron and other products, or 
6. The other reasons contributing to the long dominance of Confucianism in 
Chinese political arena are that it was most conducive to the maintenance of 
monarchical institution; that the right of rebellion was used only as a last resort; that 
the works of Confucius were employed as subjects of ancient historical, political, and 
moral essays in the competitive civil service examination, etc. For a more detailed 
study, see P. HSIEH, THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA (1644-1911), at 12-15 (1923). 
7. LEGGE, supra note 1, at II: 65. 
8. T. CH'U, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRADITIONAL CHINA 272-73 (1961). 
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ever-normal granary, various government efforts to equalize private 
holdings of land, all probably owed as much or more to Legalism than 
they did to early Confucianism."9 Even the civil service examination, 
which has traditionally been thought to be a peculiarly Confucian 
institution, was challenged as a Legalist invention.10 
Fully recognizing the value of Legalism, the Confucianists in the 
Han dynasty and thereafter worked out a legal system in which the 
polarity of law and morality was embodied in the same code. The 
result was a legalization of morality or the Confucianization of law .11 
In other words, these Confucianists adopted from Confucianism the 
substance of moral duties, while from the Legalists they adopted the 
procedure of enforcing those duties. This process began during the 
Han period and gradually matured in the Tang dynasty (618-916 
A.D.), whose code is clearly and succinctly expressed: 
Virtue and morals are the foundation of government and 
education, while law and punishments are the operative agencies 
of government and education. Both the former and the latter are 
necessary complements to each other, just as it takes morning 
and evening to form a whole day, and spring and autumn to form 
the whole year.'2 
The natural consequence of such synthesis is that moral duties 
are ipso facto legal duties in the sense that the law sanctions them by 
penalizing their breaches. Whatever is immoral is not only illegal but 
a criminal offense. 13 
Under the dominance of such ideology, civil law could hardly 
have evolved in traditional China. Even a debtor who failed to 
discharge his obligations was made punishable with flogging in 
addition to being compelled to pay the full amount owed. Therefore, 
not until recently can the Chinese be said to have developed any 
9. D. BOD DE & C. MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA 28 <1967!. 
10. Creel, The Meaning of Hsing Ming and the Fa-Chia: 'Legalists' or Administra-
tors'?, 4 BULL. INST. HIST. & PHILOLOGY 607-36 <196ll. 
11. See CH'H, supra note 8, at 267-78. 
12. Vol: 1 Chap. 1 at lla. For English translation see THE TANG CODE 54 (W. 
Johnson trans. 1979). 
13. A catchall of Confucian moralism provides: "Whoever does anything which he 
ought not to have done is punishable with 40 blows light flogging; and when the 
impropriety is of a serious nature, 80 blows heavy flogging." Vol: 10, art. 450. 
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considerable body of civil, as distinguished from criminal, law. 1• The 
code in each dynasty, without exception, dealt exclusively with 
questions of criminal and administrative law; questions of family, 
succession, and other areas of private law were mentioned only in 
connection with criminal or administrative law. 15 This marked a 
sharp contrast to the development of law in Europe, where the great 
compilations of Roman jurisprudence were concerned primarily with 
the institutions of private law. 
In this connection, it is helpful to give a brief historical 
development of Chinese written codes. Leaving aside the studies on 
the semi-historical period and the legal reference in the Book of 
History, important as these are to the historian, we come to firm 
ground in the period of the "Warring Kingdom," which was also 
characterized as a period of competition for a variety of philosophies 
like that mentioned above, with the publication of the Code of Six 
Chapters edited by Li Kwei of the state of Wei. The Six Chapters 
dealt respectively with (1) theft, (2) brigandage, (3) imprisonment, (4) 
procedure, (5) various enactments, and (6) definitions. From this time 
forward those elements that were to make up the traditional 
composition of the various dynastic codes began to appear. The Han 
dynasty added three chapters to the existing code, dealing respective-
ly with murder, mortal wounding, and a different type of theft. After 
the Han, only a few dynasties added notably to the volume and 
quality of the legal literature of China. During the Tang dynasty, a 
very comprehensive and, at least according to the ancient standard, 
quite systematic code was enacted.16 Since the older codes had been 
lost save for chapter headings or fragments, the Tang Code was the 
14. This can be substantiated by the finding of one of the best known Sinologists, 
E. H. Parker: "In the whole history of China, I have not come across a single case of 
civil jurisprudence in the strict sense, i.e., where any abstract rights between 
individuals have been thrashed out with considerations touching relevancy of evidence, 
damage to character, equitable set-off, nice definitions in contract, and so on." E. 
PARKER, CHINA: HER HISTORY, DIPLOMACY AND COMMERCE 327 !1917>. 
15. However, the district magistrate did dispose of civil cases arising from the 
failure of mediation, and the financial commissioner of the provincial government as 
well as the Board of Revenue at the national capital handled the appeal cases. As civil 
cases generally never reached the highest court and thus could not be found in the 
usual compilation of cases, not a few scholars have had the misconception of the 
non-existence of civil cases in the Chinese courts. See Buxbaum, Some Aspects of Civil 
Procedure and Practice at the Trial Level in Tanshui and Hsinchu from 1789-1895, 30 
J. ASIAN STUD. 255, 262-63 <1970l. 
16. It is important to note here that Wallace Johnson recently completed a 
translation of the general principles of the Tang Code, which is a major contribution to 
the study of Chinese legal history. See Johnson, supra note 12. 
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first in which the full text was preserved. The high quality of the 
Tang Code made it a worthy model for all the codes of the succeeding 
dynasties; in fact, the series of these codes was said indeed to present 
a remarkable continuity of provisions. 17 In addition, the Tang Code 
had great influence even beyond the confines of China; Japan 
borrowed it as the very model for her "Ta Pao Code." The most recent 
and the last code of imperial China that is also marked by its 
exhaustive substance and systematic form is the Code of the Ching 
dynasty, also known as Ta Ching Lu Li.18 
Since the ministers entrusted with the task of drawing upon 
codes of law in the various dynasties were all scholars well versed in 
the Confucian classics as a result of the civil service examination, 
these ministers consciously or unconsciously seized the opportunity to 
17. D. BODDE & C. MORRIS, supra note 9, at 59; see also J. ESCARRA, 
CHINESE LAW AND COMPARATIVE JURISPRUDENCE 16 (1926l; Cheng, Frag-
ments of Chinese Law Ancient and Modem, 1 CHINESE CULTURE 1:1, 7 (1958). 
Contra, a highly qualified Chinese author, Hsieh Yun-sheng, a former President of the 
Board of Punishments who devoted a life-long study to problems of Chinese law, 
declared that there is a considerable difference between the Tang and the Ming 
(1364-1644 A.D.) codes, the latter having undergone the influence of the law during 
Mongol times (1271-1368 A.D.); see Y. HSIEH, TANG MING LU HO PIEN (The 
Combined Compilation of the Tang and Ming Codes) 2a (1922). For a detailed study of 
legal adjustments in Yuan dynasty; seeP. CH'EN, CHINESE LEGAL TRADITION 
UNDER THE MONGOLS (1979). 
18. Sir George Staunton in his introduction to the translation of the Ta Ching Lu 
Li observed: 
By far the most remarkable thing in this code is its great reasonableness, clearness 
and consistency, the business-like brevity and directness of its provisions, and the 
plainness and moderation in which they are expressed. There is nothing here of the 
monstrous verbiage of most other Asiatic productions, none of the superstitious 
deliberation, and the miserable incoherence, the tremendous non sequiturs and 
eternal repetitions of those oracular performance . . . nothing even of the turgid 
adulation, accumulated epithets and fatiguing self-praise of other Eastern 
despotisms . . . but a calm concise and distinct series of enactments, savouring 
throughout of practical judgment and European good sense, and if not always 
comformable to our improved notions of expediency, in general approaching to 
them more nearly than the codes of other nations . . . for the repression of disorder 
and the gentle coercion of a vast population, it is equally mild and efficacious. 
Cheng, supra note 17, at 7. It was also translated into French by Renouard de 
Sainte-Croix in 1812 and an Italian version was published about the same time. 
Another edition dated 1890 has been extensively translated into French, with 
commentaries, notes and appendices by Father Gui Bonlais; see Cheng, The Develop-
ment and Reform of Chinese Law, 1 CURRENT LEGAL PROB. 170, 173 (1948l. An 
excellent analysis of the Code in its own terms has been done by William Jones in 
Studying the Ch'ing Code - The Ta Ch'ing Lu li, 22 AM. J. COMP. L. 330 (1974). 
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incorporate as many of the moral ideas and concepts of Li into the 
codes as possible. 19 Aside from the work of codification, officials from 
the lowest magistrates, who were also the local chief executive, to 
various higher authorities in the government hierarchy were inclined 
to dispense justice in Confucian terms, because they were also the 
successful candidates in the competitive civil service examination. 
Furthermore, where the law was silent or where there was no 
provision of law applicable to a particular suit, the judge often turned 
to Confucian doctrines for guidance. Tung Chung-shu gained promin-
ence in this area by invoking the principles set down in the Chun 
Chiu, the Confucian classic in which Confucius exalted some of the 
great ethical principles as cardinal rules for regulating human 
relations. His work "Chun Chiu Chueh Yu" (Judging Cases by Chun 
Chiu) included 232 cases, and he was frequently consulted even after 
his retirement.20 Another Confucianist in Later Han, Ying Shao, 
wrote a book entitled "Chun Chiu Tuan Yu" on the same subject. 
Besides these two, there were many others who used the same 
principles in rendering judgment. 21 
The most important charcteristics of traditional Chinese law are 
to be found in the concept of family and in the system of social 
hierarchy. In China, the family, not the individual, constitutes the 
19. The definition of the word "Li" varies and is difficult to translate. Literally, it 
may be translated as "ceremonies", "rites", "etiquette", or "a code of behavior". 
However, this magic word means much more to the Chinese. Indeed, it covers the whole 
scope of proper human behavior in family, social, economic, and official dealings. 
According to Needham, a veteran in Chinese history, Li meaning customs of the society 
based on ethics or on ancient taboos, includes in addition all kinds of ceremonial and 
sacrificial observances. See II J. NEEDHAM, SCIENCE AND CIVILIZATION IN 
CHINA 519 (1969). In the definition offered by a Chinese student, Leonard Hsii, the 
essential element in Li is the exercise of reason and judgment. He further breaks Li 
down into three aspects: first, an ordering of society in which each individual knows his 
rights and duties so that obedience to the natural order will naturally ensue; second, a 
code of morality which, being based on human nature, operates not by external control 
but through individual conscience; third, Li provides an ideal of social harmony, 
emphasizing the individual's obligation to society; L. SHU, THE POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY OF CONFUCIANISM 93-99 (1932). Thus, Li embodies an ethical 
content. As the English language seems incapable of supplying a term which can 
express the full meaning of Li, it is interesting to note the late Dr. Hu Shih, a 
prominent modern Chinese philosopher, has translated Li into a German term 
Sittlichkeit, the concept of ethics of Kantian and Hegelian philosophy. See Michael, The 
Role of Law in Tradition, Nationalist, and Communist China, 9 CHINA Q. 124, 127 
<1962). 
20. Ch'U, supra note 8, at 276. 
21. /d. 
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unit of the social and the political community and serves as a model 
by which the state is governed. Just as the highest duties inculcated 
by the moralists are those owing to parents and elders, so the 
strictest obligations of the law are attached to these relationships. 
Such considerations of relationships could have either a mitigating or 
an aggravating influence in regard to penalties. Although space does 
not permit the citation of all the interesting examples in which the 
presence of a certain relationship would increase or decrease the 
penalty, several of them should give a fair understanding of this 
characteristic. 
A relationship had a mitigating influence whenever the rigor of 
the law was softened to meet the requirement of justice, that is, the 
harmony of the universe. It could, for instance, save the life of a 
convicted murderer whose parent or grandparent was old, or 
disabled, when he himself was the sole able-bodied member in the 
family. In this instance, serving his parents and continuing the 
family were more important than punishing the offender. In addition, 
those offenders under the age of 15 and above 70, as well as the 
partially disabled, were entitled to redemption when sentenced to any 
punishment not greater than banishment. Offenders under the age of 
7 or above 90 were not punishable at all, even for crimes worthy of 
death.22 
A punishment was made more severe when, within a family, the 
offender was of a junior generation. The most severe punishment 
doubtless was imposed upon patricide. The Ching Code provided that 
"any person convicted of a design to kill his or her father or mother, 
grandfather or grandmother, whether on the father's or mother's side 
. . . shall . . . suffer decapitation."23 In contrast to this terrible 
punishment is that inflicted upon a father who kills a son, which is 
only 70 blows and banishment for a year and a half. Between these 
two extremes the punishment varied, depending upon the degree of 
the relationship between the parties, and upon whether the crime 
was committed by the older or the younger relative. 
Moreover, Confucianism placed a strong emphasis on filial piety, 
even at the expense of public interest. Thus, we have the following: 
The Duke of Sheh informed Confucius, saying "Among us here 
there are those who may be styled upright in their conduct. If 
22. For a more detailed discussion, see Gen, Some Characteristics of the Ancient 
Chinese Law, 48 ASIATIC REV. 156, 159 C1952l. 
23. ~CCLXXIV, in SIR G. STAUNTON, TA TSING !CHING! LEU CLU> LEE CLI>, 
at 305. 
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their fathers have stolen a sheep, they will bear witness to the 
fact." Confucius said, "Among us, in our part of the country, 
those who are upright are different from this. The father conceals 
the misconduct of the son, and the son conceals the misconduct of 
the father. Uprightness is to be found in this."24 
This can be further illustrated by the fact that only in the gravest 
matters, such as treason, could a son or daughter denounce a parent 
to the magistrate. Any attempt by a child to invoke the protection of 
the state against parental ill-treatment was itself an enormous crime 
and was punishable by death. In order to protect the solidarity of the 
family, the law went further in providing allowances for the natural 
disposition of family members to shield each other from the 
consequence of a crime except in cases of rebellion or joining the 
emperor's enemy, where failure to give information, whether between 
father and son or between brothers, was grounds for heavy 
punishment. 25 
24. CONFUCIUS Book XVIII, ch. 18. Another well-known statement by Mencius 
is also worth quoting in full: 
Tao Ying asked Mencius, saying "Shun being emperor, and Kao-yao chief minister 
of justice, if Ku-son (Shun's father) had murdered a man, what would have been 
done in the case?" Mencius said, "Kao-yao would simply have apprehended him." 
"But would not Shun have forbidden such a thing?" "Indeed, how could Shun have 
forbidden it? Kao-yao had received the law from a proper source." "In that case 
what would Shun have done?" "Sun would have regarded abandoning the empire 
as throwing away a worn out sandal. He would privately have taken his father on 
his back, and retired into concealment, living somewhere along the seacoast. There 
he would have been all his life, cheerful and happy, forgetting the empire." 
See MENCIUS, Book VII, ch. 35. 
25. A typical provision in this respect can be found in ll XXXII of the Ta Ching Lu 
Li in STAUNTON, supra note 18, at 34-35, which provided: 
All relations connected in the first and second degree and living under the same 
roof, maternal grand-parents and their grandchildren, fathers and mothers-in-law, 
sons and daughters-in-law, grandchildren's wives, when mutually assisting each 
other, and concealing the offences, one of another, and moreover, slaves and hired 
servants assisting their masters and concealing their offences, shall not, in any 
such cases, be punishable for so doing. 
In like manner, though they should inform their relations of the measures adopted 
for their apprehension, and enable them to conceal themselves, and finally to effect 
their escape, they shall still be held innocent. 
When relations in the third and fourth degrees assist and protect each other from 
punishment in the manner here described, they shall for such conduct be liable to 
punishment, but only in a proportion of three degrees less than would have been 
inflicted on strangers under the same circumstances. 
The same offences committed by relations in still more remote degrees of kindred, 
shall be punished with one degree less of the extent of the punishment inflicted in 
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The same purpose appears in the enactment regarding larceny. 
Every member of the family was regarded as having a qualified 
interest in the property of each other, the interest being greater the 
nearer the kinship. The law therefore provided that "all persons 
found guilty of stealing from a relation by blood or by marriage, in 
the first degree, shall suffer a punishment five degrees less severe 
than that which is legally inflicted in ordinary cases of theft in the 
same amount. In like manner all persons found guilty of stealing 
from relations in the second degree shall suffer punishment four 
degrees less severe than that ordinarily inflicted; from relations in 
the third degree, three degrees less severe."26 
The correlative of the provisions just quoted was a system ofjoint 
responsibility, in which members of the family were made mutually 
responsible for each other's conduct. As the scope of implication 
might be extended through generations, the severity of this prin-
ciple was unprecedented. It was even said that the members of 
the offenders' concubines' families were involved and sentenced to 
death.27 Fortunately, this law was limited to offences involving the 
state and the public; injuries to persons or to the property of an 
individual were not included. 
Another inequality within relationships in the family was the 
inferior status shared by women. For example, the Ta Ching Lu Li 
provided that: 
If a principal or first wife is guilty of striking her husband, she 
shall be liable to the punishment of 100 blows; and the husband, 
if he desires thereof, may obtain a divorce by making application 
for the same to the magistrate of the district. If any such wife 
strikes for as to wound her husband, she shall be punished by 
three degrees more severely than in the case of striking in the 
same manner an equal in ordinary cases. 26 
ordinary cases .... Nevertheless, none of provisions of this law in mitigation or 
remission of the punishment of harbouring, concealing, and assisting relations, 
shall be pleaded, or have any effect, in cases of high treason or rebellion. 
26. §CCLXXII, see id., at 287. 
27. Such was the case of Shun-yu Chang, whose six concubines had been 
remarried after he was arrested and before he was sentenced to death, but whose 
concubines' families were eventually sentenced to death regardless of some officials' 
protest against it; see Cheng, The Chinese Theory of Criminal Law, 39 J. CRIM. L. 461, 
467 (1948). 
28. §CCCXV, in STAUNTON, supra note 18, at 341. 
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On the other hand, it was no crime for a husband to strike his wife.29 
Nevertheless, Chinese women were less liable to prosecution and 
punishment. Except for adultery and crimes worthy of death, there 
was no imprisonment for women. In addition, women were entitled to 
send their sons, younger brothers or nephews as their representatives 
to the court, and they sometimes could even thus be punished. 
Beyond the family, different social status also significantly 
determined the amount of punishment, particularly in cases involv-
ing special privileged groups which includes those who qualified 
under the "eight conditions for consideration." These were (1) 
imperial clansmen, relatives of the emperor or empress, (2) old 
faithful officials of the government who saw the emperor often, (3) 
those who had rendered service to the government on the battlefield, 
(4) great learned scholars, (5) the very able employees of the gov-
ernment, civil or military, (6) the diligent and dutiful employees of 
the government, (7) any official, either civil or military of at least the 
third rank, and (8) guests of the state. The most significant privilege 
granted to these groups was that they could not be investigated, 
arrested, or tortured without the permission of the emperor; the 
sentences of those found guilty of an offense were subjected to 
consideration and approval by the emperor with a view to possible 
reduction. Even after a sentence was imposed, it was still possible for 
officials to avoid actual punishment. For example, the giving up of an 
official post would cancel out a punishment of three years 
imprisonment. 30 
During litigation in court the official was further granted the 
legal privilege of declining to appear before the court with the 
opposing party, if the latter was a commoner. However, since officials 
were required by Confucian morality to set a moral example to those 
beneath them, for certain offenses they were exposed to heavier 
punishments than those prescribed for the ordinary man. An official 
who debauched a woman living within his jurisdiction would receive 
a !'Unishment two degrees greater than the normal punishment for 
his offense.31 
29. "A husband shall not be punished for striking his first wife, unless the blow 
produces a·cutting wound; in which cases, complaint having been made by the wife to a 
magistrate, punishment shall be awarded two degrees less than in ordinary cases 
between equals." Id. at 342. 
30. CH'U, supra note 8, at 181. 
31. D. BODDE & C. MORRIS, supra note 9, at 35. For a more detailed account of 
this special Chinese system, see CH'U, id at 177-84. 
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C. Administration of Justice 
The code was implemented and enforced primarily by the county 
(hsien) magistrate, who was the emperor's all-purpose surrogate in 
dealing with the people at large. Since all cases, civil as well as 
criminal, were to be decided by him in the first instance,32 and since 
he was also required to conduct investigations and to detect crimes in 
addition to hearing cases and rendering decisions, he could exercise 
awesome punitive powers. In short, he acted as detective, prosecutor, 
coroner, judge, and jury. 
As the judicial system was not separated from the executive 
branch of government in traditional China, the magistrates had to 
perform a variety of administrative functions in addition to the 
administration of justice. Those included tax collection, maintenance 
of social order, education, social welfare, granaries, and supervision of 
local public work. Hence, magistrates were not primarily legal 
officers, but administrative officers of the government. Besides, they 
were among the lucky ones who had passed the civil service 
examination, with its emphasis on the Confucian classics; conse-
quently they lacked the necessary legal knowledge and training, as Li 
was put above Fa, which amounts to law, during their education 
process. Under the circumstances, they had to rely exclusively upon 
their clerks and secretaries for the administration of justice. Those 
secretaries of law were extremely skillful in sifting and weighing 
evidence and in applying the law to the case in hand. Their work 
included endorsing or rejecting a complaint, arranging dates of 
hearings, providing legal advice, and writing legal reports on serious 
cases to the superior officials who supervised the district.33 However, 
they were unable to attend trials, and this no doubt constituted an 
obstacle to the efficient handling of legal cases.34 
32. There was no time limitation on criminal cases; they could be reported to a 
magistrate at any time. The acceptance of civil complaints, however, had been 
restricted to only six or nine days of each month except during the "busy season for 
farmers," that is, from the first day of the fourth month to the thirtieth day of the 
seventh month; see T. CH'U, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN CHINA UNDER THE 
CH'ING 118 (1962l. 
33. For an account of their work, see id., at 98-101. 
34. This is because those legal secretaries were not part of the formal administra-
tive system; their salaries came from the private purse of the magistrate and they were 
the latter's personal employees. Another interesting point is that since there was no 
formal legal education, a legal secretary always had some pupils with him. In the 
course of time these were recommended for employment to magistrates in want of 
secretaries. As a result, they were usually from the Chekiang province, and, further, 
from the Shaoshingfu !Shaoshing County). 
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Several characteristics about the manner of conducting trials in 
traditional China must be mentioned here. First, the employment of 
torture to obtain confession was a necessary part of the penal system, 
particularly since a magistrate was not permitted to pass sentence 
unless the prisoner confessed guilt.35 Accordingly, unless the case was 
to be abandoned, the accused had to be confined and tortured until he 
or she broke down and made a clean breast of things by telling all of 
his or her misdeeds and by giving the names of all who were 
associated with him or her. Needless to say, the innocent were not 
protected by this system. The modes of torture were numerous and 
very severe. Still, according to the Penal Code of the Tang dynasty, 
torture could not be employed except in a case where there was 
sufficient and plain evidence against the offender; it was confined to 
beating with the stick, and limited to no more than three occasions, 
totaling no more than 200 blows altogether.36 In addition, all 
instruments of torture had to accord with standard sizes and forms. 
They had to be examined and branded by the superior administrative 
agency. Some privileged groups such as persons entitled to the "eight 
considerations," the aged, juveniles and the disabled, were also 
exempted from torture. 
Second, the concept of justice in traditional China was very 
different from the popular ideas of court proceedings in Western 
lands. Instead of assuming innocence as a basis, the defendant was 
presumed to be guilty.37 Not only did the magistrate himself have to 
conduct the examination, questioning and cross-examining the 
defendant in order to extract the truth, but also no lawyer was in 
court to consult and assist the defendant. As a result of the elevation 
of the Confucianist concept of Li over the Legalist emphasis of Fa, it 
is understandable that the attitude of the people toward the practice 
of law as an honorable profession had never been encouraged. In fact, 
those who provided legal advice, which could only be provided 
secretly, were generally men of bad reputation. The Ta Ching Lu Li 
expressly provided that those who incited others to undertake 
litigation or made profit out of managing a lawsuit would be 
penalized.38 This restriction severely impeded the technical develop-
ment of law in China. 
35. This system was said to have originated in the notorious Chin dynasty where 
Legalism dominated the then-prevailing political ideology. 
36. Gen, Some characteristics of the Ancient Chinese Law- II, 48 ASIATIC REV., 
233, 239 (1952). 
37. Contra, Buxbaum, supra note 15, at 269-70. 
38. See S. SPRENKEL, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN MANCHU CHINA 66, 69 
(1962). 
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Third, the most peculiar aspect of the traditional legal system 
was the comprehensiveness of its appeal system, which automatically 
took all but a few cases to higher levels of litigation for final 
judgment. To be more specific, the magistrate was only authorized to 
pronounce sentence in civil and minor criminal cases where punish-
ment was no more severe than beating or imposing the cangue. Even 
so, he had to make monthly reports to his superior on the details of 
cases. For those serious cases that called for penal servitude, the 
magistrate had to report to the superior officer, who might approve 
the former's recommended sentences. Cases involving a sentence of, 
exile, banishment, or penal servitude as a penalty for homicide were 
retried by the superior officers and were reported to another higher 
agency. Most importantly, all capital offences were sentenced by the 
emperor himself, after discussion with a committee of leading 
mandarins from several governmental bodies, including the Board of 
Punishment. This Board was one of the six regular departments of 
the government.39 Thus, a case, without any action of either party, 
might undergo a certain number of retrials to reach final judgment by 
the authorized superior, whose level was specified according to the 
grade of punishment.40 
On the other hand, a person was generally free to take an appeal 
to the superior if he was dissatisfied with the judgment of the lower 
courts. Such an appeal was nothing more than a petition asking for 
the superior's supervision of his inferior. 
D. Preference for Mediation 
We should bear in mind that the maintenance of social order and 
the settlement of troubles in the social life of traditional Chinese 
society did not wholly or even in the main depend upon the 
governmental administration of justice. A kind of justice adminis-
tered in an informal manner by autonomous organizations of the 
people, such as family, clans, villages, guilds, etc., was, in fact, far 
more effectively and extensively employed by the people. As men-
tioned above, according to the dominant Confucianist ideology, law 
was considered useful only when it served as an instrument for the 
39. Hudson even concluded, "What seems to have struck the sixteenth century 
observers as most remarkable in the operation of the Chinese law was the system of 
reviewing cases in which a death sentence had been pronounced." G. HUDSON, 
EUROPE AND CHINA 241 t193U. 
40. For a fairly detailed account of this system, see CH'U, supra note 32, at 
116-18; SPRENKEL, supra note 38, at 67-68. 
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legislation of morality. Its existence was but a necessary evil. Because 
law had never been freed from its dependence on morality, Chinese 
traditional values emphasized not the rights which are an inevitable 
development of the laws themselves, but the duties of the individual. 
Once individuals were familiar with their rights, they were inclined 
to assert them and thus caused disputes. The very existence of a trial 
was a scandalous disturbance of the natural order which might lead 
to a further disturbance of the social order to the detriment of all 
society. Any sort of trial was thus condemned, because it was a sign of 
troubled relationships between individuals. The mere act of appealing 
to a magistrate, even when the appeal was justified, was enough to 
have a man branded a troublemaker. Therefore, some middle road 
had to be sought which took into consideration the interests of both 
parties when interests conflicted. 
In other words, it was better for those who felt they had been 
wronged to "suffer a little and smooth the matter over rather than 
make a fuss over it and create further dissension."41 Specifically, if 
one stood in the right, it was recommended that he "be merciful to the 
offending party and set an example of the kind of cooperation that 
fostered group solidarity rather than exact one's pound of flesh and 
further alienate the offender from the group."42 This philosophy is in 
marked contrast to the western legal procedure which tends to 
depersonalize claims in order to bring out more sharply the question 
at issue. The Chinese system, on the other hand, tries to personalize 
all claims, seeing them in the context of human relationships. 
Under the circumstances, it is not surprising to find that there 
were many social groups (families, clans, villages, guilds and 
associations) available to intervene and act as arbitrators or 
mediators.43 For difficulties within the family the head of the family 
acted as a conciliator or mediator; sometimes, more remote relatives 
or even outsiders who were highly respected were sought. The 
standards applied by these mediators seeking compromise came from 
41. Cohen, Chinese Mediation on the Eve of Modernization, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 
1201, 1207 (1966). 
42. /d.; as John Wigmore has written: "The 'struggle for rights,' which the great 
German jurist, von Ihering, inculcated as the basis of civil law and order, is alien to 
Chinese thought. An unyielding insistence upon principle, and a rigid demand for one's 
due, are almost as reprehensible as a vulgar physical struggle." See J. WIGMORE, A 
PANORAMA OF THE WORLD'S LEGAL SYSTEM 141, 150 (1936l; see also 
SPRENKEL, supra note 38, at 114-15. 
43. The preference for settlement of disputes in a private, rather than public 
institution, of course, contributed to the scanty development of the civil law. 
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the rules of behavior or the Li, the practices of their area, and from 
the mediators' own experience and knowledge of the world. The 
prestige of the mediator was often sufficient to bring considerable 
social and moral pressure upon the parties and to succeed finally in 
obtaining an agreement. Similar procedures applied where the 
parties were not related to each other but belonged to the same clans, 
lived in the same villages, or were members of the same guild; here 
the elders of the clan, seniors of the guild or other persons of the local 
elite were invited to act as mediators.•• The parties in these civil and 
minor criminal cases45 could take their cases to the official courts, but 
it was normal for them to try mediation first. As a matter of fact they 
had to try mediation if they were to avoid social censure. In most 
cases the members of the clans and guilds were specifically prohibited 
by each group's internal regulations from seeking official help 
directly!6 Therefore, even though Tokugawa Japan (1603-1868), 
which expressly provided that civil cases must be mediated first 
before resorting to the courts;7 literally differed from the traditional 
Chinese legislation, which did not require extrajudicial mediation as 
a compulsory first step in the process of resolution of disputes, in the 
actual context of Chinese life there was not much difference between 
China and Japan. 
The most crucial problem generated by extrajudicial mediation 
was that since both parties were automatically under pressure to put 
an end to a dispute, the agreement finally reached was often not a 
real settlement. "The disagreement was merely driven below the 
surface and went on simmering, and the situation was ripe for 
explosion or provocation."48 Although it occurs in formal judicial 
procedures, perhaps even in most civilized countries, that wealthy, 
powerful individuals or families have preponderant advantages in 
44. For a more detailed description of mediation, see C. CHANG, THE CHINESE 
GENTRY 63 (1955J; H. HU, THE COMMON DESCENT GROUP IN CHINA AND ITS 
FUNCTIONS 17 (1948); M. YANG, A CHINESE VILLAGE 165 <1945); SPRENKEL, 
supra note 38, at 116; Cohne, supra note 41, at 1215-22; Luhman, Mao and Mediation: 
Politics and Disputes Resolution in Communist China, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1284-1300 
(1967). 
45. For those cases involving serious violence such as arson, kidnapping and the 
like, mediation was less frequent because the local leaders often took seriously their 
duty to report to the magistrate; see K. HSIAO, RURAL CHINA 292 (1960). 
46. On the clans, see H. LIU, THE TRADITIONAL CHINESE CLAN RULES 
156-58 (1959J; on the guilds, see SPRENKEL. supra note 38, at 89-96. 
47. D. HENDERSON, CONCILIATION AND JAPANESE LAW, TOKUGAWA 
AND MODERN 128-29 (1965). 
48. SPRENKEL, supra note 38, at 119-20. 
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settling disputes, this was more obvious in the local mediation 
process. Futhermore, it was possible for mediators to stir up disputes 
in order to profit from mediation. In addition, for those who were not 
satisfied with the results of mediation and who felt they had a 
legitimate right but were turned down by extrajudicial institutions, 
the possibility of challenging mediation in court was rather slim. Not 
only was the magistrate often ready to accept the view of those local 
institutions, but those seeking to challenge the results of mediation 
would be ruthlessly castigated by the public. 
On the other hand, the advantages of mediation were numerous. 
Most of all, it avoided the time and expense of formal legal suits. 
Private problems did not have to be revealed in public. Since the 
parties, both defendant and plaintiff, were often incarcerated and 
might have further suffered prescribed torture pending the trial, 
there is no doubt that the mediation process was literally a more 
comfortable one. The persons who presided over the mepiation were 
generally most familiar with the facts of the case, and inhabitants 
would usually be more receptive to decisions by others from their 
locality. There were also practical considerations. In a country as 
large as China where transportation was badly in need of improve-
ment, the time and expense for parties traveling to the court seat and 
staying there constituted an almost insurmountable problem for 
those who did not live nearby. Extrajudicial institutions also relieved 
the burden of the government so that it might thus devote more time 
and energy to other, more important works. In the seventeenth 
century one of the Chinese rulers, the Emperor Kang Hsi, went so far 
as to declare: 
lawsuits would tend to increase to a frightful amount, if people 
were not afraid of the tribunals, and if they felt confident of 
always finding in them ready and perfect justice. As man is apt to 
delude himself concerning his own interests, contests would then 
be interminable, and the half of the Empire would not suffice to 
settle the lawsuits of the other half. I desire therefore that those 
who have recourse to the tribunals should be treated without any 
pity, and in such a manner that they shall be disgusted with law, 
and tremble to appear before a magistrate!9 
49. ld., at 77. 
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Accordingly, it was not unusual for the magistrate to order would-be 
litigants to return to their villages to have the matter settled first by 
local mediation. 50 
E. Legal Reform in the Mainland 
Despite its great tradition, Chinese law gradually displayed its 
weakness in the 19th century after dealing with western countries. 
As most civil matters were regulated by ethical custom rather than 
formal law, the scarcity of civil provisions and a near absence of 
commercial law in the traditional codes made Chinese law incompati-
ble with the needs of a modern society. The highly developed doctrine 
of responsibility, which held relatives, neighbors, superiors, or even 
all the members of a particular nationality liable for an offence 
committed by an individual wrongdoer who had fled was a system 
which foreigners found simply unacceptable. In addition, the frequent 
use of the death penalty and of judicial torture, not only upon the 
accused, but also upon witnesses, was also found to be repugnant. 
Foreigners alleged that the gradations of punishment, including 
decapitation and mutilation of an offender,51 were too severe. 
This unsympathetic attitude toward Chinese jurisprudence, 
however, emerged only after the European countries had undergone a 
social and political revolution in the eighteenth century which made 
their criminal codes less severe and more humane in the administra-
tion of justice than those of the Celestial Empire. Before that, the 
dispensation of justice under the Chinese system compared favorably 
with other systems in its methods and results, as did many other 
features of Chinese institutional and cultural life.52 William Blake 
Odgers once described the severity of English law as follows: 
In the year 1820 there were more than two hundred crimes 
punishable with death, of these more than two thirds had 
50. CH'U, supra note 32, at 175, n.51. 
51. For a fuller discussion, see 1 G. KEETON, EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY IN 
CHINA 96-136 (1928). 
52. As early as 850 A.D. an Arab traveler said that the Chinese "administer 
justice with great strictness in all their tribunals"; see WIGMORE, supra note 42, at 
154-55. Despite the fact that he was held captive in China, Galeoti Pereyra 
emphatically asserted that justice is done in China and held it to be one of the best 
governed countries in the world; Peake, Recent Studies on Chinese Law, 52 POL. SCI. 
Q. 117' 119 (1937). 
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been made capital during the eighteenth century. Sir Samuel 
Rominlly asserted that there was no other country in the world 
where so many and so large a variety of actions were punishable 
by loss of life. Nearly all felonies were capital. If a man falsely 
pretended to be a Greenwich Pension he was hanged. If he 
injured a county bridge or cut down a young tree, he was_ hanged . 
. . . If he stole property valued at five shillings ... he was 
hanged. . . . And these barbarous laws were relentlessly carried 
into execution. A boy only ten years old was sentenced to death in 
1816.53 
One is thus justified in concluding: "In the beginning of Western 
intercourse with China, Chinese codes were less severe than those of 
Europe."54 
Realizing its inability to resist the advancement of western 
powers, China was forced to grant extraterritorial rights, the excuse 
being that Chinese law and its legal system were primitive. The 
earliest grant of such rights by China was contained in the 
supplemental treaty of July 1843 with Great Britain.55 At first, the 
exercise of extraterritorial rights by the Western powers in China 
might not have been regarded by the Chinese as abhorrent. Because 
her tradition was to avoid any contact with foreigners, granting 
extraterritorial rights was the corollary of her acquiescence in the 
, settlement of disputes among foreigners. 56 Some western scholars 
53. W. ODGERS, A COUNTRY OF LAW REFORM: CHANGES IN THE 
COMMON LAW AND THE LAW OF PERSONS IN LEGAL PROFESSION AND IN 
LEGAL EDUCATION 7 (1901). 
54. Wing Mah, Foreign Jurisdiction in China, 18 AM. J. INT'l L. 676 (1924), 
quoting E.T. Williams; see also E. PARKER, CHINA: HER HISTORY, DIPLOMACY 
AND COMMERCE 308 (1917); V. KOO, THE STATUS OF ALIENS IN CHINA 77-94 
(1912). 
55. Article XIII of the General Regulations for British Trade at the Ports of 
Canton, Amoy, Foochowfoo, Ningpo, and Shanghai. Other powers which had extraterri-
torial treaties with China were the United States, France, Norway and Sweden, 
Germany, Russia, Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain, Belgium, Italy, Austria-Hungary, 
Brazil, Peru, Portugal, Japan, Mexico, and Switzerland. The provisions of these treaties 
were collected in 1 G. HERTSLET, HERTSLET'S CHINA TREATIES (1908l. 
56. Keeton, The New Chinese Codes, 8 J. COMP. LEG. 3d ser. 225 (1926). S. 
Williams gave a famous quotation as follows: "The barbarians are like beasts, and not 
to be ruled on the same principle as citizens .... To rule barbarians by misrule is the 
true and best way of ruling them." However, we must bear in mind that before the 
Reformation the Europeans' conceptions of their power over those who visited their 
shores were not unlike those which prevailed in China; see II S. WILLIAMS, THE 
MIDDLE KINGDON 450 (1904). 
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even cited the grant of an exemption from the local Chinese laws to 
the Arabians at Canfu in the ninth century as well as to the 
Portuguese at Macao in later centuries57 and a series of treaties 
entered into with Russia relating to territorial jurisdiction58 as 
precedents to the Chinese recognition of the principle of extraterrito-
riality.59 
However, one thing was certain: all cases in which a Chinese 
appeared either as plaintiff or as defendant were within the 
justifiable reach of a Chinese court,60 and thus the criminal procedure 
of traditional China constituted the principle controversy between the 
Chinese and foreigners. The solution to the difficulty was the 
imposition of extraterritoriality. Since this decision resulted from a 
Chinese military defeat, the Chinese gradually realized that extrater-
ritoriality diminished their sovereignty and was inconsistent with the 
legal principle of the equality of states. It is by no means the case, 
however, that the argument against extraterritoriality was mainly 
one of sentiment. Rather, it was a careful, well-supported statement 
which cited numerous practical defects and abuses. These can be 
illustrated by an observation made by C. Bishop, a former American 
assessor of the Mixed Court at Shanghai:61 
57. T. JERNIGAN, CHINA IN LAW AND COMMERCE 194 (1905). 
58. Article 4 of the Treaty of Nipchu or Nerchinsk 1689 provides: "If hereafter any 
of the subjects of either nation pass the frontier and commit crimes of violence against 
property or life, they are at once to be arrested and sent to the frontier of their country 
and handed over to the chief local authority for punishment." The Treaty of the 
Frontier, signed at Kiakhta in 1729, and the Supplementary Treaty of Kiakhta signed 
in 1768 contained similar provisions relative to the suppression of brigandage and 
other disturbances along the coterminous frontiers. For texts, see THE STATISTICAL 
DE'T of INSPECTORATE GENERAL OF CUSTOME, 1 TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, 
ETC., CHINA AND FOREIGN STATES 3, 18 (1908). 
59. Chinese scholars refuted this by saying that "the Arabian practice seems to 
have been forgotten and fallen into disuse long before the formal introduction of 
extraterritoriality into China. . . . It was a mere unilateral grant and could have been 
revoked at the pleasure of the grantor. As a matter of fact, no claim to special 
jurisdiction appears to have been entertained by any power on the basis of this early 
grant." S. LIU, EXTRATERRITORIALITY: ITS RISE AND ITS DECLINE 80 (1925). 
As for these Russian treaties, as Dr. Koo also pointed out, "far from establishing the 
principle of extraterritoriality, they seem to have involved nothing more than an 
application, in exceptional circumstances, of the principle of personal law, which is 
found in the criminal jurisprudence of substantially all civilized nations to a greater or 
lesser extent." see KOO, supra note 54, at 53. 
60. 1 H. MORSE, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE CHINESE EMPIRE 
64 (1910>. 
61. For the case of the United States, see Bishop, American Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction in China, 20 AM. J. INT'L L. 281-99 (1926); Loring, American 
Extraterritoriality in China, 10 MINN. L. REV. 407-16 (1926). 
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The strongest plea for the abolition of extraterritoriality lies in 
the abuse of this privilege on the part of subjects of foreign 
powers who use it as a cloak for illegal acts. The continued 
smuggling of opium and morphine into China is but a single 
example, although the most striking, of the wrong that is being 
done to China under the cloak of a foreign extraterritorial 
jurisdiction. 62 
In a number of instances foreign courts imposed comparatively light 
sentences upon criminals.83 Also, the Chinese litigants were placed at 
a disadvantage because the variety of foreign laws and legal 
arrangements were confusing and conducive to distrust. These were 
merely the most obvious difficulties involved in extraterritoriality.64 
Since extraterritorial rights grew out of a dissatisfaction with 
Chinese law, it was widely believed that modernization of the law 
would assist China in overcoming her weakness and would eliminate 
the demand for extraterritoriality. This attitude gained added 
impetus from the Japanese legal reform and the resulting successful 
abolition of extraterritoriality before the close of the century. 
Moreover, Great Britain, the United States, Japan, Sweden, and 
Switzerland had promised in their respective treaties with China to 
abolish extraterritoriality as soon as the state of Chinese law 
permitted it.65 The result was the establishment of the Imperial Law 
62. Bishop, Extraterritoriality in China and its Abolition, 5 CHINESE SOC. & 
POL. SCI. REV. 3: 175 (1920). 
63. Id. 
64. On the defects of extraterritoriality in China, the references are plentiful; see 
W. WILLOUGHBY, FOREIGN RIGHTS AND INTERESTS 67-87 U927l; Tyau, 
Extraterritoriality in China and the Question of its Abolition, BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 
133-49 {1921-23); Price, Extraterritoriality in China, 11 OREG. L. REV. 264, 278-81 
(1932). 
65. In Article XII of the revised Commercial Treaty in 1902, Great Britain made 
the following promise: 
China having expressed a strong desire to reform her judicial system and to bring 
it into accord with that of Western nations ... Great Britian agrees to give every 
assistance to such reform, and she will also be prepared to relinquish her 
extraterritorial rights when she is satisfied that the state of the Chinese laws, the 
arrangement for their administration and other consideration, warrant her in so 
doing. 
A similar provision also appeared in the Commercial Treaties concluded a year later 
with the United States, Japan, and Sweden in 1908, and Switzerland in 1918; for texts, 
see TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS 351, 414, 431, 745, 1430 CJ. MacMurray ed. 
1921). 
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Codification Commission in 1904, which included Dr. Wu Ting-fang, a 
member of the English Bar and a former Minister to the United 
States, and Shan Chia-pan, an eminent jurist in Chinese jurispru-
dence. Japanese advisor Mutsuoka Yoshitada was associated with the 
Commission, 56 and it is not surprising to find that a number of draft 
codes of procedure and of criminal and civil law were considerably 
influenced by the Japanese code, which in turn was based upon 
Continental Codes, primarily the German and the French. 
There was considerable wisdom in the appointment of Japanese 
experts since Japan had recently solved the difficult problem of 
adapting western legal principles to eastern requirements. Moreover, 
there also was plausible reason for the reproduction in the Chinese 
code of the chief characteristics of continental rather than Anglo-
American law. It is said that "Anglo-American law emphasizes the 
individual at the expense of the family, while continental faw inherits 
something of the old 'familia.' The family being the unit of Chinese 
society, anything which weakens the existence and power of that 
institution must be as unacceptable in principle as it would be 
unworkable in practice."67 The more important consideration was that 
Anglo-American law existed not only in statutes but also in judicial 
as well as administrative decisions which were too complex and too 
little systematized at that time. To a country which had to borrow 
foreign codes, a ready-made code of comprehensive rules clearly and 
concisely set forth article by article was not only simpler and more 
systematic, but a more promising method of obtaining satisfactory 
results. As one eminent Chinese jurist once said to G. Keeton, a keen 
English observor of extraterritoriality in China, "We like your law 
and for some reasons we would have preferred them as a model for 
our own, but we cannot codify your own laws for you."68 
The first modern code ever drafted by the Codification Commis-
sion was the KUNG-SSU-LU (Company Law) of 1904. The Code was 
a hybrid of Japanese and English company laws in an abridged 
form. 69 The Anglo-American influence was, however, limited to that 
particular field. In addition to this, a number of codes on civil law, 
maritime law, bankruptcy law, criminal law, and civil and criminal 
66. lnfonnation provided in J. ESCARRA, LE DROIT CHINOIS 154 (1936). 
67. Wang, Revision of the Chinese Criminal Code, 13 ILL. L. REV. 219 233 (1918). 
68. Keeton, The Progress of Law Reform in China-II, 20 J. COMP. LEG. 3d ser. 
210, 220 (1938). As the codification in Anglo-American law has been sped up recently, 
its influence on Chinese law is more obvious than ever. We will deal with this later. 
69. For a full discussion of this law, see Li, The Kung-ssu-lu of 1904 and 
Modernization of Chinese Company Law, 10, CHENGCHI L. REV. 171 and 11 ibid 163 
(1974). 
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procedure were also drafted. 70 Of those early efforts, however, only the 
"Provisional Regulations of the Organization of the Courts and 
Subordinate Courts" (1907), the "Law of the Organization of the 
Judiciary" (1909), and the Criminal Code ever carne into operation; 
the rest remained only on paper, because they were generally the 
result of hasty drafting and because the sponsoring Ching govern-
ment fell within a few years. According to these organic laws, a 
hierarchy of modern courts of four classes - the Local Court, the 
District Court, the High Court and the Supreme Court - was 
created. Subsequently, the Local Court was abolished. Since then the 
District Court has become the court of first instance, where the trial 
is conducted by one judge. An appeal may be made to a High Court 
where three judges sit, and the last appeal is usually heard by five 
judges without oral argument and is limited to questions of law in the 
Supreme Court. 71 
To every modern court, a procurator of corresponding grade is 
attached. The Chinese procurator has no exact equivalent in Ameri-
can legal terminology. His authority is quite extensive and powerful. 
He is the combination of prosecutor, coroner, or grand jury under 
American system; that is, he has the power to hold a preliminary 
examination of the accused and the witness so as to decide whether 
the case should be prosecuted or not. In exercising this power he may 
summon, arrest, and detain the accused without first getting approval 
from a judge; he may also compel a witness to appear and make such 
searches and investigation as may serve to throw light on the case.72 
This structure of the modem courts continues to function today even 
though related laws have been revised several times. 
The drafted Criminal Code was promulgated by an imperial edict 
at the end of the Ching dynasty. The republican government, by a 
presidential mandate of March 3, 1912, adopted the said Code, with 
the exception of those provisions pertaining to the royal family of the 
late regime. Several revisions were made in 1914, 1921, and 1928 to 
bring it in line with most recent developments in criminal jurispru-
70. Laws relating to commercial matters were probably the first to be drafted 
because China had a large number of foreigners residing in her territory through treaty 
relations. It was therefore necessary that the scanty provisions of the then civil law, 
particularly in matters of commerce, were far too inadequate to cope with the many 
legal problems incidental to the modem age. 
71. According to the current Code of Civil and Criminal Procedure (art. 474 and 
389, respectively), when it is deemed necessary oral argument may be conducted. 
72. See Pound, Progress of the Law in China, 23 WASH. L. REV. 345, 357 (1948). 
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dence. 73 This code provided, for the first time, that no person could be 
held guilty of an offense unless it was expressly provided for. It also 
ended the principle of collective responsibility of the family and clan 
for the crimes of members, and torture was abolished. These revised 
codes were again drafted by the Codification Commission now with 
different members after the establishment of the Republic. Dr. Wang 
Chung-hui, a graduate of Yale and a deputy-judge of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice as well as the famous translator of the 
German Civil Code into English, was among them. In addition, Tung 
Kang, the Chief Justice of the Chinese Supreme Court, later Minister 
of Justice and the last living authority on ancient Chinese law, and 
Lo Wen-kan, an Oxford M.A. and procurator-general of the Republic, 
were also members. In addition to two Japanese advisors, Itakura 
Matsutaro and Iwata Shin, the Frenchman M. G. Padoux was also 
associated with the Commission. The latter had been responsible for 
the modernization of the Siamese codes which led to the eventual 
abolition of extraterritoriality in that country. 
The work of this Commission was quite impressive. It published 
the following volumes within ten years: The Regulations Relating to 
Criminal Procedure, The Ordinance of the General Regulation of 
Traders, The Trade Mark Law, The Regulations Relating to Civil 
Procedure, The Chinese Supreme Court Decisions, Chinese Prisons, 
and many others. Nevertheless, the external political turmoil which 
had resulted from the incessant civil wars among warlords and the 
continued interference by the military seriously impeded the progress 
of legal reform, particularly in the area of the administration of 
justice. In other words, the whole system of Chinese law at the time, 
satisfactory in theory, was inefficient and arbitrary in practice. 
Therefore, it is natural that the report of the Commission sent to 
China by the resolution of the Washington Conference of 1922 to 
inquire into the present practice of extraterritoriality in China, and 
73. The Provisional Code had been prepared with the Hungarian Criminal Code of 
1878, the German Criminal Code of 1871, the Dutch Criminal Code of 1881, the Italian 
Criminal Code of 1889, the Austrian Draft Criminal Code of 1893, the Swiss Draft 
Criminal Code of 1903, the Egyptian Criminal Code of 1904, the Siamese Criminal 
Code of 1908, and the Japanese Criminal Code of 1907 as guides. The so-called Revised 
Draft of 1928 was prepared with the Austrian Draft Criminal Code of 1903, the 
Resolutions of the German Commission of 1914 on Criminal Law Reforms, and the 
counter-draft submitted by certain German criminologists in 1911 as additional guides; 
see Chang, supra note 18, at 185. 
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into the laws and judicial system and the methods of judicial 
administration 9f China,74 was a disappointment to the Chinese.75 
Although the existing system of extraterritoriality was still 
desirable according to the survey of Chinese law made by the 
Commission, this disheartening fact did not discourage the con-
tinuance of the law reform movement.76 Between the establishment of 
the National Government in 1928 and the outbreak of the war of 
resistance against Japan in 1937, the work on codification came to 
fruition and constituted the most significant domestic achievement by 
the National Government. The Commission of Codification of Law 
was transformed into a legislative commission headed by Sun Fo, son 
of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the President of the Legislature. The 
Commission produced the Criminal Code (1935), the Code of Civil 
Procedure (1935), the Code of Criminal Procedure (1935), the Civil 
Code (1929), the Law of Insurance (1929), Company Law (1929), 
Maritime Law (1929), Bankruptcy Law (1935), the Negotiable 
Instruments Law (1929), and the Trademark Law (1936). 
Without exception, the Criminal Code was largely a product of 
various foreign codes.77 One particular feature may be illustrated. 
This code was based on the equality of men. No privileged group was 
entitled to exemption or mitigation as the traditional codes provided. 
Even today, however, family relations still play a part in the 
determination of punishments. In offenses such as profaning the 
74. The full text of the resolution can be found in II KEETON, supra note 51, at 
5-6. 
75. For a detailed analysis of the Report, see id., at 8--75. 
76. It should be mentioned that when Germany and Austria lost their ex-
traterritorial rights after World War I and when Russia voluntarily relinguished them 
in 1924, the reaction of those governments to their nationals treated in the Chinese 
courts afterwards was generally favorable; see Quigley, Extraterritoriality in China, 20 
AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 64-65 (1926). 
77. These cases included the German Draft Code of 1925 and 1927, the Cuban 
Draft Code of 1927, the Spanish Criminal Code of 1928, the French Draft Code of 1932, 
the Italian Criminal Code of 1930, the Japanese Draft Code of 1930 and 1931, the 
Philippine Criminal Code of 1930, the Polish Criminal Code of 1932, the Siamese 
Criminal Code of 1908 and the Draft Revised Code of 1919, the Swiss Draft Code of 
1931, and the Criminal Codes of the cantons of Fribourg !1924) and Vand Cl931l, the 
Czechoslovakian Draft Code of 1926, the Turkish Criminal Code of 1926, the Soviet 
Criminal Code of 1926, the Proceedings of the International Congress on Criminal 
Law, of 1926, 1929, and 1933, and the Proceedings of the International Conferences for 
the Unification of Criminal Law of 1927, 1928, 1930, and 1931; see Keeton, The 
Progress of Law Reform in China, 19 J. COMP. LEG. 3d ser. 197, 203-4 (1937). 
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dead,78 homicide,79 causing bodily harm,80 restraining personal liber-
ty,81 and abandonment,82 the existen~ of a family relation between 
the offender and the victim increases the punishment. On the other 
hand, in offenses such as theft,83 fraud,84 and receiving stolen 
property,86 the presence of a family relationship either requires the 
judge to remit the sentence or to limit the sentence or limit judicial 
cognizance to cases where the injured party himself starts a private 
prosecution. 
As civil matters were largely regulated by custom in traditional 
China, the codification of civil law was not as aggressive as criminal 
law.86 The Civil Code of 1929 also affirmed the principle of the 
78. Article 250 provides: "A person who commits an offence specified in one of the 
Articles 247 through 249 [offences against graves and corpses] against his lineal blood 
ascendant shall be subject to the punishment prescribed for such offence increased up 
to one half." · 
79. Article 272 provides: "A person who kills his lineal blood ascendant shall be 
punished with death or imprisonment for life [it is possible to receive a sentence for 
less than ten years if there is no blood relationship involved]." 
80. Article 280 provides: "A person who commits an offence specified in one of the 
Articles 277 or 278 [offen.ces of causing bodily harm] against his lineal blood ascendant 
shall be subject to the punishment prescribed for such offence increased up to one half." 
81. Article 303 provides: "A person who commits an offence specified in one of the 
paragraphs I or II of the preceding article [offence against personal liberty] against his 
lineal blood ascendant shall be subject to the punishment prescribed for such offence 
increased up to one half." 
82. Article 295 provides: "A person who commits an offence specified in the 
preceding article [offences of abandonment] against his lineal blood ascendant shall be 
subject to the punishment prescribed for such offence increased up to one half." 
83. Article 324 provides: "If an offence specified in this Chapter [offences of 
larceny] is committed along lineal blood relatives, between spouses, or among other 
relatives who live together and share their property, the punishment may be remitted." 
84. Article 343 provides: "The provisions of Article . . . 324 shall apply mutatis 
mutandis to offences specified in the four preceding articles [offence of fraud]." 
85. Article 351 provides: "If an offence specified in this Chapter [offence of 
receiving stolen property] is committed among lineal blood relatives, between spouses, 
or among other relatives who live together and share their property, the punishment 
may be remitted." 
86. The reason for their delay is, though a revolution may overthrow a political 
regime, the law that governed the interrelations of a people for centuries cannot be 
revolutionized overnight. However, the legislative commission which drafted the 1921 
Civil Code also referred extensively to a series of foreign codes. In addition to the 
Japan Civil Code of 1898 and Commercial Code of 1899 (revised 1911!, and German 
Codes of 1897, others were the Swiss Civil Code of 1917 and the Revised Swiss Code on 
Obligations of 1911, the Soviet Civil Code of 1926, the Turkish Code on Obligations 
and the Turkish Commercial Code of 1936, the Draft Italian Commercial Code of 1925, 
the Draft Franco-Italian Code on Obligations and Contracts of 1927; see Cheng, Recent 
Legislation in China, 4 CHINA L. REV. 119 (1931). 
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equality of man and woman. Sons and daughters now shared the 
estate equally on the father's death intestate, and in order to prevent 
the exclusion of daughters by will, the Code even instituted the 
system of the "legitimate compulsory portion."87 As a result of the 
admission of women to the rights of succession, a woman might now 
have separate estate; the Code introduced the system of "union of 
goods," which originated in Switzerland, to regulate the position of 
the woman during marriage in the absence of a special agreement. 
Under this, the woman retained as her separate estate property for 
personal use, the products of her labour, and certain other types of 
property. 88 
Perhaps the most conspicous characteristic of the Civil Code was 
the unification of civil and commercial law, commonly separated in 
other societies. The basis for such a distinction between civil and 
commercial law is rooted in continental legal history. Since there was 
a separate class of merchants in the Middle Ages with their own 
customs, special courts were created to try commercial cases. No such 
reason existed in China; thus, no useful purpose was served by the 
separation. In addition, as Dean Roscoe Pound observed, "It [the 
distinction] requires difficult questions of jurisdiction, procedural 
distinctions and distinctions of application of law which are simply 
anachronisms."89 Therefore, the "abrogation of the separate commer-
cial law and commercial jurisdiction was a real step forward."90 
However, some of the important aspects of commercial law were 
left to be covered by special laws later implemented; negotiable 
instruments, insurance, commercial companies and maritime com-
merce were dealt with in four special laws promulgated in 1929. The 
underlying reason for this might be that it was easier to make 
amendments to a single statute than to the code. By doing this, the 
87. Article 1223 of the Civil Code provides: "The compulsory portion of an heir is 
determined as follows: 1. For a lineal descendant by blood, the compulsory portion is 
one half of his successional portion; .... " 
88. Article 1017 provides: "That part of the union property [all property belonging 
to the spouses at the time of the marriage as well as property acquired by them during 
the continuance of the marriage becomes their union property) which belongs to the 
wife at the time of marriage as well as that which she acquires by inheritance or other 
gratuitous titles during the continuance of the marriage constitutes her contributed 
property and remains in her ownership." 
89. Pound, The Chinese Civil Code in Action, 29 TUL. L. REV. 277, 279 (1955). 
90. ld. 
A CoMPARATIVE STUDY oF JumciAL REVIEW 37 
general tenor of the law would be less likely to be disturbed during 
the development process in China.91 
In regard to criminal trials, Chinese procedure followed the 
normal continental form rather than the Anglo-American one. 
Following a preliminary investigation by a procurator, a preliminary 
examination was held to cide whether the accused is to be committed 
for trial. Then the public prosecution followed. A necessary corollary 
of this type of procedure was that lawyers played an insignificant 
role. Since pretrial interview of witnesses was forbidden for fear they 
may be influenced by the lawyers, a lawyer's pretrial investigation 
was largely confined to interviewing his client, possibly members of 
the client's family, and examing the documents and any real evidence 
under the client's control. During court trials, the customary rule of 
lawyers was not that of courageous fighters for the rights of their 
clients. It is said that their advice to the criminal defendant was often 
not to deny guilt, but to plead mitigating circumstances in order not 
to irritate the presiding judge. 
Since the judge received and studied the records and dossiers of 
the police and procurator in advance of the trial, this practice 
inevitably influenced his attitude towards the disposition of the case. 
In sum, the trial was actually dominated by the civil law principle of 
"judicial prosecution," which means that the judge alone controls the 
proceeding of the trial rather than the "party prosecution" in the 
American system. In other words, speaking generally, criminal 
procedure in the civil law countries is "inquisitorial," while that in 
the common law countries is "accusatorial."92 
Another important feature in the adoption of the continental 
legal system was that in rendering a judgment the court was not 
bound by strict rules regarding the probative force of evidence, but 
rather was guided by its own conviction. The examination of evidence 
was enormously extensive; it could cover any matter deemed relevant 
to the issues or the credibility of the witness. The Code of Civil 
Procedure provided in article 222 as follows: "Except where it is 
91. ld.; contra, Charles Sumner Lobingier, a former judge of the United States 
Court for China, regarded this as constituting "the main features of a code of 
commerce. Their relegation to separate laws would seem to be even less satisfactory 
than their combination in a separate instrument." Lobingier, The Corpus Juris of New 
China, 19 TUL. L. REV. 512, 542 (1945). 
92. Both systems have their advantages as well as disadvantages. However, this is 
only true in a historical context according to Merryman of Stanford, because of a 
converging trend towards roughly equivalent mixed systems of criminal procedure. See 
J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 134-39 (1969). 
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otherwise provided by law, the court, in rendering a judgment, shall 
decide on the truth or falsity of the facts according to its free moral 
conviction with due consideration given to all the points raised in the 
oral proceedings as well as the result of the examination of evidence. 
The reasons on which the moral conviction is based shall be stated in 
the judgment." The Code of Criminal Procedure contained similar 
provisions in the following articles: 
Article 154. The facts constituting a crime shall be determined 
according to evidence. 
Article 155. Evidence shall be evaluated by the court according 
to its free conviction. 
This liberal attitude towards the admissibility of evidence in the 
civil law countries arose from the belief that only ,by placing all the 
available information before the court can the truth be discovered.93 
In addition, cases are universally tried before trained judges, sitting 
without juries. There are few exceptions to this rule. Hearsay 
evidence is not admissible. With regard to evidence obtained irregu-
larly, such as by the ultra vires actions of a police officer, the general 
practice is to admit such evidence.94 However, the confession of the 
defendant will not be admitted if it was obtained by coercion, fraud, 
illegal detention, or other improper means.95 
93. Judge Marvin E. Frankel summarized his nine years on the federal trial bench 
by warning "that our adversary system rates truth too low among the values that 
institutions of justice are meant to serve." Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal 
View, 123 U. PENN. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (1975). This is supported by a statement made 
by an eminent scholar after long and careful study; "He said that if he were innocent, 
he would prefer to be tried by a civil law court, but that if he were guilty, he would 
prefer to be tried by a common law court. This indicates that criminal procedure in the 
civil law country is more likely to distinguish accurately between the guilty and the 
innocent";- MERRYMAN, supra note 92, at 139. 
94. This is not only the practice of other civil law countries, but England and the 
Commonwealth system also refuse to follow the American precedent; see Symposium, 
The Exclusionary Rule under Foreign Law, 52 J. CRIM. L. C. & P. S. 271 (1961). In 
addition, we shall note here that during the American post-trial pre-sentence 
procedure, the technical rules of evidence are not generally applicable, Williams v. 
New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949); U.S. v. Shipiani, 435 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1970l. 
95. Article 156 provides that confession of an accused not extracted by violence, 
threat, i~ducement, fraud, unlawful detention or other improper devices and consistent 
with facts may be admitted in evidence. Both France and West Germany have the 
same exception to the general rule of admissibility; see A. SHEEHAN, CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE IN SCOTLAND & FRANCE 29 !1975>; J. LANGBEIN, COMPARA-
TIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY 69 !1971>. 
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Although these codes were quite advanced according to the then 
western standard, one thing could not be ignored: they were totally 
alien to the general public in China. Since the country was not only 
facing continuing threat from foreign powers, but was also under-
going incessant military actions against the remaining warlords and 
the Chinese Communists, and since it had only achieved nominal 
unification under the central government in Nanking, it was 
impossible to create an efficient, nationwide system for the adminis-
tration of justice. In the rural areas, the inquisitorial methods of the 
imperial regime, together with portions of the old codes and moral 
practices, were still enforced. Because the command of the central 
government was not carried far enough to reach every part of the 
country, many modern rules which ran counter to traditional 
practices were simply put aside. This unfortunate condition would 
have been temporary and would not have been hard ta overcome if 
China had had more time to develop its legal system.96 The 
disappearance of the old social order and the rule of moral code was 
imperative to the acceptance of the new legal system. Unfortunately, 
Nationalist China had failed to realize this goal on the mainland 
when the war of resistance against Japan broke out in 1937 and the 
Communists took over in 1949. 
F. Legal Reform in Taiwan since 1949. 
The legal reforms and provisions of the earlier codes have been 
maintained by the government of the Republic of China (ROC) in 
Taiwan. Although the administration of justice is still far from 
perfect, the westernization of codes continues. Moreover, the influence 
of the American legal system has been more obvious in recent years 
as a result of the enormous contact between the ROC and the United 
States. No longer limited to the sphere of commercial law, other fields 
of law have also been influenced by American law. Certain American 
rules of criminal procedure were incorporated into the Code of 
Criminal Procedure after the 1966 revision.97 For instance, police 
must deliver a criminal suspect to the procurator as soon as possible, 
96. Dean Roscoe Pound of Harvard Law School, who had served as legal advisor to 
the central government at Nanking in 1945-46, praised Chinese codes for being in line 
with western ideas of law, and was optimistic that, given favorable conditions, the 
operation of a western legal system would eventually operate in China; see Pound, 
Progress of the Law in China, 23 WASH. L. REV. 345 (1948). 
97. See Tao, Reform of the Criminal Procedure in Nationalist China, 19 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 747, 748 (1971). The underlying reason is the dissatisfaction among the 
Chinese because some due process protections granted to the American servicemen 
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and he shall be examined not more than twenty-four hours after his 
arrest,98 search warrants must be secured before searching the 
property or person of a suspect, 99 and a confession may not be used as 
the sole evidence of guilt during a trial unless it is proven to have 
been made voluntarily and corroborative evidence supports it. 100 
One of the major problems in the Chinese administration of 
justice since the modernization has been the control of the Ministry of 
Justice. The functions of the Ministry include appointing the judges, 
procurators, and other officials connected with judicial administra-
tion. It also directs the procurators and supervises their work in 
general. It is agreed that these functions are more administrative 
-than judicial, and most of the foreign countries have placed the 
Ministry under the executive branch. However, China did not accept 
this conclusion in the past and until 1943 the Ministry was shuffied 
about several times between the Judicial and Executive Yuan. Since 
then it has been one of the ministries of the Executive Yuan. 
The other controversy, which has not been settled until recently, is 
the question of the jurisdiction over the courts. Two of the three 
grades of courts, namely, the high courts and the district courts, 
together with the whole hierarchy of procurators, have been under 
the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, which is in turn under the 
control of Executive Yuan; only the Supreme Court is directly under 
the Judicial Yuan. The judicial system not only has been split, but its 
freedom from interference by the executive branch was questionable. 
This jurisdictional problem evolved into a heated controversy among 
Yuans and led to an interpretation rendered by the Council of Grand 
Justices which held that the district and high courts should be under 
the jurisdiction of the Judicial Yuan. 101 This decision is, however, only 
after the conclusion of the Agreement on the Status of United States Armed Forces in 
the Republic of China in 1965 were not equally enjoyed by those who were tried by the 
same court according to the old Code of Criminal Procedure. For text of the Agreement, 
see 1 U.S.T. 373, T.I.A.S. No. 5986 (1966). For a discussion of this treaty, particularly 
in the field of the criminal jurisdiction, see Tao, The Sino-American Status of Forces 
Agreement: Criminal Jurisdiction Over American Soldiers on Nationalist Chinese 
Territory, 51 B.U.L. REV. 1-30 (1971). 
98. Article 91 provides: "If an accused is arrested with a warrant or because of a 
circular order without a warrant, he shall be sent immediately to the place desig-
nated .... " 
99. Article 128 provides: "A search requires the use of a search warrant." 
100. Article 156, para. 2 provides: "Confession of an accused shall not be used as 
the sole evidence of conviction and other necessary evidence shall still be investigated 
to see if the confession coincides with facts." 
101. Interpretation No. 86. 
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on paper and not until 1979, did the ROC government decide to 
implement it and set effective date on July 1, 1980. The details of the 
interpretation and its effect will be dealt with at length in the 
following chapter. 
In keeping with the French model/02 an Administrative Court 
has been established along with the Supreme Court under the 
supervision of the Judicial Yuan. The court has a number of judges 
who have been divided into several chambers. The judges are 
required to have had at least four years of previous service in 
subordinate positions of due rank. 103 Among the five judges of each 
chamber, two must have judicial service.104 These requirements were 
devised to insure that the judges will be familiar with the subject 
matter of the disputes. Administrative suits also can be divided into 
three grades. Any individual who feels that injury has been done to 
his rights or interests through an unlawful decision or illegal 
administrative act on the part of a government organ may bring an 
action against that authority to the authority immediately higher. 105 
If the ruling is unsatisfactory, the petitioner may make a re-appeal to 
an authority one step higher than the one which renders the ruling. If 
he still is not satisifed with the decision of reappeal, the last organ he 
may resort to is the Administrative Court. 
The Court considers the argument of both sides, examines the 
administrative rulings, and renders accordingly a decision against 
which no further appeal is allowed. Since traditional conceptions still 
more or less influence the people, their attitude towards the 
government is passive; generally, to sue the government is a totally 
alien and unthinkable idea. In addition, their legal knowledge is 
comparatively inadequate. As a result, only a limited number of 
ordinary individuals bring actions against government branches and 
most decisions are rendered favorable to the government. 
Another agency which is on a par with the Supreme Court and 
the Administrative Court in the Judicial Yuan is the Committee on 
102. The reasons for establishment of a separate administrative court in France, 
which has served as a model to other countries in Europe, are the following: the 
deep-rooted notions about the separation of powers, the widespread distrust of the 
judiciary as a result of excessive interference with the administrative work of the 
government before Revolution, the traditional image of the judge and the judicial 
function. See B. SCHWARTZ, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND COMMON 
LAW WORLD 4-8 <1954). 
103. The Organic Law of the Administrative Court, article 6. 
104. Id., article 4. 
105. The Appeal Law, article 1. 
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the Discipline of Public Functionaries. Its members enjoy life tenur.e 
and a portion of them are drawn from the judicial service. 106 Its major 
function is handling impeachments submitted by the Control Yuan. 
The trial is ordinarily conducted by brief and the impeached 
defendants may be summoned for questioning when the Committee 
deems it necessary. 107 If the case is connected with criminal matters, 
the action of the Judicial Yuan has to be delayed until the conclusion 
of criminal procedures in the ordinary courts. Since the heaviest 
discipline which it can impose on a public functionary is dismissal 
and deprivation of the right to hold public office, its significance very 
often is overshadowed by the pending criminal action. On the other 
hand, the decision of the criminal court will have no effect on the 
disciplinary department's application of its own sanctions. The legal 
process differs from the United States system in that the United 
States Senate upon conviction in an impeachment trial has the 
official removed from office. Then he may be indicted and tried for the 
criminal offense. 108 
The quality of justice depends on a multitude of factors. Among 
them the quality of the bench and the bar are obviously important. 
As the result of the adoption of the continental civil law system, 
China also established the career system. The selection of the higher 
court judges is made through promotion from the lower courts. 
Although law professors and private lawyers can be recruited into the 
judiciary,t09 the overwhelming majority of judges come into the 
profession by passing an examination which any graduate from the 
department of law of any accredited college or university, both 
domestic and abroad, can take. Those who hope to practice must pass 
a judicial examination different in form but identical in subject-
matter.110 Another feature of the career system is the assimilation of 
106. The Organic Law of the Committee on the Discipline of Public Functionaries, 
article 1, 2. 
107. Id., article 15. 
108. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3. 
109. The Law of Organization of Courts, article 33. However, since the social status 
of a law professor is deemed higher than that of a district court judge, few professors 
are willing to accept appointment at the district court level, to which all first 
appointments are made. Moreover, in addition to this restriction, the attractive income 
lawyers attain in private practice contributes to the fact that few, if any, judges have 
been recruited from the bar. 
110. Both examinations are extremely difficult, with a rate of only 5'k to 15'7c 
passing depending upon both the need of the particular year and the caliber of the 
candidates. This rate can be compared to the Japanese judicial examination, which 
maintains roughly a 5% pass rate; see Hattori, The Legal Profession in Japan: Its 
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the status of judges and procurators. Both are drawn from the same 
examination, receive the same judicial training after passing and 
nearly the same salary, and are subject to the same discipline, though 
their functions are totally different in nature. 
Since legal education is conducted on an undergraduate level 
which produces students who are less socially mature, and since few 
practicing lawyers who generally know more about trial technique 
have ever been recruited into the judiciary, those future judges are, 
without exception, young and inexperienced. Moreover, the depart-
ment of law in Chinese schools is not organized solely for training 
lawyers, its courses are oriented toward a general and essentially 
theoretical knowledge of law as well as other disciplines such as 
political science and economics, and most of its students become civil 
servants or enter private enterprise after grad~ion. Therefore, for 
successful candidates a period of training emphasizing the necessary 
judicial knowledge and skills, namely, the application of the law in 
the courts and its actual use by the public procurator, is definitely 
needed. Under the existing system, all successful candidates are 
required to receive training in the Institute of Training of Judicial 
Officials for eighteen months. In the first ten months, the training 
covers class work and research which emphasize the study of cases. 
All students are then sent to district courts and procurators' offices 
for six months. Under the latters' supervision, students attend 
trials and draft indictments and judgments. In the remaining two 
months, the field work is reviewed and summed up. 111 It should be 
indicated here that any candidate who passes the bar examination 
can practice immediately without any further training. 112 
Since the judiciary is organized hierarchically, original appoint-
ments are made to the lower posts and vacancies in the higher 
positions are usually filled by promotion from the lower courts. The 
reliance upon government for an advancement which results in 
increased salaries and higher social status is vulnerable to attack for 
possible abuse by the administrative system. 113 On the other hand, a 
career judge has the possibility of greater independence from the 
Historical Development and Present State, in LAW IN JAPAN 143 (A. von Mehren ed. 
1963). 
111. For details, see Yang, Career Judiciary in the Republic of China, 2 
CHENGCHI L. REV. 122, 130-31 0970). 
112. This was the practice of Japan before World War II, which may be the model 
followed by China. Hattori, supra note 110, at 128. But now the Japanese lawyer has to 
receive the same practical training as that of the judge and procurator. 
113. See Yang, supra note 111, at 136-49. 
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influence of pressure groups, be they from politics or business, labor 
organizations, or others. Furthermore, there is more opportunity to 
train a career judge adequately for trial work. 
Another characteristic of the career system is the lack of active 
cooperation within the legal profession that can be found in the 
United States. The typical judge will never have practiced law or 
served in any other branch of the legal profession. As a result, a judge 
tends to restrict his professional and social contacts to other judges. 
The workload of judges, which is much heavier than that of other 
executive officials, also contributes to judicial isolation. 114 In addition, 
the social status of lawyers cannot be equated with that of judges, as 
a result of historical and social factors. Until the beginning of the 
twentieth century, professional representation of the parties in both 
civil disputes and criminal proceedings was strictly prohibited. Those 
persons outside the district government who offered their legal 
services to the public were generally held in disrepute and were 
commonly called "Song Kouan" (brigands of law suits). 
Attitudes and practices developed under the old system have 
carried over into the present. Traditionally, disputants were encour-
aged to reach a solution without relying upon legal procedures or the 
legal profession. Great emphasis is still placed upon the solution of 
disputes through the mediation process, even in present-day Chinese 
society. The Code of Civil Procedure expressly provides that the court 
may at any time attempt a compromise between the litigants in order 
to reach an amicable settlement, and this agreement is as binding as 
a definitive judgment. 115 
114. The average number of cases to be disposed monthly by the district and high 
courts judges is around 100, and 50 in the Supreme Court. Since the responsibility of 
Chinese judges includes personally collecting evidence, examining dossiers, holding 
public trials and writing judgments, their workload is heavier than their counterparts 
in the west. It is not abnormal for them to work until midnight or on weekends. This 
workload seriously limits their social life. However, personnel and expenditures will 
both be increased according to the "Measures for Improving Judicial Administration 
and Strengthening Judicial Function" which has been adopted recently in the cabinet 
meeting; see Central Daily News, Dec. 18, 1978. 
115. Article 377 provides: "Irrespective of the stage of the proceedings reached, the 
court may, in the course of oral proceedings, attempt to bring the parties to a 
compromise or cause a commissioned judge or a requested judge to do the same, when it 
is considered that there is hope for compromise." Article 380 further provides: "A 
compromise concluded before the court shall have the same effect as an irrevocable 
judgment." 
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CHAPTER III. 
THE PROCESS OF CONSTITUTION-MAKING 
It is said that constitutional questions in the modern sense did 
not arise in China until the close of the nineteenth century, around 
the time of the above-mentioned legal reform movement. The leaders 
of the abortive "Hundred Days Reform"1 were definitely influenced by 
Japan's constitutionalism resulting from the promulgation of the 
Meiji Constitution in 1889, even though no constructive measures for 
framing a constitution were taken in that short period. The ultimate 
goal of this campaign was to constitutionalize the absolutism that had 
for two thousand years been the characteristic feature of the 
monarchy. The concept of constitutionalism was thus harbored by 
more than a few intellectuals. It later inspired a major controversy 
and was even a major cause in the downfall of the Ching dynasty .. 
The failure of the Boxer Movement2 immediately after the 
Hundred Days Reform had taught Empress Dowager the painful 
lesson that only by the restoration of the reform movement could the· 
1. After realizing the futility of limited learning of western technology, the 
young emperor Kuang Hsu of the Ching dynasty strongly encouraged more thorough 
reforms. A series of decrees aimed at modernizing the armed forces, the bureaucracy, 
the legal and educational systems, and the economy were promulgated. New categories 
of examination were to be added, new schools were to be integrated into the 
examination system, universities were established, and agricultural schools were set 
up in each province. These reforms also included free education to children, a national 
system of government newspapers, a budget system in government expenditures, 
promoting the prosperity of merchants, and, most of all, the abolition of superfluous 
offices both central and local which had duplicate functions or had no function at all. 
Nevertheless, these reforms only lasted for a brief period of one hundred days in 1898 
(June-September). The reforms produced such rapidly increasing consternation among 
the officials, both high and low, that a coup d'etat finally occurred. Empress Dowager 
Tzu Hsu restored the regency and placed her nephew, Kuang Hsu, under house arrest. 
This was a major setback for reformers as all the issued edicts were rescinded and most 
of the reformers were executed. For a succinct but complete account of the "Hundred 
Days Reform", see Butcher, The Emperor's Attempt to Reform the Chinese Government 
in the Summer of 1898, 43 POL. SCI. Q. 544-65 (1928). 
2. The Boxer Movement was anti-foreign in nature, advocating superstitious 
methods against western weapons. The Empress Dowager lent the movement her 
encouragement and support. During the frenzied period, the Boxers killed some foreign 
diplomats and over a hundred civilians and missionaries. After the defeat, heavy 
indemnities were imposed on China by an international relief expedition. 
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monarchy be preserved. The years 1901-05 witnessed the adoption of 
many of the measures which essentially originated in the Hundred 
Days Reform of 1898 even though the Empress Dowager categorically 
denied it, conceivably to save face. However, not until the conclusion 
of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 did the need for establishing a 
constitutional system in China receive any attention by the imperial 
court. Japan was so strong that in less than twenty years she had not 
only freed herself from humiliating extraterritoriality, but had also 
defeated two colossi of the East, China and Russia. The Chinese 
public and its government were amazed by Japan's achievements and 
concluded that it was due chiefly to that country's efficiency in 
government, which in turn was credited largely to the newly adopted 
constitution. 
Under an increasing demand from the people, events moved 
rapidly. The government sent out a commission of five officials to 
Japan, Europe and America to study their constitutional govern-
ments in 1905. Upon their return, the commissioners reported 
favorably on their investigations and urged the adoption of a 
constitution and parliamentary representation at an early date.3 The 
government was happy to learn that in the case of Japan, the exercise 
of constitutionalism had not substantially weakened the imperial 
authority. As a result, the Ching government decided to commit itself 
to a program of constitutional change to placate public opinion and at 
the same time to preserve the autocratic power of the emporor. 
On September 1, 1906, the throne issued an edict that expressly 
declared the adoption of a constitutional government in the near 
future. (It also reformed law and finance and reorganized the army.) 
The edict clearly stated that supreme control had to remain in the 
throne.4 Two more edicts, issued in the next year, authorized the 
establishment of a National Consultative Council and of the Provin-
cial Assemblies respectively to serve as the training ground for the 
later actual parliamentary system.5 A more conspicuous step taken by 
the Ching government was the promulgation of the proposed 
"Principles of Constitution" and a "Nine-Year Program (1908-17) of 
the Constitutional Preparation."6 
3. H. YEN, A SURVEY OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA 
123-24 (1968). 
4. For text, see THE CHINA YEAR BOOK 353 !19121. 
5. ld., at 355-56. 
6. ld., at 357-63. 
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It is not surprising to find that the "Principles of Constitution" 
was a near duplicate of the Japanese 1889 Meiji Constitution, as the 
latter had served as the model for the former. Not only did a number 
of articles of the Chinese Constitution correspond exactly to those of 
the Japanese, but the sequence of articles or order of the clauses was 
also almost identical in both documents. However, a close analysis 
reveals that several articles in the Chinese version gave powers to the 
emperor that were not found in the Japanese original. Article 3 of the 
Chinese Constitution gave the emperor alone the power to propose 
laws in parliament, although the Japanese Constitution stated that 
the Japanese emperor exercised legislative power only with the 
consent of the Imperial Diet. Article 12 of the Chinese Constitution 
gave the emperor power to raise funds when parliament was not in 
session, thus depriving the parliament of its control over the purse 
. strings of the government; no equivalent provision appeared in the 
Japanese Constitution. The most striking difference is that China's 
article 29 forbade Chinese members of the parliament to petition the 
emperor; article 49 of the Japanese Constitution expressly gave this 
right to members of the Imperial Diet. 7 
Other articles, especially the first, which straightforwardly 
provided that "The Taching Dynasty [Great Ching Dynasty] shall 
rule over the Taching Empire for ever and ever, and be honoured 
through all ages," leave little doubt that Chinese constitutionalism 
did not imply a lessening of imperial power. All legislative, executive 
and judicial power was to remain concentrated in the emperor's 
hand.8 This clearly underlined the insincere attitude of the Ching 
government toward the establishment of a truly modern constitution-
al system in China. 
7. For a fairly detailed comparison, see P.C. HSIEH, THE GOVERNMENT OF 
CHINA <1644-1911) 352-54 (1923). 
8. This is evidenced by a number of articles, such as article three: "The Emperor 
alone has power to make laws, and to decide what matters shall be placed before 
parliament for discussion." Article four provides: "The Emperor has the power to 
convoke, to open and to close, to suspend and to extend the time of and to dissolve the 
Parliament." Article ten provides: "The Emperor has supreme power over the 
administration of the laws and the appointment of judges, his edicts may supplement 
laws from time to time." Simultaneously with the promulgation of this "Principles of 
Constitution," a "Principles of Parliamentary Law" was adopted. Citing a few 
provisions will sufficiently show the very limited power parliament was to possess. 
Article one provides: "Parliament has the power to propose legislation, but not the 
power to legislate." Article two: "Measures adopted by Parliament have not the force of 
law, and are not to be carried out, until they have received Imperial sanction." Article 
seven: "Matters discussed in Parliament must be passed by both Houses before they 
can be memorialized to the Throne for its sanction." 
48 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
The "Nine-Year Program of Constitutional Preparation," also 
borrowed from Japan, was so comprehensive that if it had been 
faithfully carried out, it might have created better conditions in 
China for the development of a democratic government. Each year 
certain changes were to take place, such as census taking, judicial 
reform, police reorganization, the introduction of a budget and 
auditing system, the introduction of local self-government, the 
extension of modern educational facilities, the preparation of a 
constitution and parliamental law, culminating in the ninth year in 
the establishment of a parliament, privy council and cabinet.9 On the 
one hand, it was necessary to have the Chinese people gradually go 
through a process of modern political education in order to be able to 
govern themselves. Constitutionalism cannot be realized merely by 
the promulgation of a constitution. However, on the other hand, this 
nine-year period provided the Ching government time to overcome its 
weaknesses and further strengthen its absolute rule. 
Unfortunately, the latter more accurately expressed the govern-
. ment's attitude. This was reflected in the fact that those plans 
relating to the drafting of the codes or laws generally came out as 
scheduled, while as to those programs requiring actual work, little or 
nothing ever was done. This insincere attitude can be further 
evidenced by the newly organized cabinet whose members were 
dominated by imperial clansmen with a prince of blood as premier. 
Accordingly, in the name of constitutional government, the Ching 
government learned more from the West and Japan about safeguard-
ing the rights of the government and the throne than about giving to 
the people their share in the government. 
The provincial assemblies were opened in October 1909. Member-
ship was open to all males thirty years of age and older who had the 
necessary qualifications, which included 10 years residency and 
literacy. The franchise was opened to all males over twenty-five years 
of age who were natives of the province and had attained a particular 
standard of education, held certain public offices, or possessed 
property or capital valued at $5,000 or more. Those prerequisites for 
qualification, of course, degraded the spirit of the democratic election. 
Nevertheless, the major restriction imposed by the Ching government 
lay in the fact that the provincial assemblies' function was purely 
advisory. Those financial propositions which constituted the major 
concern in every local government could be considered only when 
brought before them by the governor. All measures adopted by the 
9. For text, see THE CHINA YEAR BOOK 361-63 C1912l. 
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assembly required the assent of the governor before they had the 
force of law. 
A Consultative Council was established in the nation's capital on 
October 3, 1910. Its composition was quite novel. Out of the total 
membership of two hundred, the Emerpor had the right to choose one 
hundred, the other half being appointed by governors from a list, the 
product of elections held in provincial assemblies. The traces of a true 
representative government were thus further eliminated under this 
peculiar selection procedure. On the surface, the Council's powers 
were fairly wide: consideration of the national budget, national 
revenues, and public loans; compilation of new laws and revision of 
old ones. However, practically every matter within the purview of the 
Council had to be handled by the cabinet or submitted to the throne 
before being considered by the council.'0 Therefore, it was only 
empowered to discuss matters submitted to it by the Emperor. 
Another means of limiting the function of the Council was the 
selection of its president and vice-president. They were not chosen 
among Council members but were appointed by the Emperor. 
Moreover, they enjoyed extensive powers ordinarily not shared by the 
Council members. Only they had the right to petition the Emperor. 
They had the power to order any member to retire from the session or 
to deprive him of the right of speech on account of misbehavior. 11 
Those limitations imposed on both the provincial assemblies and 
the national Consultative Council certainly justify the conclusion 
that the object of the imperial government was no more than a 
perpetuation of the existing system under a thin veil of constitutional 
guarantees. 
However, the assemblies and Council turned out to be far more 
vigorous than the Ching government had anticipated. Since it was 
the first time in Chinese history that the people could vote and be 
elected even on a limited basis, not only did the general public place 
great expectations on those elected, but representatives were also 
eager to pursue their business aggressively. In spite of their limited 
sphere of activities, the provincial assemblies were from the begin-
ning able to exert a considerable influence on the politics of the day. 
They did not hesitate to oppose unpopular government measures, nor 
to denounce what they considered the wrongful practices of the 
10. The Revised Regulation of the Tzechengyuan <the Consultative Council), 
article 15. The provisions can be referred to in THE CHINA YEAR BOOK 379 <1912!. 
11. Articles 45 & 46, id., at 381. 
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government officials. They even tried to impeach a governor although 
they had not been granted this power. 12 
The aggressive activities of the national Consultative Council 
were of equal distinction.13 This is particularly significant in light of 
the Council's peculiar composition. Although members were nomin-
ated either by the emperor or the governor, on the most critical 
constitutional questions, the Council was generally unanimous 
against the Ching government. 
The most prominent demand made by the provincial assemblies 
and the national Consultative Council was for the early assembling of 
parliament and a shortening of the time of preparation. Before the 
opening of the Council, two organized petitions had already been 
delivered to Peking, both of which were flatly rejected by the imperial 
court. The representatives of the provincial assemblies constituted 
the first petition group. Professional and overseas groups joined 
together with them in launching the second petition only three 
months later in April 1910. The joining of the Council in the third 
petition naturally accelerated the pace of this movement. In addition 
to this, most of the governors also lent their support because they 
keenly felt the tendency of reviving centralization. Significantly, 
"even the Manchu nobles and Mongol princes [in the Council] who 
were supposed to be reactionary joined heartily. Newspapers through-
out the country praised the action."14 Realizing that the ever-
increasing pressure could not be stemmed, an imperial edict was 
issued promising the convocation of parliament for the fifth year 
instead of four years later. 15 Although some representatives still were 
not satisfied with this result and organized another two petitions 
demanding that parliament open immediately, they were treated 
harshly by the Ching government. 16 
The people gradually recognized the Ching government's unwill-
ingness to reform, and the last alternative, revolution, became 
inevitable. After the outbreak of the Wachang uprising on October 
10, 1911,17 the government made its last effort to save the dynasty by 
12. NAN-TUNG CHANG-CHI-CHIH-HSIEN-SHENG-CHUAN-CHI !The Biogra-
phy of Chang Chi Chih) 142. 
13. Comment, Constitutional Changes in China, 5 AM. J. INT'L L. 201, 202-203 
(1911). 
14. Jd., at 202. 
15. THE CHINA YEAR BOOK 372-74 (1912). 
16. For details, see 1 C. LE, CHUNG-KUO CHIN-PAI-NIEN CHENG-CHIN-
SHIH (Political History of China in the Last Hundred Years) 282-83 (1942>. 
17. The revolutionary movement was led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Born near Canton in 
1866 into a peasant family, Sun received secondary and advanced education in western 
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the promulgation of the so-called "Nineteen Articles" on November 2, 
1911.'8 In sharp contrast to the "Principles of the Constitution," the 
Emerpor renounced almost all his powers. He could now exercise only 
the authority that would be delegated to him by law or in accordance 
with the constitution. The legislature assumed the major powers to 
govern and as such became almost as powerful as the British House of 
Commons. In other words, the ministerial responsibility and the 
parliamentary system which were the British product had been 
emphasized. Regrettably, it was too good to be true. Had the Ching 
government announced the "Nineteen Articles" instead of the "Princi-
ples of Constitution" ten years earlier, its dynasty might have been 
saved and a constitutional monarchy might also have been estab-
lished in China. 
After the revolution spread to almost all of the central and 
southern parts of China, delegates sent by these re~olutionary 
provinces met in Hankow. They took only one day to draft an Organic 
Law for the Organization of the Provisional Government which 
elected Dr. Sun Yat-sen as the provisional president. As the Organic 
Law merely outlined the general organization of the government, 
while omitting mention of the rights of the people and the procedure 
of amendment, it cannot, in the strict point of view, be classified as a 
real constitution. However, in view of the circumstances under which 
it was composed (the war was still going on against the imperial army 
in the nearby city of Hanyany), and because it was intended to serve 
only temporarily, criticism of it should not be too harsh. On the 
whole, the model of the American presidential system was incorpo-
rated.19 
Since both the revolutionary and the imperial government were 
seriously troubled by insufficient financial reserves and since neither 
could defeat the other decisively, Yuan Shih-Kai, a man of ability and 
medicine in Hawaii and Hong Kong. At first he, like other intellectuals, tried to foster 
the improvement of the imperial government by presenting a petition to then Premier 
Li Hung-chang. But he was abruptly turned away and was not even allowed to see Li. 
Realizing that his ideas would not be acted upon by that government, he made up his 
mind to overthrow it. After ten unsuccessful armed uprisings, rebels acting in 
impulsive haste surprisingly defeated the imperial forces at Wuchang, an important 
city in the middle of Yangtze Valley, and occupied that city overnight on October 10, 
1911. 
18. For text, see THE CHINA YEARBOOK 628-29 (1925). 
19. Article 13 provided that whenever the legislature passed a measure which the 
President disliked, he might, within ten days after he received such a measure, return 
it with a stated reason to the legislature for reconsideration; unless it was again passed 
by a two-thirds vote of the legislature, the President had no obligation to promulgate or 
execute it. For this and other articles, see id., at 629-30. 
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ambition who possessed the allegiance of the imperial army, used his 
skill to play on the fears and weakness first of the one and then of the 
other side. Eventually he was able to secure a settlement which was 
comparatively satisfactory to both sides and consequently left him the 
strongest single factor in the whole nation. In exchange for using his 
force to help bring down the monarchy, he was awarded the 
presidency.20 After Yuan gave his unconditional promise of support 
for the republic, a Provisional Constitution was promulgated on the 
same day that he was inaugurated. Since those who drafted the 
Provisional Constitution distrusted Yuan's sincerity, they adopted a 
provision for minsterial responsibility intended to limit his powers. 
This was an inevitable departure from the previous presidential 
system in the Organic Law. 
All the important powers were placed in the hands of the 
legislature at the expense of the executive branch of the government. 
Moreover, even some fundamental characteristics of the presidential 
system were also incorporated as additional guarap.tees. These 
included confirmation by the legislature of appointments of the 
cabinet,21 and the concurrence of the legislature to declare war and 
conclude treaties.22 It is clear that these provisions were devised to 
further restrict presidential authority.23 However, they also caused 
numerous unnecessary confrontations between the legislative and 
executive branch. Professor Willoughby made the following pertinent 
observation: 
The fatal error was made of attempting to avoid the danger of 
executive autocracy, not by devising means for imposing political 
or legal responsibility upon the President for acts that he might 
commit, but by making it constitutionally impossible for him to 
take essential executive action without first obtaining the 
20. It is generally believed that Dr. Sun Yat-sen himself made the initiative of 
offering Yuan the presidency of the republic after he secured the end of the Ching 
dynasty. 
21. Article 34 of the Provincial Constitution; for text, see THE CHINA YEAR-
BOOK 462-63 (1914). 
22. Article 35, id., at 463. 
23. For an examination of this document and its underlying principles in the light 
of the constitutions of other nations, especially the cases of the United States and 
France, seeM. TYAU, CHINA'S NEW CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
PROBLEMS 22-142 (1920). 
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approval of the parliament - which approval it was often 
impossible to obtain.24 
As the result of a general election in which the revolutionaries 
controlled the majority of the legislature, serious conflict between 
Yuan and the legislature became inevitable. The aim of the 
revolutionaries had been to impose a parliamentary regime on the 
country. Consequently, it is not surprising to find that a Constitution-
al Draft passed by them, the so-called Constitution Draft of the 
Temple of Heaven, was again dominated by provisions limiting 
executive and augmenting legislative power.25 As Yuan was a man of 
ambition and influence, he certainly could not live with this Draft. 
Nevertheless, his several attempts to secure modifications were 
disregarded and even his delegates were refused a hearing. A drastic 
measure immediately followed. The Kuomintang, composed mostly of 
the revolutionaries, was dissolved on the ground that it was a 
seditious organization. Since the presence of members of the Kuomin-
tang constituted a necessary quorum, this act virtually rendered the 
legislature incapable of doing any business. Yuan lost no time in 
securing another Constitution Draft, this time under his direction, 
and promulgated it immediately.26 All power over the administration 
was vested in the president; the power of the legislature was cut back. 
An astute dictator might have been satisfied with this arrange-
ment, but Yuan was a man of the old regime. He wanted to 
perpetuate his power and to be an Emperor. 27 However, the times had 
changed and monarchical schemes united the various political parties 
against him.28 After the annulment of all monarchical decrees 
24. W. WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN CHINA 36 
(1922). 
25. For text, see THE CHINA YEARBOOK 490-99 (1914). The place of drafting 
was the Temple of Heaven, where ancient Emperors had once offered annual sacrifices 
to Heaven on behalf of the people and pledged their obedience to the divine will that 
they should minister unto the wellbeing of the root or foundation of the country. 
Accordingly, this Constitution Draft was known as the Temple of Heaven Draft. 
26. THE CHINA YEARBOOK 437-43 (1916). 
27. It is important to note that a President Election Law, which was also his 
brilliant product, uniquely provided that not only was the term of office ten years, 
which is longer than any other country's president, but also that only the incumbent 
President was entitled to nominate three persons as presidential candidates. Moreover, 
the incumbent President was also eligible for reelection. For summary, see CHINA 
YEAR BOOK 434-35 (1916). 
28. Another significant factor that contributed to the end of the monarchical 
movement was the reservation of foreign powers. Since it was the time of the First 
World War, the international situation was so troubled that western powers had to 
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following Yuan's death, the dissolved parliament reconvened and the 
Provincial Constitution of 1912 was also revived. Although the final 
revision of the Constitutional Draft of the Temple of Heaven occupied 
most of the time of the governmental body, two major controversies 
prevented it from being effective. One involved the delimitation of 
powers between central and local government: that is, whether the 
provincial governors should be elected or appointed and what powers 
belong to the provinces. Another was the question of joining the 
Allied Powers to declare war against Germany. Not only did the 
legislature have different opinions, but also President Li and Premier 
Tuan were at odds. Under the pressure of local military governors, 
the legislature was again dissolved by President Li. Some of its 
members went to Canton to protest the illegal dissolution. Dr. Sun 
Y at-sen was elected generalissimo and was entrusted to form a 
separate government in the south. However, elements of the govern-
ment included military leaders who were not Sun's true followers. It 
was thus impossible to expect it to function smoothly, and nothing of 
a constructive nature was ever done to advance the course of 
constitutional development. 29 
After the failure of the ridiculous restoration of the Ching 
dynasty by militarist Chang Hsun, Premier Tuan gained executive 
power and formed another parliament. In order to emphasize its 
legitimacy, a new Draft Constitution appeared in 1919.30 This was 
essentially the same as the Draft Constitution of the Temple of 
Heaven. 
However, another strong faction led by Tsao Kun defeated Tuan 
in the following year. Tsao was thus scheming for the presidency. At 
that time, former President Li was called back again for the purpose 
of disputing the legitimacy claimed by the separate southern 
government. When Tsao sufficiently prepared himself to be elected 
fight for their survival in Europe. They feared Japan would fish in the troubled water 
which resulted from the confrontation between Yuan and revolutionaries. Japan had 
not had a particular inclination towards the Republic since its inception, and Yuan 
himself was even less loved by the Japanese because he had campaigned against the 
Japanese interests in Korea during the later period of the Ching dynasty. In addition, 
after very comprehensive intelligence work, the Japanese concluded that opposition 
against Yuan was considerable and that it was thus unwise to lend support to Yuan. 
29. For a detailed examination of the constitutionality of both the Peking and the 
Canton government, see WILLOUGHBY, supra note 24, at 18-27. 
30. For text, see W. PAN, THE CHINESE CONSTITUTION 179-90, app. F. 
(1945). 
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president, Li was ousted in an act of outrageous rudeness. 31 Some 
members of the parliament could not tolerate this incident and went 
south to Shanghai in an attempt to organize another legislature. 
However, some of them were bribed by Tsao back to Peking to elect 
him president. In order to divert attention from its ignoble behavior, 
the legislature hurriedly adopted a Constitution (in only seven days) 
and promulgated it on October 10, 1923, the same day Tsao Kun was 
inaugurated.32 
On the whole, the similarities between the Constitution and the 
Draft Constitution of the Temple of Heaven are considerable. The 
major difference lies in the distinct powers of the central and 
provincial government. It is unlike either the Constitution of Canada, 
where residual powers are not mentioned and belong to the central 
government,33 or that of the United States, where the residual powers 
are definitely reserved to the states.34 The Chinese Constitution 
stipulated that when any matter arose not specified in the Constitu-
tion, it should be under the jurisdiction of the republic if by its nature 
it concerned the republic, and under the jurisdiction of a province if 
by its nature it concerned the province.35 Also, the principle of 
31. The whole process, summarized as follows, shows the tyranny of warlordism. 
At first, units of garrison demonstrated before his residence demanding to be financed, 
and police refused to carry out the order to disperse hooligans who were making noise. 
Then telephone and water lines were cut off. In response to the demand from Li to 
discipline their soldiers, the commanders tendered their own resignations. Knowing his 
helpless situation, he left Peking for Tientsin with the presidential seal, apparently 
intending to exercise authority there. But he was held prisoner on arrival at the 
railway station in Tientsin until he gave up the presidential seal and signed the 
resignation proclamation prepared for him. See F. HOUN, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
OF CHINA 1912-1928, 131-32 (1957). However, it is interesting to note that two other 
famous Chinese scholars disputed a part of this incident by claiming that President Li 
concealed the presidential seal in a French hospital in Peking; see C. LO, CHUNG-
KUO HSIEN-FA-SHIH (Constitutional History of China) 192 (1967); II C. LE, supra 
note 16, at 599. 
32. For text, see THE CHINA YEAR BOOK 694-705 (1925). 
33. The opening words of section 91 of the British North American Act of 1867 
conferred on the federal Parliament the power "to make laws for the peace, order, and 
good government of Canada, in relation to all matters not coming within the classes of 
subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the provinces .... "It is 
clear from this language that any matter which does not come within a provincial 
power must be within the power of the federal parliament. This is said to be designed 
to create a stronger central government in Canada than exists in the United States. 
For a detailed examination of a variety of possible dividing lines employed to deal with 
the distribution of powers in Canada, see P. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF 
CANADA 241-65 (1977). 
34. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
35. Article III. 
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self-government was extensively emphasized. In other words, the 
influence of federalism was strongly imbued. The reason for this 
attitude can be explained by the movement of the provincial 
self-government. This movement arose as a result of some provinces 
seeking autonomy in their domestic affairs in order to avoid the 
conflicts between the north and south as well as their individual 
continuous factional strife. It first appeared in the Hunan province 
and spread to several other provinces. However, except for Hunan and 
Chekiang, both of which drafted constitutions, others only either 
announced their intent to have self-government or had constitutional 
drafts. In addition, a gathering of eight civic groups which called 
themselves the Conference on the State of the Nation in Shanghai in 
1922 also drafted a federal constitution. 36 In fact, self-government 
never was realized in any province at all, because it was used by the 
local military governor to assure himself of a semi-independent 
position, free from either the interference of the central government 
in Peking or the encroachment of the neighboring military governors. 
In 1924 military strife brought down Tsao Kun and his Constitu-
tion. A new Constitution Draft was promulgated in 1925 which 
resembled the former Constitution except that the lines of the federal 
system were more clearly drawn.37 
In the following three years the Peking government did not even 
need to pay lip service to the drafting of a constitution in order to 
legitimatize its regime. In short, within seventeen years five constitu-
tions or constitution drafts had been sponsored by the government 
after the establishment of the republic in 1911, not to mention 
numerous constitutions drafted by private persons or organizations. 
Despite the utterly discredited versions, the 1923 Constitution was 
doubtless the best drafted because it was the product of the 
Constitution Draft of the Temple of Heaven which not only repre-
sented a new spirit at the time it was drafted, but was also much 
debated and was reviewed several times by the parliament. Neverthe-
less, constitutionalism cannot be realized merely by the promulgation 
of a single paper. Since militarists controlled both the central and 
local government, they almost invariably devised constitutions that 
promoted their own personal interests. The real meaning of constitu-
tionalism did not concern them at all. Thus constitution-making 
during this period was simply a farce. 
36. For text, see LO, supra note 31, at 181-82. 
37. For text, see CHINA YEAR BOOK 1234-48 (1926). 
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The preceding discussion has shown that the 1911 revolution 
failed to build a new Chinese state based upon the western idea of a 
constitutional parliament and cabinet. What are the reasons for this 
failure? First, elements of the revolutionary party were largely 
recruited from overseas Chinese, students studying abroad, members 
of the new model army, and several secret societies. These groups had 
no common objective beyond the overthrow of the Ching government. 
Very few of them had a thorough understanding of the real spirit and 
method of constitutionalism and democracy. Second, the 1911 revolu-
tion had failed to bring about far-reaching changes in social, political, 
and ideological areas. The old bureaucracy and military establish-
ments, personified by an ambitious general, were left intact. Third, 
the success of the revolution was based not upon the people, but upon 
the local governments of the various provinces. In other words, the 
revolutionaries had not been able and indeed had seldom attempted 
to mobilize mass support on a large scale either in the cities or in the 
countryside. 
The chaotic condition was brought to end, at least nominally, by 
the Kuomintang or Nationalist Party in 1928 after the successful 
Northern Expedition against the warlords. According to Dr. Sun, the 
founder of the party, the first phase of national reconstruction- the 
period of military operation - had been completed and the next stage 
of political tutelage was to begin. Its underlying purpose was to 
educate the people to exercise their political rights. Beginning in the 
village and county, the Kuomintang were to organize local self-
government and finally elect delegates to form the National Assem-
bly, whose duties were the adoption of the constitution and the 
establishment of a government in accordance with its provisions. All 
of this having been accomplished, the country would enter the last 
phase - constitutional government. During this period the party was 
to be entrusted with the responsibility of nursing the country until 
the country was strong enough to look after itself. A necessary 
corollary to this was the supremacy of the Kuomintang. 
The "Provisional Constitution of the Political Tutelage Period" 
clearly bears witness to this assumption.38 Article 30 provides that: 
38. For text, see PAN, supra note 30, at 247-55, app. L. The adoption of the 
Provisional Constitution was the reaction to the promulgation of a Constitution Draft 
(Taiyuan Draft), which was drafted by some famous figures who wished to maintain 
their own forces and resisted the ascendency of Chiang Kai-Shek; they nevertheless 
failed in the following civil war. See T. CH'IEN, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 
OF CHINA 137 (1967). 
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During the period of political tutelage, the National Congress of 
the Kuomintang delegates (Kuo-Min-Tang-Ch'uan-Kuo-Tai-Piao-
Ta-Hui) shall exercise the governing powers on behalf of the 
National Assembly (Kuo-Min-Ta-Hui). During the adjournment 
of the National Congress of the Kuomintang, the Central 
Executive Committee of the Kuomintang shall exercise the said 
powers. 
All the important offices of the government, including that of 
president, were filled by persons selected and appointed by the 
Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang.39 The government. 
doubtless was to be under the direction and supervision of the 
Kuomintang.40 However, we must bear in mind that the party 
dictatorship was never supposed to last for an indefinite period. The 
preamble to the Provisional Constitution also clearly spelled this out. 
The fact that the Kuomintang had to fight continuously against its 
own separatist elements, Communists and Japanese, however, slowed 
any progress toward the early termination of political tutelage. 
Nevertheless, there was impressive progress in the area of 
material construction: currency was unified, a revenue system and 
budget were established, banking institutions were reformed, modern 
industries were developed, and railroad and highway construction 
were undertaken.41 The most notable success during this period was in 
the area of foreign affairs. Instead of resorting to unilateral abolition 
of treaties imposed by foreign powers, the central government carried 
on several negotiations. The Sino-American treaty, which was the 
first to establish the principle of complete tariff autonomy, was signed 
39. Article 72. 
40. Political tutelage is often labeled undemocratic. However, the essential of a 
successful democracy lies in the existence of necessary conditions. In the case of China, 
not only had illiteracy been high, but also the living standards as well as the 
experience in self-government were low. There was a definite need for a training period 
before the commencement of a constitutional government. Professor A.N. Holcombe 
made a discerning observation by stating: "It is evident that his [Dr. Sun] distinction 
between the different stages of revolutionary process is sound. . . . The period of 
tutelage when it shall have been securely established, will make an undoubtable 
advance." A. HOLCOMBE, THE CHINESE REVOLUTION 312 (1931l. 
41. For a detailed discussion of China's economy and finance during this period, 
see Young, China's Fiscal Transformation, 1927·1937; Chang, Toward Modernization 
of China's Currency and Banking, 1927-1937, in THE STRENUOUS DECADE: 
CHINA'S NATION-BUILDING EFFORTS, 1927-1937, at 83-170 (P. Sih ed. 1970l. 
Hung-Hsun Ling also gives detailed account of the Communication construction; see A 
Decade of Railroad Construction, 1926-1936, at 255-88. 
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on July 25, 1928.42 This was followed by treaties with other 
countries.43 By 1930 the central government was also very likely to 
secure treaties with all minor foreign nations by abolishing the 
extraterritorial rights of their citizens.« However, not until 1943 did 
Britain and the United States lead the way to surrender of their 
extraterritorial rights.45 Five foreign concessions among twenty-six 
had been relinquished by foreign powers through the efforts of the 
central government.46 The aim of equality in the international society 
was not far from being reached. 
On the other hand, the Kuomintang itself should not be 
exonerated for its failure to enforce effectively those tasks entrusted 
to it.47 This is especially true on the local level where the members of 
Kuomintang seriously impeded the development of self-government, 
its central responsibility. As a result, many became impatient with 
the lack of significant progress. The demand for drafting & constitu-
tion spread rapidly, receiving greater impetus after the Japanese 
42. For text, see CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, 
TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS WITH AND CONCERNING CHINA 1919-1929, at 
230-31 (1929); see generally Dennis, Treaty Regulating Tariff Relations Between the 
United States and China, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 829-32 (1928). 
43. These treaties were concluded during the last two months in 1928. The list 
includes Norway (November 12), Italy (November 27), Denmark (December 12), 
Portugal (December 20), France (December 22), and Spain (December 27). For texts, see 
id., at 273-38, 243-73. 
44. Originally, there were nineteen countries which enjoyed the right of 
extraterritoriality in China. Except for Austria-Hungary and Germany, which lost 
their right as a consequence of World War I, and the Soviet Union, which voluntarily 
relinquished it after the Bolshevik Revolution, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Portugal, and 
Spain agreed to its termination when other participating states of the Washington 
Conference of 1921-1922 or the majority of states enjoying extraterritoriality would 
agree to do the same. Brazil, Norway, and the Netherlands also expressed their 
willingness to comply with the Chinese desire to terminate extraterritoriality; see W. 
TUNG, CHINA AND THE FOREIGN POWERS: THE IMPACT OF AND REACTION 
TO UNEQUAL TREATIES 254-57 (1970). 
45. For the texts of these two treaties, see Y. CHEN, TREATIES AND 
AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND OTHER POWERS 
1929-1954, at 140-55 (1957). A comprehensive study of the origin, development and 
the abolition of the extraterritoriality in China is provided by W. Fishel in THE END 
OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN CHINA 145-87 (1952). 
46. Great Britain relinquished her concessions in the following cities: Hankow and 
Kiukiang in 1927, Chinking in 1929, and Amoy in 1930; Belgium returned her 
concession in Tientsin in 1929. For texts, see CARNEGIE, supra note 42, at 205-16, 
and CHEN, supra note 45, at 18-20, 63-65, 1-6. 
47. Even a sympathizer of the Kuomintang has to admit this inefficiency; see W. 
TUNG, THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS OF MODERN CHINA 128 (1964). 
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invasion of Manchuria, the northeast part of China, in 1931. 
Recognizing that the popular demand was too strong to resist, the 
Kuomintang began to draft a constitution by the Legislative Yuan 
even though not a single province had had local self-government, 
which was the prerequisite for the period of constitutional govern-
ment according to Dr. Sun's teaching. 
The first draft, which appeared in June 1933, wa·s solely the 
product of Dr. John C.H. Wu.48 In order to solicit comment and 
criticism, it was released to the public. After examining those critical 
responses, another draft known as the Preliminary Draft of the 
Constitution of the Republic of China was completed and again 
released. Since the public continued to react to this version, the 
drafting committee had to revise the Draft. This Draft later went 
through three readings and when published by the Legislative Yuan 
was known as the "First Draft of the Constitution of the Republic of 
China." 
After receiving instructions from the Central Executive Commit-
tee of the Kuomintang, the Legislative Yuan undertook to draw up 
the necessary amendments and promulgated the "Second Draft." 
Again, the Kuomintang produced its commentary on the Draft and 
the Legislative Yuan had to make further revisions. It was finally 
promulgated by the National Government on May 5, 1936 and was 
popularly known as the "Draft Constitution of Double Five."49 
It seemed that a permanent constitution would soon be prom-
ulgated. Nevertheless, the election of delegates to attend the National 
Assembly which would be charged with the responsibility of drafting 
a final constitution encountered difficulties since some parts of the 
northern provinces were then under the control of a semi-autonomous 
regime which was supported by the Japanese. After full-scale war 
broke out in July 7, 1937, an indefinite postponement of the 
convocation of the National Assembly was inevitable. 
In retrospect, we have to acknowledge that in draftsmanship this 
latest version was far superior to all the earlier drafts. It was the 
result of tedious work by the Legislative Yuan for a period of more 
48. It is interesting to note that Dr. Wu was one of several intimates of the late 
Mr. Justice Holmes of the United States Supreme Court. Their relationship began 
when Dr. Wu sent an article about ancient Chinese law published in the Michigan Law 
Review to Justice Holmes for comment. Their friendship lasted for eleven years 
<1921-32). Their intimate correspondence was collected in JUSTICE HOLMES TO 
DOCTOR WU. 
49. For the major differences between these various drafts, see T. CH'IEN, supra 
note 38, at 298-303. 
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than three years. Most of all, the political theories bequeathed by Dr. 
Sun Yat-sen had been strictly adhered to.50 For example, in addition 
to the five-power government which combined the typical western 
doctrine of separation of powers and the two traditional Chinese 
systems of the censorate and civil service examination, 51 Dr. Sun had 
made a brilliant demarcation between the power of the people 
(political power) which included election, recall, initiative, and 
referendum, and the power of the government (governing power) 
which performed its functions through the five Yuans. The former 
would be exercised by the National Assembly, which was to be the 
organ that government was responsible to. Accordingly, not only the 
president and vice-president, but also th~ members of the Legislative 
and Control Yuan were to be elected and subjected to recall by the 
National Assembly,52 which would be composed of delegates elected 
by popular vote. 
50. A detailed examination of the provisions of the Draft can be found in PAN, 
supra note 30, at 64-88. 
51. In the whole structure of the imperial Chinese government two institutions 
were particularly noteworthy. One was the censorate, the other, the civil service 
examination. It is generally agreed that the service provided by the censorate to the 
traditional Chinese government was unique. Briefly, it surveyed governmental 
activities and exposed violations of law and derelictions of duty by government 
personnel, with the intent both to purge the administration of incompetence, 
arbitrariness, and malfeasance and to stimulate the implementation of prevailing 
political doctrine. See Hucker, The Traditional Chinese Censorage and the New Peking 
Regime, 45 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1041 (1951). Like the censorate, the competitive 
examination system for civil service is another unique contribution made by the 
Chinese. For detail, see Teng, Chinese Influence on the Western Examination, 7 HARV. 
J. ASIA STUD. 267, 268-70 (1943). In a centralized government the examination 
system accomplished several things: uniformity in written language was achieved; 
communications between localities and the capital were strengthened; and most of all 
the throne was stabilized by controlling the thought of the leading social group and 
channeling it into the lines of an official ideology which emphasized the principles of 
loyalty and service. On the other hand, this system had the unhealthy tendency to 
stupefy the active minds of the race, particularly after the overformalization of essay 
writing and the overemphasis on caligraphy and poetical composition in the Ming 
dynasty. This, combined with the continuing ignorance of the importance of science 
and technology, might have contributed to the lack of an active and fruitful response to 
the new problems and ideas resulting from the interchange with western culture. See 
W. FRANKE, THE REFORM AND ABOLITION OF THE TRADITIONAL CHINESE 
EXAMINATION SYSTEM 25-27 !1960). In spite of all these defects, the main 
argument for the examination was that it facilitated social mobility and insured the 
government a continuing supply of new blood. Therefore, to the western practice of 
dividing the government into the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, the 
Chinese system added two more, the examination and the control. The Five Yuan 
(branches) stand on equal footing and the president is above them as the head of state. 
52. Article 32. 
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Contrary to the common belief, the war did not necessarily stifle 
the development of democracy in China. Since this was an "all out" 
war against foreign aggression, the nation had to achieve unity and 
solidarity in order to overcome so powerful an enemy. The People's 
Political Council was brought into being. Although not all members 
were elected by popular vote, they represented all of the existing 
political parties including the Communists. In spite of the seemingly 
undemocratic means of choosing its members and its limited func-
tions, its work was comparatively satisfactory. Several committees 
within the Council dealt with reviewing the Draft Constitution of 
Double Five which had been established without producing any 
concrete results. 
Immediately after General Marshall came to China to serve as a 
mediator between the Kuomintang and the Communists, the "Politi-
cal Consultative Conference" was h~ld in Chungking from January 10 
to January 30, 1946. It was composed of 29 delegates representing 
different political parties and groups. A number of radical revisions 
were proposed by it. Among them, the National Assembly, the 
essential part of the original system of government, was to be 
abolished and the president was to be elected and recalled by 
representatives of the county, the provincial and central assemblies, 
before popular elections were to be held; a system of ministerial 
responsibility was to be adopted with the Executive Yuan correspond-
ing to the cabinet and the Legislative Yuan corresponding to the 
parliament; the Control Yuan was to be transformed into an upper 
chamber, elected by the provincial assemblies and exercising the 
functions of consent, impeachment, censure, etc. 
Predictably, these changes were difficult for the Kuomintang to 
accept. However, after reaching a compromise between the Kuomin-
tang and other political parties - save the absent Communists - the 
National Assembly was restored, but with a very limited function. 
Moreover, the influence of the cabinet government was reduced by 
depriving the Executive Yuan of its right to dissolve the Legislative 
Yuan and by failing to provide the Legislative Yuan with the 
no-confidence vote characteristic in other parliament countries.53 
53. C. LIN, CHUNG-HUA-MIN-KUO HSIEN-FA SHIH-LU (An Analytical Study 
of the Constitution of the Republic of China) 116 (1975!. However, Ch'ien Tuang-sheng 
maintained that no compromise had been reached and the Reviewing Committee of the 
Political Consultative Conference simply followed the wish of the Kuomintang; see 
CH'IEN, supra note 38, at 319. James D. Seymour concurred with this argument; see 
Seymour, Republic of China, in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE 
WORLD 9 (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz ed. 1974). A close and further examination of those 
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This latest draft has served as the basis for the Constitution of 
1946 and it has been and still is the fundamental law of Nationalist 
China. 54 
The promulgation of a constitution did not bring China into the 
era of constitutionalism. On the contrary, the civil war accelerated to 
an unprecedented extent. Amidst the war, the first session of the first 
term of the National Assembly convened at Nanking in 1948. 
Although proposals to amend the Constitution were numerous, it was 
hardly conceivable that many radical amendments would be passed, 
particularly since the constitution had been enacted only sixteen 
months earlier and some three-fourths of the delegates were the same 
persons who attended the Constituent National Assembly which had 
produced it. Finally, instead of any formal amendment to the 
Constitution, the "Temporary Provisions for the Duration of Mobiliza-
tion to Suppress the Rebellion" [hereinafter referred to as the 
Temporary Provisions] were adopted, though in fact their adoption 
followed the procedures prescribed for the amendment to the Consti-
tution. 
According to these provisions, the President was permitted, for 
the period in question, by resolution of the Executive Yuan Council,S5 
to take any emergency measure in order to prevent the state or the 
people from facing immediate dangers or to cope with serious 
financial or economic crises as prescribed in articles 39 and 43 of the 
Constitution, without being subject to the procedural restrictions of 
the Legislative Yuan. These two articles were the origin of the 
President's emergency powers. The first provides that the President 
may declare a state of siege but has to secure previous approval or 
subsequent ratification by the Legislative Yuan, which may ask the 
President to lift the state of siege by resolution. The second provides 
that the President in the case of natural calamity, epidemic, or a 
amendments and provisions of the Constitution later adopted by the National 
Assembly reveals that almost all of the letter and spirit of the amendments were 
incorporated into the Constitution. This was made at the insistence of Chiang Kai-shek 
in hopes that the Communists would thus have gone back to the peace talk; see Y. 
CHIANG, CHUNG-KUO CHIN-TAI-SZU CHUAN-LIEH-TIEN (The Turning Point of 
Modern Chinese History) 175-76 (1976). It is important to note here that Mr. Chiang 
had actively participated in the Political Consultative Conference as well as the 
National Assembly and he is the member of China Democratic Socialist Party. 
54. For text, see TUNG, supra note 47, at app. G. 
55. The Council is composed of the premier and vice-premier of the Executive 
Yuan, heads of the ministries and commissions and Minister of State with the premier 
as chairman. It is responsible for discussion and finalization of statutory or budgetary 
bills, and other important matters to be submitted to the Legislative Yuan. 
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serious financial or economic crisis may, when the Legislative Yuan 
is in recess, by resolution of the Executive Yuan Council, issue 
emergency decrees, but they have to be confirmed by the Legislative 
Yuan within a month. 
Given the fact that a civil war was in full swing, not only did 
military efforts require strengthening, but also economic measures 
were desperately needed to save the country from bankruptcy. The 
extension of Presidential power was understandable. However, we 
should question the necessity of exempting the restriction imposed by 
article 39, particularly since the Legislative Yuan could always 
subsequently confirm the declaration of state of siege; the immediate 
action taken by the President to deal with any exigency could hardly 
have been impeded. 
The only restriction which now may be placed on the new 
extensive presidential power is that under article 57 the Legislative 
Yuan may by resolution ask the Executive Yuan to modify or annul 
such presidential power. Nevertheless, article 57 provides that the 
President can veto such a resolution, which in turn can be overruled 
only with a two-thirds majority. It is scarcely conceivable that the 
President could not even command a following of one-third of the 
Legislative Yuan. Accordingly, the wisdom of drafting the "Tempor-
ary Provisions" was manifestly questionable and the criticisms of its 
unwarranted expansion of the presidential power have force. 
A series of four amendments have been attached to the "Tempor-
ary Provisions," two of which are worthy of mention here. 56 The first 
amendment, which was adopted in 1960, waived the restriction placed 
by the Constitution against a third-term reelection of the President. 57 
The reason was obvious. The continuing leadership of President 
Chiang Kai-shek was necessary to maintain the political continuity 
and stability of the government. During that time he was the only 
person with a significant enough reputation to be identified with all 
of China and keep the economic and political transformation in 
Taiwan proceeding smoothly. The last amendment, adopted in 1973, 
authorized the government to conduct supplementary elections in the 
areas it actually controlled. Since 1971 when it lost its seat in the 
United Nations, Nationalist China has suffered a series of severe 
56. Two other amendments not given in detail here relate to the enforcement of 
initiative and referendum by the National Assembly and the creation of some 
government agencies. For details, see Cheng, A Study on the Temporary Provisions of 
the Constitution of the Republic of China, 13 CHINA CULTURE 4: 38-57 (1972). 
57. Article 47. 
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diplomatic setbacks. These setbacks have had repercussions in its 
domestic politics. In particular, a movement toward internal political 
modernization has been initiated. One of its major goals was the 
solution of the problem of attrition in the membership of the national 
representative groups due to age. Of the 2961 National Assembly 
members elected in 1947, only 1393 were still serving in 1971; of the 
759 members of the Legislative Yuan, 434 remained; and in the 
Control Yuan, where the average age of members was over sixty-five 
years,58 membership declined from 180 in 1949 to 69 in April 1971. 
Because it claims to be the only government of China, the Nationalist 
Chinese government was reluctant to hold a general election in 
Taiwan. Nevertheless, the ROC government has had to recognize the 
phenomenon of political stagnation and the rising demands of its local 
residents to participate in the policy-making process. As a result, in 
1972, 53 new members were elected to the National Assembly, 36 to 
the Legislative Yuan, and 7 to the Control Yuan. Their terms are 
three (Legislative Yuan) and six years (Control Yuan and National 
Assembly), respectively, according to the provisions of the Constitu-
tion. 
On June 11, 1980, the Government announced the further 
expansion of the number of new members for the above three bodies. 
In total 204 new members will be elected in Taiwan - 76 to the 
National Assembly, bringing the total to 1218, 96 to the Legislative 
Yuan, bring the total to 412, and 32 to Control Yuan, bringing the 
total to 74.59 Among the three bodies, the most important one is the 
Legislative Yuan. The election of 96 new members to this body would 
significantly revitalize that body. Moreover, many remaining mem-
bers are too old or ill to be active. As a result, less than half of the 
remaining members regularly attend the meetings of the Yuan. So, 
in practical terms, after the recent increase of the membership, 
approximately half of the active members of the Legislative Yuan 
will be elected in Taiwan.60 
58. See generally, Wei, Political Development in the Republic of China on Taiwan, 
in CHINA AND THE QUESTIONS OF TAIWAN 74-111 CH. Chiu ed. 1973!. 
59. Parliamentary Seats Added, 21 FREE CHINA WEEKLY 1 (No. 23, June 
1980). 
60. See Hungdah Chiu, The Future of Political Stability in Twaiwan, in TAIWAN: 
ONE YEAR AFTER UNITED STATES-CHINA NORMALIZATION <A SENATE 
FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE WORKSHOP> 40-41 <June 1980J. 
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On the provincial and local levels, however, self-government has 
been fully practiced on Taiwan since 1951. With the exception of the 
governor, who is appointed by the Executive Yuan,all chief executive 
officials and members of the legislative assemblies have been chosen 
by direct vote of the people. 
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CHAPTER IV 
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A. Reasons for Establishing a Specialized 
Constitutional Court 
67 
After reviewing the history of Chinese Constitutions, one may 
ask, assuming that the current constitution may not be changed in 
the near future because of the political realities, how can it adapt 
itself to the changing political and economic setting? In other words, 
how can the constitution continue to remain inviolable and yet not 
hinder the rapid development of the country? A sound system of 
constitutional interpretation is needed; in essence, this is the system 
of judicial review in the constitutional context. Under this system, 
judges interpret the constitution in such a way that it still serves as a 
supreme living law in daily life even though it was actually drafted 
years ago. Thus it can maintain its highest place in a hierarchy of 
legal norms within a country by striking down those statutes which 
conflict with it. 
Neither the "Principles of Constitution" nor the "Nineteen 
Articles" promulgated by the Ching government mentioned the 
system of judicial review. The first provision for judicial review 
appeared in the Constitution Draft of the Temple of Heaven of 1913. 
The power of interpretation of the future Constitution belonged to the 
legislature/ a conclusion drawn from the French model of govern-
ment in which the legislature has full authority to interpret its own 
statutes. The 1919 Constitution Draft adopted a system that entitled 
only the leaders of the legislature and judiciary to compose a special 
conference handling the task of interpretation.2 Although the Consti-
tution of 1923 still followed the principle of parliamentary supremacy 
with minor revision/ it established that the Highest Court of Justice 
had the authority to pass judgment on conflicts between national law 
and provincial law! The 1925 Constitution Draft seemed to move a 
1. Articles 112 & 113. 
2. Article 101. 
3. By relaxing the quorum for passing a decision from two-thirds presence and 
three-fourths concurrence to two-thirds presence and concurrence provided in article 
141. 
4. Article 28. 
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step toward the creation of a special constitutional court whose 
members included a chief justice, four other justices of the Supreme 
Court and four other persons nominated and elected by the legisla-
ture.5 
Since the National Government was guided by the Kuomintang 
during the political tutelage period, the Central Executive Committee 
of the Party had the final say on those conflicts between statutes and 
the "Provisional Constitution during the Period of Political Tutel-
age."6 A variety of devices were proposed during the draft of 
"Constitution Draft of Double Five."7 It was finally decided that "the 
question [ot1 whether a law is in conflict with the Constitution shall 
be settled by the Control Yuan submitting the point to the Judicial 
Yuan for interpretation within six months after its enforcement."8 
However, it failed to decide whether the Supreme Court or another 
specialized court which it would create within the Judicial Yuan was 
to assume the task. 
Although the American practice of judging the constitutionality 
of laws by regular courts has been followed by a number of countries, 
an alternative was established in Austria in 1920 with the creation of 
a Constitutional Court that specializes in this function.9 There were 
several reasons for this structural change. Since the principle of stare 
decisis is not a part of the civil law system, at least in theory, courts 
are not generally bound even by the decisions of the highest court.10 
Thus, there may theoretically exist a conflict among courts on the 
question of whether a statute is constitutional.11 Furthermore, the 
existence of a separate administrative court independent of the 
regular courts which occasionally had to apply the same statutes as 
5. Article 94. 
6. Article 85. 
7. See generally T. TSAO, THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF MOD-
ERN CHINA 164-65 {1947). 
8. Article 140. 
9. Since the United States Supreme Court has limited its jurisdiction in the 
public law area through the procedure of certiorari, the contrast between these two 
systems, at least in terms of the nature of the work handled by them, may not be so 
stark; see Frankfurter and Landis, The Supreme Court Under the Judiciary Act of 
1925, 42 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18 {1928). 
10. As a matter of fact, since one important indicator in deciding the promotion of 
judges in lower courts is the rate at which their decisions are upheld by the higher 
courts, they simply cannot risk ignoring the lines laid down by the decisions of superior 
courts. 
11. However, it is arguable that the danger of a lack of uniformity is not so great 
under such a unified country as Austria in which no state court exists at all. 
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the ordinary court aggravated the possible contradiction among 
judicial organs.12 
Most of all, the exercise of judicial review differs in character as 
well as in meaning from those functions performed by an ordinary 
court. It extends into the field of politics. The constitutional judge has 
to relate every clause of the constitution to political reality. In other 
words, he must, more than the ordinary judge, also understand 
something of the essence of politics and of those social forces which 
determine political life. However, judges in civil law countries are 
career judges who generally enter the judiciary soon after graduation 
from the university, where their training has emphasized strict 
legal-analytical studies. These civil law judges simply do not have the 
opportunity to acquire practical experience. As a result, they 
inevitably promote a narrow application of the letter of the law and 
can hardly be expected to make any effort to question the legality of a 
provision in a statute.13 Hence in civil law countries it is highly 
advisable to create a specialized constitutional court, whose members 
are drawn from a variety of backgrounds outside the bench. 
By explicitly providing in article 171 of the current Chinese 
Constitution that "laws that are in conflict with the Constitution 
shall be null and void," the principle of judicial review is firmly 
established. Article 173 vests the power of constitutional interpreta-
tion in the Judicial Yuan. In addition, article 78 of chapter seven 
reiterates that "the Judicial Yuan shall interpret the Constitution 
and shall have the power to unify the interpretation of laws and 
orders." This chapter includes articles 77-82, which are equivalent to 
Article III of the United States Constitution. Since the Judicial Yuan 
is the highest organ of the state and is charged with civil, criminal 
and administrative cases, it may appear that the American model of 
judicial review was followed. The next article, however, clearly 
suggests the opposite since it provides that "the Judicial Yuan shall 
have a certain number of Grand Justices to take charge of matters 
specified in article 78 of this Constitution, who shall be nominated 
and, with the consent of the Control Yuan, appointed by the President 
of the Republic." A specialized tribunal is thereby created above and 
12. Kelsen, Judicial Review of Legislation, 4 J. POL. 183, 186 (1942). 
13. The cases of Weimer Germany and Italy from 1948-1956 amply evidence the 
unsuitability of the so-called "decentralized" American system in civil law countries. 
For an excellent treatment on the rationale of establishing the "centralized" judicial 
review, see M. CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY 
WORLD 53-66 (1971). 
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outside the regular court structure. Accordingly, the Chinese Consti-
tution not only recognizes the principle of judicial review, but also 
establishes a special court to pass judgment on constitutional 
questions. 
B. Members 
The Constitution leaves the composition of the Council of Grand 
Justices entirely to enabling legislation. The Organic Law of the 
Judicial Yuan, adopted by the Legislative Yuan on March 31, 1947, to 
become effective simultaneously with the new Constitution, further 
affirms in article 3 that there shall be a Council of Grand Justices in 
the Judicial Yuan, composed of seventeen such Justices. 14 The 
American lawyer accustomed to a nine-member court, may consider 
this number of justices too large. As a matter of fact, the United 
States may be the only country having a nine-member court. 15 Again, 
in contrast to an absence of any constitutional or statutory qualifica-
tions for the Supreme Court Justices of the United States,t6 article 4 
of the Organic Law of the Judicial Yuan explicitly provides that only 
those persons who have one of the following qualifications shall be 
eligible as a Grand Justice: 
1. having served as a justice of the Supreme Court for more 
than ten years with a distinguished record of service; 
2. having served as a member of the Legislative Yuan for more 
than nine years and having contributed significantly to its 
activities; 
3. having taught for more than ten years some major courses at 
a university or college, and produced some specialized 
writings in the field of law; 
4. having been a justice of the International Court or an author 
of some authoritative books in the field of public law or 
comparative law, and 
14. Article 3. 
15. The Constitutional Council of the Fifth French Republic consists of nine 
appointed members, but in addition thereto all fonner Presidents of the Republic are 
ex officio members for life. Some countries even have an even number of justices, 
ranging from Ireland with six, to West Gennany with sixteen, and Switzerland with 
twenty-six. 
16. However, a law degree has been considered to be an unwritten prerequisite for 
membership in the Supreme Court as well as other federal courts in the United States; 
see H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS 41 (1974). 
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5. being erudite in jurisprudence and having experience and 
renown in politics. 
Paragraph two of the same article further stipulates that the number 
of Grand Justices appointed by virtue of each of the above items shall 
not exceed one third of the total number. 
Whether one favors the American or Chinese method of choosing 
the members of the court is a matter of personal preference. Among 
those countries that established a special constitutional court, almost 
all regulate the composition of the court. 17 A country without any 
experience in creating the system of judicial review needs detailed 
regulation to insure that the backgrounds of its court members will 
be diversified; this characteristic is particularly desirable in the 
formative stages of the court. 
Lawyers were deliberately excluded from the above categories, 
which provides further evidence that their status needs to be raised. 
Because of the non-litigious character of the society and its emphasis 
on informal as well as personal means of resolving disputes, the 
lawyer's skill has historically been neither especially needed nor 
valued. Although the prestige of the Chinese lawyer seems to be on 
the rise - a result of the rapid development of a more complex society 
in a recent decade - compared with its American counterpart, it still 
has a long way to go. Still, there is the view of the Japanese that 
lawyers are often reluctant to sit on its Supreme Court, which decides 
constitutional cases incidental to regular litigation, because this 
position generally is not lucrative compared to business law practice. 
Although President Eisenhower deemed prior judicial experience 
crucial for nomination to the United States Supreme Court, only 
twenty-two among one hundred justices had ten or more years of 
previous judicial experience on any lower level court before they were 
appointed. Yet forty-two justices, including some who were regarded 
17. E.g., three of the sixteen members of each senate ofthe West German Federal 
Constitutional Court must be professional judges; fifteen Italian constitutional justices 
have to be drawn from among the high bench, university professors of law and 
attorneys of twenty years' standing. Although under heavy American influence, the 
Court Organization Law of Japan explicitly provided that ten of the fifteen members of 
its Supreme Court must have had at least ten years' experience as regular judges or a 
total of twenty years' experience as summary court judges, lawyers, procurators, or law 
professors (art. 41 sec. 1). In practice, the pattern of maintaining a definite share in 
three categories of judges- five from the bench, five from the bar, and five from the 
persons of knowledge and experience - has been followed ever since its inception. 
72 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
as the greatest, such as Marshall, Brandeis and Warren, had never 
been on the bench before. 18 An oft-quoted remark made by Justice 
Frankfurter applies here: "One is entitled to say without qualification 
that the correlation between prior judicial experience and fitness for 
the Supreme Court is zero."19 
Nevertheless, the necessity of having a certain number of justices 
drawn from the judiciary should not be ignored. Unlike all of the 
United States Supreme Court Justices who have had extensive legal, 
though not judicial, experience in actual life before their appoint-
ment/0 the legal profession in civil law countries is separately 
divided. A young law student ordinarily chooses his future occupation 
as judge, procurator, lawyer, civif servant, or law professor after 
graduation and generally sticks with it forever. Although it is 
theoretically possible to move from one of these professions to 
another, such moves are comparatively rare. It is thus possible that 
someone appointed to the constitutional court may never have 
practiced law to any extent or may have never attempted to take the 
bar examination at all. Total unfamiliarity with the legal procedure 
is conceivable. Another overriding consideration favoring the selec-
tion of persons with previous judicial experience in those countries is 
that they certainly have acquired some habits of independence, 
having remained at a considerable distance from actual politics. This 
is an extremely precious quality for the highest court undertaking 
constitutional review. 
Since the trial judge is mostly concerned with the laws of 
procedure and evidence, it is natural that he tends not to question the 
articulated doctrines of law. This is especially true when applied to 
civil law judges. Because they enter the judiciary while still quite 
young and inexperienced in regard to practicalities and since their 
advancement is relatively slow and based to a considerable extent 
upon seniority, strong judicial personalities and judicial lawmaking 
like those in America can hardly be developed. A traditional attitude 
of legal dogmatism and inflexibility is the natural consequence. 
Speaking of these career judges, Mauro Cappelletti and John Adams 
were of the opinion that "they have been trained in the execution of 
the law as it stands, and they tend to shy away from the type of 
18. See the table II in ABRAHAM, supra note 16, at 45-47. 
19. Frankfurter, The Supreme Court in the Mirror of Justices, 105 U. PENN. L. 
REV. 781-795 (1957). 
20. ABRAHAM, supra note 16, at 52. 
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policy-making decisions that are involved in judicial review."21 In 
view of the inevitable political character of the judicial review, it is 
wise that a constitutional court not only be composed of jurists, but 
also of statesmen. This has certainly been true of United States 
Supreme Court justices, who, except for Justice George Shiras, Jr. 
(1892-1903), have engaged in at least some public service at various 
levels of government.22 
Another difference from the American system of judicial review 
is that the term of service for the Chinese Grand Justices is fixed at 
nine years.23 Having learned from the sharp conflict between the 
United States Supreme Court and President Roosevelt in the 1930's, 
most justices of constitutional court justices have been subject to 
reappointment after a period of time. Since 1967 all fifteen Italian 
Justices hold office for nine years.24 After 1970, service on the Federal 
Constitutional Court of West Germany has been restricted to a single 
twelve-year term.25 Civil law countries have felt that life tenure 
might lead to carelessness in the performance of a court member's job 
or to his loss of contact with the life of the country. However, the 
advantages of a limited term seem more than outweighed by the 
resulting jeopardy to the judges' independence. This potential for 
political abuse has been somewhat moderated as most of the Chinese 
Grand Justices have been customarily re-elected.26 In this connection, 
it is noted that until recently Justices in both West Germany and 
Italy were not prohibited by law from seeking re-election.27 This is 
21. Cappelletti & Adams, Judicial Review of Legislation: European Antecedents 
and Adaption, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1207, 1215 (1966). 
22. ABRAHAM, supra note 16, at 52. 
23. Article 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Yuan. 
24. See Flanz & Figliola, Italy, in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF 
THE WORLD 26 (1973). 
25. Before that, those drawn from the bench still enjoyed life tenure until they 
reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-eight; other members of the Court were 
chosen for an eight-year term but were eligible for re-election. 
26. Because of the lack of available information, the author cannot find out the 
reason for those who failed to be nominated. However, except in two cases, all of those 
Grand Justices were seventy or more years old when their original term expired. The 
advanced age may have played a significant role in preventing them from seeking 
re-election. 
27. CONST. art. 135, para. 3 (Italy); Constitutional Court Act, art. 3 para. 4 <West 
Germany). There was also a proposal to eliminate the possibility of re-election during 
the debate of drafting the Law Governing the Council of Grand Justice in 1957; see 
LI-FA-YUAN-KUAN-PAO <Gazette of the Legislative Yuan), 20th., 4st sess. 50-58; 
5th sess. 105-6 (1957). However, it failed to be adopted. 
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probably a solution to the inherent defects of the fixed tenure, though 
stability and consistency may not be adequately guaranteed. 
From the establishment of the Council in 1948 up to 1978 there 
have been sixty-one Grand Justices. Twenty-seven belonged to the 
first term, seventeen to the second term, twenty-one to the third term, 
and fifteen to the current fourth term, which began on September 28, 
1976. The reader must wonder about these four seemingly magic 
numbers, which do not correspond to the required seventeen Grand 
Justices. A brief history is needed. At the time of its inauguration, 
only twelve Grand Justices had been duly appointed. The other five 
candidates had not been confirmed by the Control Yuan. Moreover, 
two of them also declined their nomination. After another Grand 
Justice died, eight more nominations were submitted to the Control 
Yuan, and all of them were confirmed. Since the civil war had already 
spread throughout the country, the Grand Justices simply could not 
get seriously down to work. After the National Government moved to 
Taiwan, only two of them reported for duty. 28 In March 1952, seven 
new members were added. With the original two appointed, they 
constituted a quorum and began to function. 
When their term expired in July 1958, fifteen new Grand 
Justices were appointed in September. As two of them died before the 
expiration of their term, new ones were added. The third term began 
on October 2, 1967 also with fifteen Grand Justices. As a result of 
death, withdrawal from duty, and transfer to other public service, six 
men and a woman were appointed. 
From the preceding historical survey we may conclude that the 
Grand Justices in the first term were most numerous but least 
organized. Only nine of them had really worked together for a period 
of seven years. The following question naturally arises. Why did the 
President in all but the first term nominate fewer Grand Justices 
than the number provided? The probable answer is that these two 
seats have been reserved for the members of two other minority 
parties, the Young China Party and the Chinese Democratic Socialist 
28. They were Hu Pao-ao and Su Shih-hsing. An inquiry was made of the 
whereabouts of the Grand Justices. It was found that one had been transferred to a 
cabinet post, one had resigned, four had died, and one had gone over to the Communist 
regime, while the whereabouts of others were simply unknown; see CHINA HAND-
BOOK 81 (1953-54). 
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Party,29 and we do not know whether they have ever attempted to 
provide any names for consideration to the President. 
At the time of their appointment, twenty of those sixty-one 
Grand Justices were justices of the Supreme Court and were thereby 
under the section one authorization, and seventeen were professors of 
law and were appointed according to section three. In addition, 
seventeen were actively involved in politics, five were highly 
regarded authors who were the second part of the fourth section 
appointees and four were section two's legislators. Only those who 
would qualify as Grand Justices under the first half of section four, 
which provides for persons having been a justice of the International 
Court, have never been appointed.30 
A superficial analysis concludes that justices, law professors, and 
politicians were the major components. However, a close analysis 
produces a somewhat different picture. Although there. were eight 
Grand Justices in the first term belonging to section five appointees, 
their numbers were reduced to six in both the second and the third 
term and, most of all, only one of the current fourth term members 
belongs to this group. Therefore, the influence of politicians has been 
reduced drastically recently. On the other hand, forty Grand Justices 
had engaged in some kind of public service in their previous career 
before their appointment to the Council, although such public service 
had not constituted a major part of their careers. It is worth 
mentioning that not a few of them are serving in the current term. 
Their impressive number supports our early contention that involve-
ment in public service is helpful to some extent in the career 
development of judges and professors. 
Only one Grand Justice in the first term was selected under the 
second part of the section four. Not until midway into the third term 
did another Grand Justice come to the council holding the same 
qualification. Three persons in the current term were nominated 
under this section. Because authors of books on law are generally also 
professors oflaw, the total number of such members therefore reaches 
29. For detailed information about these two parties, see T. CH'IEN, THE 
GOVERNMENT AND POLICIES OF CHINA, at 351-55 (1967). The former currently 
has 64 representatives in the National Assembly, 12 in the Legislative Yuan and 4 in 
the Control Yuan. The latter has 37 members in the National Assembly, 6 in the 
Legislative Yuan, and 3 in the Control Yuan. Data provided in CHINA YEARBOOK 
70, 72 (1977). 
30. Two Grand Justices, Ju-ao Mai and Che-chun Hsiang, had served as judge and 
prosecutor respectively in the International Military Trial Tribunal for the Far East 
CIMTFE) at Tokyo after World War II, but both were nominated under section three. 
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eight in the current term. This, combined with the established fact 
that professors of law have steadily occupied, along with the justices 
of the Supreme Court, ten or more seats within the Council in the 
past terms, proves that the major source of the Council has been 
greatly limited to the university and the bench. Further, the former 
group has had more recent appointments to the Council than the 
latter. This reflects a long-recognized practice in civil law countries to 
look toward the universities in making high judicial appointments 
because only the scholar is a real protagonist of the civil law 
tradition. Paraphrasing the oft-quoted notion that common law is a 
law of the judges, the civil law is a law of the professors. 
It is also relevant to note that most countries limit the activities 
of the justices of the constitutional court during their term. This 
practice differs from that in the United States, which has no provision 
against its members involving themselves in extra judicial functions. 
A few justices in the United States have played politics while 
performing judicial functions, some having even sought the Presiden-
cy.31 In most other countries, a justice is only permitted to teach 
during his term. Those professors whose selection to the court has 
been based on their teaching frequently continuing their former 
professions during their court tenure. This inclination toward 
teaching has also been exercised by jurists selected from other 
categories. Usually they are well received by the universities. In 
addition to the unusual prestige enjoyed by the law professor in civil 
law countries, a practical consideration can also be discerned. Since 
justices' terms are fixed, there exists a distinct possibility of 
unemployment after the expiration of judicial tenure. Therefore, the 
impetus to retain a more permanent professional post as insurance for 
the future is understandable. The members of the Council of Grand 
Justices are also restricted in their extra judicial work to teaching, 
even though there is no express prohibition against other kinds of 
activities. 
After examining the qualifications for candidacy to the constitu-
tional court, we now tackle the recruitment process. Nowhere is the 
relationship between the political and judicial systems more casual 
than in the selection of justices for constitutional adjudication. The 
31. Mr. Justice McLean had sought a presidential nomination five times, and Mr. 
Justice Hughes did become the presidential candidate in 1916. Other recent examples 
were Justices Roberts' service on the Pearl Harbor investigation, Jackson's tour as 
prosecutor at Nuremberg, and Chief Justice Warren's reluctant chairmanship of the 
Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy. 
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only provision of the Chinese Constitution relating to judicial 
recruitment is article 79, which, like its American counterpart, 
specifies simply that Grand Justices shall be nominated with the 
consent of the Control Yuan. 
We will not discuss the method chosen to select candidates for the 
Council in its first term, in part because the Council was in a rather 
unstable condition and in part because relevant material is simply 
not available. During the other three terms of the Council, an 
informal method was followed for the selection of candidates. First, an 
advisory committee was established. It was chaired by the Vice-
President and consisted of the secretary-generals of the Office of the 
President, National Security Council and Kuomintang, and the 
President of the Judicial Yuan. After it began its work, each member 
would submit a list of candidates recommended by a variety of outside 
groups or by the individual himself. Then the most important 
principles of recruitment were decided. The most recent principles 
included five guidelines: a candidate must be under seventy-five 
when his term expires; not less thai) a third and no more than 
one-half of its present members can be re-elected; except for Taiwan 
and Fukien, other provinces may have no more than one Grand 
Justice; there must be two women candidates; and party affiliation is 
not necessary.32 Fifteen candidates would then be produced under 
these guidelines and submitted to the President for nomination. 
Besides the five rejections in the first term, the candidates have 
always been confirmed by the Control Yuan. 
In the supplementary selection of Grand Justice.:;, occasioned by 
death or departure for other reasons, no advisory committee was 
needed. It was the sole responsibility of the President of the Judicial 
Yuan to propose the successor and report to the President.33 Of course, 
he had to consult with other departments before he finalized the list. 
The party plays a significant role in the whole recruiting process. 
Not only is its secretary-general a member in the advisory committee, 
but he works with the members of the Control Yuan to secure the 
necessary confirmation. In view of the fact that the Kuomintang has 
controlled the political power and has been the only major party in 
the Republic of China for such a long period, its influence can hardly 
be disputed. Although the American political parties do not occupy as 
important a position as that of the Kuomintang, the Presidents of the 
32. LIEN-HO-PAO <United Daily News), May 3, 1976. 
33. Liu, The Function of Interpretation of Constitution Practiced by the Council of 
Grand Justices, 3 HSIEN-CHENG-SHIH-TAI (Constitutional Reviewl 1:33. 41 11977l. 
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United States have often made the most of their Supreme Court 
selections by nominating members of their own political party. 
However, it is interesting to note that nine Republican Presidents 
and three Democratic Presidents have chosen at least one justice of 
the opposing party.34 In fact, except for the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations, since the 1930's all the Presidents have followed the 
practice. This also applies to the Chinese Council of Grand Justices. 
In each of the four terms at least one member was included who did 
not belong to the Kuomintang. 
The principle of geographic balance has also been influential. 
Twenty-one of the total thirty-five provinces have produced at least 
one Grand Justice. The ratio can be compared with thirty-one out of 
the fifty states in the case of the United States.351 Since the actual 
controlled area has been limited to Taiwan and several off-shore 
islands along the Fukien province, natives of Taiwan have occupied 
more seats than others, and this trend has been more obvious in the 
most recent term. This coincides with the overall increase in the 
recruitment of native Taiwanese into all branches of the government. 
Often a concern for geographical balance is coupled with a desire 
for religious representation in considering a nominee to the Supreme 
Court. Since the Chinese traditionally tolerate different religions and 
a so-called "religious war" has never occurred in Chinese history, the 
de-emphasis of religion in the political process in general and in the 
recruitment of Grand Justices in particular is not surprising. 
Moreover, women have been in the Council since 1967, and there 
even been two female Grand Justices in this term. In this respect, the 
Chinese record is better than the Americans' with the heretofore all 
male Supreme Court.36 
We have already seen that one possible criterion for the position 
of Grand Justice in the Council is at least ten years' experience on the 
bench or at a university. In the case ofmembers of the judiciary, their 
promotions are strictly limited according to the career system 
hierarchy. Moreover, the Council has become the top rung of judicial 
career ladders. Accordingly, the average age of appointment of the 
judiciary to the Council has been relatively high. The same is true of 
34. ABRAHAM, supra note 16, at 58-60. 
35. However, no President has apparently considered himself absolutely bound by 
this factor. Its major purpose lies in political considerations. 
36. The first woman Grand Justice was Chin-Ian Chiang, appointed under the first 
section. In other words, she has been in the Supreme Court for over ten years. 
Hsin-hsiang Fan and Ch'iang-wei Chiang are the two now serving in the Council. Both 
of them were Supreme Court Judges before becoming Grand Justices. 
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those appointed politicians who reach prominence through the 
bureaucratic hierarchy. Maybe this can be explained in part by the 
Chinese culture's emphasis on seniority and the fact that in China 
age is given status. Nevertheless, on the whole, the general average 
age at appointment was below sixty - 58.6. It is relevant to indicate 
that this average age has been deliberately reduced from 59.1 in the 
first term to the 57.4 in the current term, and even four professors in 
their mid-forties have been nominated. If the trend continues, the 
Council may become more active, energetic, and aggressive, all of 
which is desperately needed to circumvent the Council's rigid 
procedural restrictions and to raise the Council's status while 
promoting constitutionalism in the Republic of China. 
C. Jurisdiction 
After detailing the composition of the Council of Grand Justices, 
we can now proceed with the other side of the picture, the parties. 
Who is best qualified to represent the interests involved in determin-
ing the validity or invalidity of the governmental act? The answer is 
not a simple one and, like other aspects of the judicial review system, 
the practice in the civil law countries runs counter to that of the 
American. In the United States, the question of a law's constitutional-
ity can only be placed before the court as a part of a concrete case or 
controversy, and thus only the party to a law suit may raise 
constitutional issues. This approach is defended on the ground that a 
party who has a direct interest in the outcome is in the best position 
to contest a questionable statute. It is said that under this system the 
proceedings are more lively and more assiduously contested, and that 
the court is less apt to overlook significant issues.37 
On the other hand, individuals may not always be able to 
institute judicial review because of lack of money, time, energy, or 
because they simply do not have a genuine legal interest to enter into 
the legal process. It is possible that a decade or more may pass before 
a plaintiff is found. Dissatisfied with the somewhat haphazard system 
of incidental control, the constitutions of some civil law countries 
designate a limited number of public authorities as parties who may 
raise the issue of unconstitutionality. 
The Chinese Constitution has no clause corresponding to article 
III, section 2, paragraph 1 of the United States Constitution, which 
limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts specifically to a "case or 
37. Grant, Judicial Control of Legislation, 3 AM. J. COMP. L. 186, 198 (1954). 
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controversy." Thus, legislation regulating the jurisdiction of the 
Council of Grand Justices was drafted in 1957. Before its appearance, 
a "Rules of Order" consisting of twenty-one articles which set forth in 
detail the scope of interpretation, the quorum of the meeting, the 
manner of voting, etc. had been enforced.38 Since the Rules of Order 
were initiated and adopted by the Council itself without going 
through the legislative process, they were decried for a long time. The 
unfriendly attitude grew into a vehement attack on the Council as a 
result of Interpretation No. 76, which we will deal with in detail in 
the next chapter. Opponents, especially the legislators, decided to 
write a new law clarifying the jurisdiction and procedure of the 
Council. 
Article 3 of the Law Governing the Council of Grand Justices 
(hereinafter cited as Governing Law) provides: 
As to the interpretation of Constitution, the Council of Grand 
Justices is authorized to exercise the following: 1. to clear up 
doubts and problems arising from application of the Constitution; 
2. to determine and explain whether a law is in conflict with the 
Constitution; 3. to determine and explain whether the statutes 
for self-government of provinces and counties and the laws and 
regulations promulgated by provincial governments are in con-
flict with the Constitution. 
Except for provincial self-governmental law, which is the only type of 
statute that must be submitted by the province to the Judicial Yuan 
immediately after its enactment to determine its constitutionality,39 
the remaining functions have to be exercised upon the receipt of an 
application for interpretation. Both governmental organs and the 
people have the right to apply for constitutional adjudication. The 
inclusion of the people is significant, particularly because the "Rules 
of Order" allowed only a government agency to bring an application. 
Under that system, the deficiency in protecting individual civil 
liberties had long been recognized. However, it was only after 
considerable parliamentary debate that the individual won the right 
to file a constitutional complaint directly with the Council of Grand 
Justices.40 
38. CHINA HANDBOOK 82 C1951l. 
39. CONST. art. 114. 
40. Almost half of the debate centered on this subject; see Ll·FA-YUAN-KUAN-
PAO !Gazette of Legislative Yuan I, 21st, 12, 14, 16th Sess. 
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As the requirement of "case or controversy" need not be satisfied, 
this direct review procedure should have expanded the actual scope of 
constitutional review beyond that available in the United States. 
However, accessibility to the Council has not been easy because of 
rather strict procedural barriers. Only under the following three 
conditions may a central or local governmental agency apply to the 
Council: (1) when a question is encountered by it in applying a 
provision of the Constitution while performing its duties; (2) when a 
dispute arises between governmental agencies with regard to the 
application of a provision of the Constitution in conducting their 
official business; or (3) when a question is raised as to whether an 
application of certain law or an administrative ordinance is in conflict 
with the Constitution when it is applied. In short, standing can only 
be granted after a governmental organ performs its business in 
applying a provision of the Constitution or a particular statute or 
ordinance. It may not raise a constitutional issue freely without 
performing its duty first and this issue must be within its legitimate 
jurisdiction. 
According to the preceding second condition, it seems that the 
Council is the sole arbiter of disputes between units of government 
concerning their respective rights and duties under the Constitution. 
The Council is not, however, authorized to resolve all controversies 
between organs. Only when the interpretation of the Constitution is 
definitely required does it enter. Even so, this is an entirely 
unfamiliar system to the American jurist, even though most of the 
constitutional courts in civil law countries have the same kind of 
jurisdiction. The doctrine of the "political question" has not been 
transferred outside the United States' boundaries. The main purpose 
of this provision is to require that the government agency maintain 
its continuing public duty to guard the constitutional order. Some-
times this method may have the benefit of cooling off a heated 
political struggle for power by limiting it to a mere legal controversy. 
On the other hand, it may involve the Council in a political 
battleground which it would be best to avoid, particularly if the 
political departments fulfill their own duties to search for a political 
compromise within the limits of the Constitution. This system of 
so-called "judicialization," which inevitably places the Council of 
Grand Justices or other constitutional courts in dangerous, embarras-
sing and perhaps unrealistic positions to settle by judicial procedure a 
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conflict of power between high constitutional organs, has been a 
disputed subject, notably in West Germany.•' 
The potential risk involved in the efforts to settle political 
conflicts by the Council of Grand Justices has been eased to a large 
extent by the article 44 of the Chinese Constitution. In the event of a 
dispute among the various Yuans, article 44 authorizes the President 
to call a meeting of the Presidents of the Yuans concerned for 
consultation on a solution. Therefore, the various Yuans are not 
required to file an application with the Council even for disputes 
related to constitutional interpretation. Those disputes may still be 
resolved in the political arena. Theoretically, the application of the 
Constitution is prior to the legislative statute as a result of the 
doctrine of the hierarchy of law. Therefore, the legal means of 
resolving governmental conflicts between Yuans under the Governing 
Law must give way to the political solution directly provided by the 
Constitution. 
However, only conflicts between Yuans are within the scope of 
article 44. Does this imply that other disputes among lower levels are 
to be resolved in the Council? If the answer is affirmative, the Council 
would be implicated in numerous conflicts between government 
agencies. However, according to article 8 of the Governing Law, the 
application of a subordinate government agency to the Council may 
only be made through its superior agency. This provision substantial-
ly reduces the number of government applications. Before article 8 
was enacted in 1957, the same provision in the former "Rule of Order" 
applied both to constitutional interpretation and to uniform interpre-
tation of laws or ordinances, the other function of the Council. From 
the legislative history of the Governing Law, however, it appears that 
article 8 was intended to apply only to the function of uniform 
interpretation of laws or ordinances.42 Hence it would appear that 
subordinate agencies have direct standing to apply for a ruling as to 
constitutionality. 
41. A. HEIDENHEIMER, THE GOVERNMENTS OF GERMANY 151 (1966); 
Loewenstein, JUSTICE IN GOVERNING POSTW ARD GERMANY 236, 262 <R. 
Litchield ed. 1953). 
42. According to the arranged order of the articles, article 8 follows immediately 
after the provision concerning the uniform interpretation. This might be taken as 
evidence for its limited application. The major supporting evidence, however, was the 
statement made by Tung Huang in the plenary session of the Legislative Yuan. He was 
the major figure in the Committee of Judicial Affairs which had drafted the law that 
later was accepted by the Legislative Yuan. See LI-FA-YUAN-KUAN-PAO IGazette of 
the Legislative Yuan), 21st., 14th Sess. at 23. 
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Nevertheless, the existing practice is for subordinate government 
units to act through their superior agencies in seeking a constitution-
al interpretation.43 Also, in order to maintain a sound hierarchy of 
administrative supervision within the administrative system and to 
manage their relatively large numbers, it may be deemed desirable to 
prohibit the initiation of constitutional adjudication by subordinate 
agencies. 
In West Germany, this right is also not universally available to 
every government agency. "Administrative agencies, government 
corporations, churches, or other corporate bodies with quasi-public 
status" were among the disqualified.« However, parliamentary 
parties and even political parties outside parliament in West 
Germany in certain circumstances have standing in the Federal 
Constitutional Court. This is a rather brilliant device because a 
legislator and a minority political party in general are more 
aggressive than a government agency which employs people of career 
service. 
Although China did not adopt a system of federation, a de-
limitation of powers between the central and provincial govern-
ments is not easy to achieve. The Constitution has attempted to 
provide a clear boundary between the central and province,45 but it is 
not safe to say that disputes will never arise. Since the Governing 
Law first provided that both the central and local government agency 
would be qualified to apply for interpretations and that the jurisdic-
tion of the Council of Grand Justices would include "disputes between 
government agencies"46 without a specific limitation to central 
agencies, the settlement of conflicts between the central and local 
government originating from the division of powers between them 
under the Constitution must be within the jurisdiction of the Council 
Accordingly, both state and local laws may be challenged directly 
before the Council by a province or a central government agency, 
43. Interpretation No. 99 was the only exception. It was made by the Central Bank 
of China, which is under the administrative control of the Office of the President. 
Considering that the Council is under the control of Judicial Yuan and that the status 
of the President is above the five Yuans, the filing of the application by the Bank itself 
is not hard to understand. Nevertheless, one reason for the dissenting opinion in this 
case was this procedural fault; see SZU-FA-YUAN TA-FA-KUAN HUl-l CHIEH-SHIH-
HUT-PIEN (The Collection of Interpretations Made by the Council of Grand Justices of 
the Judicial Yuan) 182 (1977). 
44. D. KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN WEST GERMANY 105 <1976!. 
45. Articles 107-111. 
46. Article 4. 
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respectively, whenever a province deems that a law or an act having 
the force of law of the state invades the sphere of authority attributed 
to it by the Constitution, or whenever, on the other hand, the central 
government regards a local law as having exceeded its authority. 
Oddly enough, however, the Legislative Yuan has been vested by 
the Constitution with authority to settle disputes between central and 
local governments.47 The reason for such a novel arrangement has 
long puzzled students of the Chinese constitution. How can a 
legislative body with four hundred members, already burdened with 
uncea!)ing legislative work, devote the time necessary for the solution 
of these delicate problems? Before the promulgation of the Constitu-
tion, the Legislative Yuan had never been entrusted with this duty. 
Although the Legislative Yuan occasionally scrutinized provincial 
enactments and regulations during the period of political tutelage, it 
did not maintain the authority to interpret them when it found they 
were in conflict with those of the central government, but rather 
submitted the point or points of issue to the Judicial Yuan48 This 
present arrangement needs to be amended. 
One of the most important functions of the Council is to decide 
upon the constitutionality of both local and national legislation. 
Three avenues are open for referring issues of constitutionality to the 
Council. First, the central or local government can ask the Council to 
determine whether a national or local statute is consistent with the 
Constitution, or whether a local law is consistent with other national 
law. The standing of a central or local government agency in this 
respect does not differ much from the above-mentioned case of 
constitutional controversies. It is worth mentioning, by way of 
contrast, that in West Germany one-third of the members of the 
Bundestag, the lower house of parliament, also can initiate such a 
procedure. 
Greater significance lies in the second and third avenues. Since 
the Governing Law only provided for standing for a "central or local 
government agency," the different levels of the regular courts 
appeared to fall within the standing requirements. However, in 
practice this only meant that regular courts could certify a question 
with respect to the constitutionality of a controlling statute to the 
Council when such a question arose in the course of litigation and 
was necessary to the resolution of the case. As early as Interpretation 
No. 9, which was rendered on October 27, 1952, the Council had 
declared that if there was anything in a judgment that did not 
47. Article 111. 
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conform to the Constitution, a party could point this out on appeal. A 
party was permitted to argue that a particular statute or administra-
tive act relied upon by the court's judgment was in violation of the 
Constitution. However, the judge was not bound by the allegation; he 
had complete discretion to decide whether there was any doubt on 
constitutional grounds about the validity of a national or local law 
governing a case. 
Once a question of constitutionality is referred to the Council, are 
the court proceedings suspended until the decision of the Council? In 
Italy and West Germany, whose constitutional review has been 
regarded as the model for the other civil law countries, the answer is 
affirmative.49 Since neither Chinese constitutional scholarship nor 
actual Chinese practice has as yet provided an answer, these 
European examples are highly relevant. 
As each court exercises its judicial function independent-
ly, it seems unnecessary to discuss the necessity of requiring the 
lower courts to go through the higher courts to certify a constitutional 
question. There have been only two cases referred by a regular court 
and they were either submitted by the Supreme Court or the 
Administrative Court,S0 each of which is the highest organ in its 
judicial hierarchy.51 There was no indication in these applications 
that the questions referred had originated in the lower courts. 
Another case is relevant here because its original application was in 
the district court, the bottom level of the judiciary, and it went 
through all the intermediary superior courts, the Higher Court, and 
the Ministry of Justice, until finally it was the Executive Yuan that 
brought the application.52 Since the data collected so far are scarce, 
any conclusion is far from complete. 
Since every judge in Italy and West Germany is in a position to 
undertake an examination of the constitutionality of a statute in a 
concrete case, the practical differences from American judges are not 
so great. As the famous comparative constitutional law scholar, 
Mauro Cappelletti, has remarked succinctly, "It is not the case for 
Italy and Germany (as it is in the United States) that the judges are 
48. For detail, see TSAO, supra note 7, at 220. 
49. Cappelletti & Adams, supra note 21, at 1220-21. 
50. Interpretation Nos. 47, 89. 
51. This in fact resembles the Austrian practice because only the two Supreme 
Courts in Austria, one for civil and penal law, the other for cases involving 
administrative law, have the power to raise constitutional questions before the 
Constitutional Court. 
52. Interpretation No. 37. 
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competent to perform the function of judicial review. However, they 
all at least have the right to require the Constitutional Court to 
exercise its powers of review."53 
Some American jurists may have serious doubts about this 
arrangement of the Constitutional Court because they may think that 
a constitutional issue cannot be decided abstractly without having the 
benefit of the facts. 54 Some may also claim that as a result of the 
separation of constitutional questions from specific factual situations, 
the constitutional court may be forced to decide questions that would 
be better postponed.55 However, a close examination reveals that 
these arguments do not always prove to be true. In practice, the strict 
separation of a constitutional question from a factual setting can 
hardly be achieved. It is usual for the Constitutional Court to take 
note of the facts in the case. Parties to the original proceeding may be 
required to file briefs and sometimes even offer oral arguments in the 
proceedings before the Constitutional Court. On the other side, 
according to Donald Kommers, a specialist in West Germany's 
Federal Constitutional Court, the system prevailing in the civil law 
nations has an advantage, that is, "the Court's opportunity to make 
policy is accordingly limited by the willingness of state and federal 
judges to deliver constitutional questions to the Court's keeping."56 
In addition to references from national or local government 
agencies the Council of Grand Justices may also receive petitions for 
relief from individuals who maintain that their constitutional rights 
have been violated. The objects of such complaints may include an act 
of the executive power, an administrative act, a judicial decision, or 
even the statute itself. Therefore, it is possible that, after a judge 
decides not to raise the question of constitutionality in the regular 
suit, the individual litigant may file with the Council if he is 
convinced that he has been deprived of a basic right given him by the 
Constitution. This represents a great advance in the protection of 
civil liberties. 57 
As was the case in West Germany, the debate over granting 
standing to an individual was heated. The proponents argued that 
53. CAPPELLETI'I, supra note 13, at 75 C1971 I. 
54. Freund, A Supreme Court in Federation, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 597,617 (19531. 
55. CAPPELLETI'I, supra note 13, at 80. 
56. D. Kommers, The Federal Constitutional Court in the West German Political 
System, in FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL RESEARCH 73, 78 (J. Grossman & J. 
Tanenhaus ed. 19691. 
57. It is worth pointing out that both Austria and Italy until now have not allowed 
individuals to file with their Constitutional Courts. 
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public authorities cannot always be relied upon to protect private 
rights with sufficient vigor. Only the individual who suffers loss of 
liberty can be expected to defend his right with great zeal, with the 
result that the issues in dispute might be better articulated and 
resolved. Furthermore, such individual standing could serve as a 
constant alert to public officials not to overstep their authority. The 
special dignity derived from this basic freedom in the Constitution 
would thus be stressed and elevated. Not a few opponents, inside and 
outside the Legislative Yuan, however, argued that this procedure 
would heavily burden the Council and would further worsen the 
problem of prolonging litigation. The Council might become the 
"super revision" court, and the administration of justice would be 
dangerously disrupted.58 
In the end, success belonged to the proponents. Along with the 
promulgation of the Governing Law in 1957, the right. of the 
individual to sue the government on constitutional grounds became a 
reality. However, several procedural limitations simultaneously were 
imposed upon this individual right. Standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of a statute or administrative act is conferred only 
upon persons whose material or moral interests, as defined expressly 
or implicitly in the constitution,59 are wronged. This requirement is 
similar to the "standing to litigate" prerequisite in United States 
constitutional law.60 Also, the exhaustion of previous legal remedies 
before appealing to the Council is mandatory. This means that, in the 
case of a petition based on a judicial decision, the petitioner must 
have exhausted all regular avenues of review before bringing the case 
to the Council. If the petition involves the actions of administrative 
officials and if administrative remedies are available, these too must 
be exhausted before resort to the Council can be successful. 
58. See LI-FA-YUAN-KUAN-PAO (Gazette of the Legislative Yuan), supra note 
42. 
59. Articles 7 to 18 of the Constitution specifically enumerate the civil rights such 
as the freedom of speech, correspondence, assembly and association, equality before the 
law, etc. As article 22 spells out, "All other freedoms and rights of the people that are 
not detrimental to social order or public welfare shall be guaranteed under the 
Constitution"; hence constitutional protection should be extended beyond those 
enumerated rights and liberties provided in the Constitution. 
60. H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 156-92 (1953). 
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D. Proceeding 
After the promulgation of the Governing Law in 1957, the "Rules 
of Order" ceased to exist. However, the precedent of drafting its own 
internal rules has been followed by the Council and agreed to by the 
Legislative Yuan. A new "Rules Concerning the Conduct of Business 
by the Council of Grand Justices" [hereinafter referred to as Rules] 
was created and has applied ever since.61 All appeals to the Council 
must first go to a petty bench of three Grand Justices. After 
examining the arguments, the petty bench might decide to recom-
mend refusing the application. In such a case it would make a simple 
report to the Grand Bench (which includes all the Grand Justices 
with the President of the Judicial Yuan ex officio) to refuse the 
appeal. On the other hand, it might prepare a rather detailed 
statement of the relevant facts and issues for the deliberation of the 
Reviewing Bench (which differs from the Grand Bench by excluding 
the President of the Judicial Yuan) when its suggestion of acceptance 
is confirmed by the Grand Bench. The reason for establishing a 
Reviewing Bench is to circumvent the Grand Bench which according 
to the Governing Law is chaired by the President of the Judicial 
Yuan or the Vice-President if the former is absent.62 These officials do 
not necessarily have the qualifications required of the Grand Justices, 
even though the procedure of nomination and confirmation are the 
same, and they may only preside at the meeting without the right to 
argument and vote.63 All substantive matters are reserved for the 
Reviewing Bench, and the Grand Bench only serves as a rubber 
stamp, a formality. 
The Grand Justice on duty for the month is responsible for 
calling the Reviewing Bench, which then elects one of the fellow 
Grand Justices as chairman. This presents a stark contrast to the 
United States Supreme Court, where any period under the leadership 
of a particular Chief Justice has customarily been marked by his 
61. The legality of drafting the internal rule by the Council itself was challenged 
by a current member, Jui-kuan Yao, in his critical article, A Study on Some Problems 
Related to the Function of the Council of Grand Justices, 3 HSIEN-CHENG-SHIH-TAI 
<Constitutional Review) 3:51 (19781. 
62. Governing Law, art. 15. 
63. Response made by the Kuan-sheng Hsieh, President of the Judicial Yuan, to 
the inquiry of the members of Judicial Affairs Committee, Control Yuan; see HSIN 
SUN PAO <Newborn Daily News), May 10, 19511. 
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name.64 The Chinese arrangement of course is cumbersome and 
should be revised in the future. 65 
In West Germany, cases are allocated to the justices on the basis 
of their particular interests and specializations except for those that 
are related to a constitutional complaint initiated by the individual. 
In China, the allocation of application to each petty bench is based 
upon rotation, and the assignment of Grand Justices to the petty 
bench is made by lot, the only condition being that each member must 
belong to a different nominating category.66 The decision to require all 
the Grand Justices to handle every kind of case was received by many 
of them with mixed feelings. However, since three members are 
involved as a collegiate unit for a single case, the possible deficiency 
of any Grand Just.ice has been significantly corrected. Furthermore, 
one or more Grand Justices who have the expertise to deal with the 
particular kind of case may be additionally assigned to the unit for 
the purpose of drafting the opinion of the Council. 67 
While the decision in the Council when dealing with the uniform 
interpretation of statutes or administrative ordinances is made by a 
simple majority, three-fourths of the total number of Grand Justices 
are required for a quorum and at least three-fourths of them must 
concur before a decision of constitutionality is made.68 In other words, 
without the attendance of three-fourths of the members, no decision 
at all can be rendered. This special majority rule was a reaction to the 
previous practice in which only a simple majority was sufficient for 
64. Among them, Marshall, Hughes, and Warren have received the most 
attention; see, e.g., J. OSTER, THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DOCTRINES OF 
JOHN MARSHALL (1914); J. CUNEO, JOHN MARSHALL, JUDICIAL STATESMAN 
(1975l; D. DANELSKI & J. TULCHIN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF 
CHARLES EVANS HUGHES fl973l; S. HENDEL, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES AND 
THE SUPREME COURT (195ll; L. KATCHER, EARL WARREN: A POLITICAL 
BIOGRAPHY fl967l; J. WEAVER, WARREN, THE MAN, THE COURT, THE ERA 
11974). 
65. The lack of a significant role as to the chief justice also can be found in Japan 
as well as West Germany; see Itoh, Judicial Decision-Making in the Japanese Supreme 
Court, 3 LAW IN JAPAN 128, 151 (1969!; Kommers, supra note 56, at 81. 
66. Rules, art. 5. 
67. Id., art. 3. 
68. Governing Law. art. 13. This can be compared with the Japanese practice in 
which more than eight of the fifteen justices are needed to declare a statute 
unconstitutional; see Wada, The Supreme Court of Japan as Adjudicating Agency and 
its Functions, 23 JAHRBUCH DES OFFENTLICHEN RECHT DER GEGENWART 
537, 541 (1974). Cases involving impeachments, forfeiture of basic rights, and the 
constitutionality of political parties in the West German Federal Constitutional Court 
also require a two-thirds majority; see Kommers, supra note 56, at 82. 
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questions of constitutionality. This was later amended so that 
two-thirds of the Grand Justices residing at the seat of the central 
government had to be present and a majority of the total number had 
to be in agreement,69 in order to meet the special circumstances after 
1949. 
In view of the serious consequences caused by a judgment of 
unconstitutionality, raising the numb~r of the required majority 
seems reasonable. Nevertheless, when we consider that this rule is 
stringent even in comparison with the amendment procedure of the 
Constitution,70 it appears excessive and may even cause undesirable 
results. It is not difficult to appreciate that the larger the majority 
required, the smaller is the minority that can veto the adjudication of 
the majority of the court. In other words, in order to determine 
whether a statute or ordinance is constitutional, at least thirteen 
members must be present and at least ten members must concur. In 
view of the prevalent practice of only nominating fifteen Grand 
Justices, the quorum required for the passing of the decision is 
twelve. Because the current members of Grand Justices number is 
fourteen, attendance of eleven members is required. 71 Accordingly, 
any four Grand Justices of the Council may form a bloc to effectively 
prevent the exercise of the Council's function of constitutional 
interpretation. This gives minority members disproportionate bar-
gaining leverage in constitutional deliberations and has contributed 
to a large extent to the scarcity of constitutional decisions rendered 
by the Council during the past twenty years. 72 
The conference of the Reviewing Bench is the second step of the 
decision-making process. It is normally held on every Friday morn-
69. Rules of Order, art. 12. 
70. Article 174 of the Constitution provides two procedures: (1) Upon the proposal 
of one-fifth of the total number of the National Assembly and by a resolution of 
three-fourths of the delegates present at a meeting having a quorum of two-thirds of 
the entire Assembly; (2) upon the proposal of one-fourth of the members of the 
Legislative Yuan and by a resolution of three-fourths of the members present at a 
meeting having a quorum of three-fourths of the members of the Yuan, an amendment 
maybe drawn up and submitted to the National Assembly by way of referendum. 
71. Professor Chien-han Chiang, chairman of the Political Science Department at 
National Taiwan University, was nominated and confirmed. But given the strong 
opposition during his confirmation due to his co-authoring of a book criticizing the 
Control Yuan, he withdrew from the Council; CHUNG YANG JIH PAO (Central Daily 
Newsl, Oct. 3, 1976. 
72. See C. LIN, CHUNG-HUA-MING-KUO HSIEN-FA CHU-TIAO SHIH-YI !A 
Detailed Study of Articles of the Chinese Constitution) 79-80 ( 1975l; Tong, The 
Research on Making the Interpretation of Constitutional System of our Nation. 2 
HSIEN-CHENG-SHIH-TAI !Constitutional Reviewl 4:52, 54 !1977l. 
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ing. 73 Five days before it convenes, a report prepared by the 
responsible petty bench has to be circulated among the Grand 
Justices.74 At the conference, members of this petty bench summarize 
the case and state reasons for their recommendation. Then they 
entertain questions and comments. Discussion is usually informal. 
Unlike the practice of the United States Supreme Court in which the 
Chief Justice always has the privilege of "speaking first" and "voting 
last" and where seniority is the controlling rule of order for the other 
members, there is no prescribed order regarding speaking and voting. 
Since the case is discussed quite freely by the Grand Justices without 
special order or limitation of time, this practice may lead to the 
wasting of time and energy. When there is a large backlog of pending 
cases, it becomes quite impractical. On the other hand, free and 
informal discussion may contribute greatly to the polishing of the 
decision and to the attainment of a greater majority. 
After the underlying principle on which the decision is to be 
based has been determined at the conference, the case will be referred 
back to the original petty bench, which, along with one or more other 
Grand Justices assigned by the Council, will write the opinion of the 
Council.76 Therefore, in this respect, the rigidity of assignment in 
China also differs from the comparative flexibility in the United 
States Supreme Court.76 
After the opinion is completed, it is again submitted to the 
conference of the Reviewing Bench for further pruning, qualification, 
deletion, and amendment until a satisfactory result is achieved. Also, 
five days' prior notice is required in which to circulate the drafted 
opinion before the conference.77 During the whole process, neither the 
drafting assignment nor the judicial vote may be disclosed to the 
public. Also, the nature of the deliberations within the Council is kept 
strictly secret.78 This last provision is not hard to understand because 
73. Interview with Grand Justice Yu po Cheng. 
74. Rules, art. 6. 
75. This rule also appears in the practice of the West German Federal Constitu· 
tiona) Court; see KOMMERS, supra note 44, at 176, and Japanese Supreme Court; see 
Wada, supra note 68, at 541. 
76. If the Chief Justice is in the majority, he of course can write the opinion of the 
Court himself or designate others. When he is on the minority side, it is the senior 
Associate Justice on the majority who chooses either himself or assigns another 
member to write the opinion. Nevertheless, there also have been some methods used in 
the assignment process; see H. ABRAHAM, JUDICIAL PROCESS 205-11 !1975l; D. 
ROHDE & H. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 172-87 !1976l. 
77. Rules, art. 6. 
78. /d., art. 12. 
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the same practice applies to any country's court whether or not it 
deals with a constitutional question. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter once 
observed, "That the Supreme Court should not be amenable to the 
forces of publicity to which the Executive and the Congress are 
subjected is essential to the effective functioning of the Court."79 
However, when we examine the legislative history of the 
Governing Law, it may appear that the intent of the legislative Yuan 
was the opposite, to maintain a public conference. The original draft 
of the Governing Law in this regard contained a provision that "The 
Council may hold secret meetings when it deems necessary." This 
implied that public meetings should be the rule. Although this 
provision was deleted in the final draft, the reason was that there was 
simply no ground to justify the existence of the secret meeting.80 The 
legislative history clearly reveals the confusion on the part of the 
legislative Yuan regarding the meeting of the Council and trials 
conducted in regular courts. Since the Council decides its cases almost 
on an objective procedure, that is, relies on the written statements of 
the parties and the opinion of the concerned public agency, the 
principle of public trial is not necessarily to be applied. As for its 
internal deliberation, complete secrecy does, and must, exist. Other-
wise, the members of the Council simply could not maintain proper 
relations and harmony in the transaction of business. The confidence 
of Grand Justices in their communications with one another should 
be fully respected. 
With regard to direct persuasion of the Council by the parties in 
a case, the Council never holds an open hearing. It may, though very 
rarely, request parties to come to the conference to give an oral 
explanation.81 All the cases before the Council are decided on the 
basis of an examination of the papers, ie., the records of the case, the 
briefs, and the research reports of the Grand Justices. The possible 
purpose of an oral explanation may be to uncover additional facts that 
bear upon the issues.82 
79. Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. PENN. L. REV. 311, 313 Cl955l. 
80. LI-FA-YUAN-KUAN-PAO (Gazette of the Legislative Yuan) 21st., 15th sess. 
52 (1957). 
81. This only happened once, on Interpretation No. 148, and the party only came 
to the second section of the Secretariat of the Judicial Yuan, which is charged with the 
administrative matters of the Council. This information is provided from an interview 
with Mr. Yu-po Cheng, a current member of the Council. 
82. Oral argument is also held only infrequently in the West German Federal 
Constitutional Court; see KOMMERS, supra note 44, at 180. It is relatively surprising 
that the Japanese Supreme Court, which followed the model of the United States 
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In striking contrast to the freedom of the Justices of the United 
States Supreme Court to express individual views in dissenting or 
concurring opinions, the Grand Justices follow traditional continental 
jurisprudence.83 Only one opinion, which presumably represents the 
official consensus, is issued in each case, and the identity of the 
author may not be disclosed to the public. This was done because it 
was feared that the publication of dissenting opinions could impair 
the prestige of the Council and create uncertainty. On the other hand, 
the elimination of the dissenting opinion could result in a serious 
impairment of this invaluable source of public discussion and public 
debate, which are the characteristics of a democratic society. In 
addition, the possibility of writing and publishing differing opinions 
would give each judge a keener sense of responsibility for the decision 
and also provide an opportunity to change former decisions demons-
trated to be unsound, thereby contributing greatly to the development 
ofjurisprudence.84 This argument may be amply supported by the case 
of the United States Supreme Court. Not a few among the most 
memorable opinions of the Court initially on the dissenting side have 
eventually become majority opinions.85 
Nevertheless, an undiscriminating eulogy of the practice of 
issuing dissenting opinions by some foreign scholars is not totally 
desirable. The appearance of a dissenting opinion often forces the 
majority to take positions more extreme than were orignially 
intended, but this tendency has been largely ignored.86 Moreover, the 
exercise of individual judicial opinion-writing can at times produce a 
less-reasoned statement of the grounds for disagreement. On the 
whole, the right to dissent on well-chosen occasions, if wisely used, no 
doubt can be of great service to the profession and to the law. But 
Supreme Court, also conducts oral arguments only infrequently; see Itoh, supra note 65, 
at 153. 
83. Only after 1971 were the justices in the Federal Constitutional Court of West 
Germany allowed to express their dissenting opinions; see KOMMERS, supra note 44 
at 180. 
84. For a discussion of the pros and cons of the dissenting opinion, see McWhinney, 
Judicial Concurrence and Dissents: A Comparative View of Opinion- Writing in Final 
Appellate Tribunals, 31 CANADIAN B. REV. 595-625 (1953l; Nadelmann, The 
Judicial Dissent, Publication v. Secrecy, 8 AM. J. COMP. L. 415-32 (1959l. 
85. Several distinguished cases have been cited in ABRAHAM, supra note 76, at 
203. 
86. Mr. Justice Jackson cited the notorious Dred Scott case as a classic example in 
which Chief Justice Taney's extreme statements were absent in his original draft and 
were inserted only after Mr. Justice McLean, then a more than passive candidate for 
the presidency, raised the issue in dissent. SeeR. JACKSON, SUPREME COURT IN 
THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 19 (1955l. 
94 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STuDIES SERIES 
there is nothing good, for either the court or the dissenters, in 
dissenting per se.81 
Not until1957 did the Governing Law recognize the value of the 
different opinions and reverse its previous course. Since then differing 
opinions can be issued by the individual Grand Justices.88 Since the 
provision uses the term "different" generally, it appears to include 
both dissenting as well as concurring opinions. However, in practice, 
there have only been three concurring opinions.89 On the other hand, 
the rate of dissents has been quite impressive. Thirteen of the 
nineteen cases since 1957 relating to the Constitution have borne 
dissenting opinions. In a society in which consensus, harmony, and 
unanimity are important values, such a high rate of dissent must be 
very meaningful. Since the pressure for social harmony and for 
outward unanimity is rather strong, the Grand Justices, like 
individuals in an ordinary social context, customarily seek to 
reconcile their different positions among themselves. Conscious that 
if the majority is divided over its reasons the decision may lack 
authority for other public agencies and the regular court, the Grand 
Justices always attempt to agree on common grounds by sacrificing to 
some degree the particularity of their opinions. The near absence of 
concurring opinion may be explained by this fact. 
Since January 7, 1977, the author of the dissenting opinion has 
been identified to the public.90 This is a reversal of the previous 
practice of giving only the number of those dissenting and their 
opinions. Of course, this amendment is a significant step toward the 
study of judicial behavior of the Council. The reason for this change 
was that one Grand Justice in his dissenting opinion criticized 
sharply the majority opinion and was warned by some Grand Justices 
not to issue it. After he willingly accepted responsibility for his 
dissenting opinion by affixing his name to it, the Rules were 
amended.91 
On the other hand, there is one amendment which restricts the 
issuance of different opinions. The only different opinion which is 
permitted is one with respect to the principle of the syllabus of 
interpretation.92 In other words, collateral issues are beyond the scope 
of different opinions. This reflects the continuing threat posed by 
87. ld. 
88. Article 17. 
89. Interpretation Nos. 115, 128, 130. 
90. Rules, art. 7, para. 2. 
91. Yao, supra note 61, at 57. 
92. Rules, art. 7, para. 1. 
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some narrow-minded Grand Justices within the Council and the 
continued influence of the traditional unanimity doctrine. 
Another restriction, however, is far more serious. According to 
article 7 of the Rules, the different opinion must be submitted within 
five days after the syllabus of the interpretation has been passed by 
the Reviewing Bench. This is a severe restriction to the development 
of a different opinion not only because the time is unreasonably 
limited, but also because in practice it often renders the submission 
impossible since the syllabus of the interpretation and the supporting 
opinion are sometimes not reached in the same conference, even 
though the Rules require that the latter shall be attached to the 
former. 93 How could a different opinion be submitted without first 
reviewing the supporting opinion of the case? Furthermore, the final 
stage of the whole process is the Grand Bench, which is held on the 
Friday fortnight. Even if the different opinion is submitt~d on the 
final allowable day, there are still nine more days before the Grand 
Bench convenes. There are simply no grounds for imposing such a 
time restriction. 
Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that although, theoretically, 
a shift in positions between the Reviewing Bench and Grand Bench 
where the final vote is conducted should not happen, as the former 
should have already resolved all disputes and decided the content as 
well as the supporting opinion of a case, there have been at least two 
occasions in which the original conclusion reached in the Reviewing 
Bench was questioned later and had to be revised in order to be 
passed by the Grand Bench.94 This indicated that post-Reviewing 
Bench "line-up" switches are still possible and that different opinions 
may in this context play some role in changes of votes. The extent to 
which this is significant is not known. 
The major purpose of the different opinion until now has been one 
of clarification. Without it, decisions sometimes do not include the 
ideas, the fears, or the explanations behind the Council's conclusion. 
Whether the issuance of different opinions will eventually serve as 
"the intelligence of a future day"95 is yet to be established. This might 
be attributed in part to the fact that only a limited period of time has 
passed. 
Since the judicial biographies or histories which have tremendous 
value in the studies of the American Supreme Court are totally 
93. Rules, art. 3, para. 2. 
94. Different opinion of Interpretation Nos. 130, 137. 
95. C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 68 !1928). 
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nonexistent in the Republic of China, research on the process of law 
making within the Council has been severely limited. This, coupled 
with the fact that, unlike the system of law clerks in the United 
States Supreme Court, the Grand Justices conduct their research and . 
draft opinions themselves, makes research difficult. The opinions of 
former law clerks of the United States Supreme Court that often 
contain enormous information for the study of the American Supreme 
Court is simply lacking.96 In addition, the self-made Rules also 
explicitly direct that anything relating to the disposition of a case, 
such as the assignment of the application, discussion or debate in the 
conference, and any other related procedure should be kept secret. 97 
These are difficult problems that must be overcome if a more in-depth 
examination of the decision-making process of the Council of Grand 
Justices can be achieved in the future. 
96. E.g., H. WILKINSON, SERVING JUSTICE C1974). 
97. Article 12. 
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CHAPTER V 
PRACTICE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A. General Survey of the Output 
Against the backdrop of these structural and procedural aspects 
of the Council of Grand Justices, we now proceed to a review of its 
output. Having begun its serious work in 1949, after moving with the 
nationalist government to Taiwan, its workload in the area of 
constitutional review has been comparatively modest. Of the 167 
applications lodged with the Council up to the end of 1975, only 
thirty-five have resulted in decisions. However, another sixteen 
decisions relating to the uniform interpretation of statutes or 
ordinances may be added to the above category because they have had 
constitutional significance. The work of interpreting statutes or 
ordinances has thus far occupied a large amount of the business of the 
Council. Compared with the 167 applications for constitutional 
decisions, there were 1145 cases in which there have been 
applications for uniform interpretation. In other words, the Council 
has done more in the field of maintaining the unity of laws than in 
the field of constitutional review. The situation, of course, substan-
tially diminishes the practical significance of the Council as a 
constitutional organ. 
Table I gives a chronological representation of cases decided and 
indicates which parties initiated each application since the inception 
of the Council. The Table shows that after two cases were decided on 
January 6, 1949, there were no interpretations rendered until May 
21, 1952 because of the chaos and political confusion in mainland 
China. 
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TABLE I 
<INITIATION OF CASES) 
Year Applicant Total 
Executive Legislative Control Assembly Assemblies Court Individuals Others 
!national! lloca/J 
1949 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
1950 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1951 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1952 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 
1953 6 1 4 1 0 0 0 0 12 
1954 6 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 7 
1955 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 
1956 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1957 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 4 
1958 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
1959 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1960 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
1961 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 
1962 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1963 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1964 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1965 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1966 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 
1967 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
1968 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1969 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1970 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
19.71 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1972 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1973 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1974 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1975 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1976 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1977 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 
1978 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 
Total 28 1 13 2 3 2 5 1 55 
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After resumption of business, twenty-six constitutional 
interpretations were rendered in the period between 1952 and 1955. 
The number is quite impressive compared with the scarcity of 
decisions in other years. The reason for this concentration might be 
that there were so many pending constitutional questions that needed 
to be dealt with in order to cope with the aftermath of the defeat in 
the civil war. After that, although judicial review of constitutional 
questions did not disappear altogether, it certainly became 
infrequent. This may be due in part to the stringent procedural 
requirements imposed by Governing Law and Rules. The Council's 
strong pro-government leaning in the past may also have deterred the 
individuals from filing constitutional grievances. 
More than half of the decided cases were considered as a result of 
applications by the Executive Yuan. Considering the enormous and 
still expanding number of agencies subordinate to the ~xecutive 
Yuan, this number is not surprising. Nevertheless, after 1972, the 
more active role played by the Executive Yuan seems to have 
changed. The real reason behind this change is unclear. On the one 
hand, we may assume that every agency has made serious efforts to 
study and resolve constitutional problems as they have arisen. And, 
when conflicts involving two agencies developed, out-of-court 
settlements have been preferred. On the other hand, the 
constitutionality of either statutes and administrative ordinances 
might not be of much concern to the public officials who applied them. 
These officials rarely were concerned with whether the people's rights 
or liberties were illegally invaded or limited. 
Since the regular session of the National Assembly is held ninety 
days prior to the expiration of each presidential term, the period in 
which it can perform its prescribed duty is rather limited. Thus, it is 
not surprising to find that only two cases, one even proposed jointly 
with the Executive Yuan; were raised by the National Assembly. On 
the other hand, legislation is the major work of the Legislative Yuan, 
which may revise any statute at any time it deems necessary to do 
so. The need to ask the Council of Grand Justices to decide the 
constitutionality of a statute seems very remote if the Legislative 
Yuan performs its legislative duty properly and scrupulously. The 
result is that only one case decided by the Council was initiated by 
the Legislative Yuan.2 
1. Interpretation No. 85. 
2. Interpretation No. 29. It is interesting to note that this application questions 
the extent of authority exercised by the National Assembly. 
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It is striking that over 2 million cases reached a variety of courts 
during this period,3 yet only two cases produced applications to the 
Council on the part of the ordinary courts. 4 Several reasons can be 
given for this. One is that judges of these courts, who were trained 
and socialized in a civil-servant-oriented establishment, have tradi-
tionally had general confidence in the constitutionality and legality of 
the statutes, and, accordingly, find it hard to accept judicial review. 
Another is the unfamiliarity with the procedure of application. Lower 
courts always thought they were required to go through each higher 
court in the hierarchy to certify their cases. Such passivity notwith-
standing, applications from the regular courts have been steadily 
increasing since 1970.5 
Although the "Rules of Order" (which were superseded by the 
"Rules Concerning the Conduct of Business by the Council of Grand 
Justices" [hereinafter referred to as "Rules"] after the promulgation 
of the Governing Law) allowed a local government agency to apply 
directly to the Council, the local assemblies on two occasions referred 
their cases first to the local executive department, the provincial 
government, and then to the Executive Yuan, the superior of the 
provincial government, for the purpose of seeking constitutional 
interpretations from the Council.6 The Governing Law of 1958 
explicitly provided that any central or local government agency is 
entitled to file with the Council. Thereafter, three cases were 
initiated directly by local assemblies.7 Because they were decided in 
close succession within a period of three months in 1957 and because 
there have been no further local assembly applications for constitu-
tional interpretation since then, their significance as affirmative 
precedents was minimized considerably. However, interpretation No. 
122 perhaps opened a new avenue for the local assemblies. It was 
3. There have been 2,444,887 cases during 1958-75 period; see CHUNG-HUA-
MING-KUO TUNG-CHI-TI-YAO (The Statistical Data of the Republic of China) 
780-803 (1975). 
4. Nos. 47 & 89. 
5. There were only four applications from the regular court before 1970, all of 
them concentrated between 1952 and 1954. Since 1970, every year has seen cases in 
which the courts have applied for review. Although the numbers are not large (1970: 1; 
1971: 1; 1972: 2; 1973: 2; 1974: 2; 1975: 1), this shows an encouraging trend implying 
that more judges realize the importance of judicial review and have attempted to use it; 
see CHUNG-HUA-MING-KUO TUNG-CHI-TI-YAO (Statistical Data of the Republic of 
China) 773 (1974), 811 (1975). 
6. Interpretation Nos. 38 & 42. 
7. Interpretation Nos. 74, 75, & 77. 
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filed by the Control Yuan at the request of a local assembly, though 
there was no formal administrative relation between the two bodies. 
The absence of full knowledge of the procedural aspects of the related 
statutes and rules contributed largely to this irregularity. 
Closely related to the standing of local assemblies is the question 
of whether the local government, and its executive branch, can bring 
a case into the Council. Since both the Governing Law and the Rules 
provide for application by a "local government agency," the local 
executive branch should presumably be included. However, there has 
not yet been a single case filed by a local administration. Have no 
such administrations ever intended to ask for a constitutional 
interpretation? A close examination reveals that four cases brought 
by the Executive Yuan were begun by a local administration.8 
Another one filed by the Control Yuan was also a result of local 
administration initiative.9 Apparently, local administrations, like 
local assemblies, had insufficient knowledge of their privilege to file 
suit directly. 
In addition to the Executive Yuan, the Control Yuan has also 
maintained a high percentage of applications to the Council. Since it 
has established ten committees, corresponding to the ten ministries 
and commissions in the Executive Yuan, in order to check on the 
work of the latter, and since it may send a corrective measure to it, 10 
the constitutionality of an administrative ordinance of course is under 
its purview. Although other important functions, such as impeach-
ment and censure, are directed at the illegal conduct of public 
officials, in the process of investigation the constitutionality of a 
statute or administrative ordinance may also be called into question. 
In addition, the fact that the Control Yuan receives complaints 
directly from the people provides it with numerous opportunities to 
find constitutional problems with statutes. Moreover, since it is 
highly respected, being a century-old tradition that now makes it 
equal to other central government agencies, its requests generally 
carry more weight and are well received by the Council of Grand 
Justices. 
8. Interpretation Nos. 17, 24, 35, & 115. 
9. Interpretation No. 20. 
10. The Executive Yuan, or its ministries and commissions, is required to act and 
report to the Control Yuan within two months; see article 25, the Law of Control. 
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Among the 167 applications, 110 were filed by individuals. Table 
II marks the increase in this category over the twenty-year period 
until 1975, although the pattern of growth is not always constant. 
The relative growth and consistency in the year-to-year figures 
underscore the gradual importance this category of applications 
occupied as an indication of the institutional stability of the Council. 
It makes up a full two-thirds of all docket applications. However, 
because only one application succeeded in producing a constitutional 
interpretation through 1976,11 this result doubtlessly discouraged 
further applications by the people. The remaining applications were 
dismissed more readily than certiorari petitions are denied by the 
United States Supreme Court. 12 
TABLE II 
APPLICATION FILED BY INDIVIDUALS, 1950-1975 
Year 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
Number 
1 
0 
6 
2 
5 
0 
0 
0 
2 
1 
5 
4 
5 
6 
Year 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
Total 
Number 
6 
4 
7 
3 
6 
15 
14 
11 
0 
1 
0 
6 
110 
Before the promulgation of the Governing Law in 1958 only 
government agencies were entitled to be parties in constitutionality 
proceedings; the refusal of an individual's application was an inevit-
able consequence. However, there were eight cases in which a 
government agency filing with the Council was for an individual.'" 
11. Interpretation No. 117, rendered in 1966. 
12. Between 85 and 90 percent of all certiorari applications have been denied, and 
few of them received reasons for the denial; see H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL 
PROCESS 177 <19751. 
13. Interpretation Nos. 1, 4, 5, 30, 68, 74, 75, & 77. 
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Although the Governing Law explicitly grants standing to the people, 
almost all applications by individuals have failed. They were 
dismissed as frivolous or rejected for not meeting procedural or 
jurisdictional requirements. The most common ground for rejection 
was that the individual had either not exhausted regular legal 
remedies or had not indicated what specific constitutional rights had 
been violated. The significance of granting standing to individuals 
has thus been seriously minimized by rigid procedural barriers. 
However, an encouraging sign seems to have emerged since 1976, 
the beginning of the current term of the Council. Four applications 
filed by individuals were accepted and decided. 14 Significant in their 
own right, they represent all the cases decided by the Council in 1976 
and 1977. Although the decisions were unfavorable to the applicants, 
the fact that the applications were accepted indicates that the 
attitudes of the current Grand Justices may differ to some extent 
from those of their predecessors. Among the five cases successfully 
filed by individuals with the Council, the first and third were 
initiated by substitutes for either the National Assembly or the 
Legislative Yuan in an attempt to challenge administrative orders 
preventing them from filling vacancies. 15 The interests they intended 
to protect were limited to a special area and thus were not shared by 
the general public. However, the second, fourth, and fifth cases were 
effected by ordinary people;16 the subject matter addressed by the 
latter two was the constitutionality of judicial precedents rather than 
a statute or administrative ordinance. This represented a rather more 
liberal attitude toward the rigid procedural requirement imposed by 
the Governing Law, which had stated that only a law or ordinance 
could be questioned in the case of an individual's application. This 
positive change may again make the Chinese people more willing to 
go to the Council when they feel that their constitutional rights are 
being violated. 
Table III gives the government agency's or the individual's 
grounds for seeking a constitutional interpretation. About half of the 
applications involved "doubts and problems concerning the Constitu-
tion." In other words, clarification of the meaning of words or 
sentences in the Constitution has been the major concern of the 
Council. Judging the constitutionality of statutes or ordinances, 
which one usually consideres the Council's more important function, 
14. Interpretation Nos. 148, 150, 153, & 154. 
15. Interpretation Nos. 117 & 150. 
16. Interpretation Nos. 148, 153, & 154. 
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has been at issue in only six cases, and these were either filed by the 
Control Yuan or by an individual. The paucity of these cases clearly 
implies that attention paid by the executive branch to the constitu-
tionality of statutes or ordinances is inadequate. Therefore, without 
granting standing to the individual, the protection of an individual's 
constitutional rights would be virtually meaningless. The perform-
ance of the Control Yuan is particularly admirable, and it hopefully 
will continue vigorously to proclaim the theme of protecting human 
rights. 
TABLE III 
rounds. of proceeding NUMBER 
1. Doubts and problems concerning the constitution ...................... 26 
2. Conflicts between central government organs .............................. 2 
3. Constitutionality of statutes ..... .... ..... ....... ....... ..... ..... .......... .. ... . ... 3 
4. Constitutionality of ordinances ..................................................... 3 
5. Others ............................................................................................. 22 
The early fear that channeling into a judicial forum conflicts 
between government agencies which were fundamentally political in 
character would jeopardize the sound development of the democracy 
has proved to be groundless. Only two cases belong to this categoryY 
Conflicts among the five Yuans usually are resolved by negotiation in 
a conference conducted by the President. 18 Almost all other conflicts 
have been settled before coming to the Council. It thus seems that 
government agencies have not found the Council a convenient or 
necessary forum in which to resolve conflicts among themselves. Only 
as a last resort is application to the Council considered. 
Conflicts between central and local government agencies are 
conspicuously absent from Table III. This may be due to the fact that 
the Kuomintang controls both the central and local governments. It 
also may be due to the fact that local territory has always been under 
the very close supervision of central officials, and any conflict that 
arises would be resolved quickly. Furthermore, the local govern-
ment's ignorance of the procedure for bringing an application directly 
to the Council has contributed significantly to their submissiveness. 
17. Interpretation Nos. 3 & 76. The decision of No. 76 did cause some political 
criticism. It declared that the combination of the Legislative, Control Yuans and 
National Assembly amounted to a parliament in the western countries. Some members 
of the Legislative Yuan, thinking that only their organ qualified for this match, 
criticized this decision vehemently. 
18. See Chapter III, at 125-26. 
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A meaningful examination of judicial review in any particular 
country cannot be made merely on the basis of constitutional and 
other legislative provisions. It has to delve into the detailed work of 
the responsible court - in the case of the Republic of China, the 
Council of Grand Justices. Since the system of judicial review 
originated historically in the United States, a comparison of some 
selected Chinese decisions with their American counterparts will 
afford the reader a better understanding of the actual function of the 
Council and of the practical effects of its work. 
The court's decision in a civil law country is extremely brief and 
abstract. It generally begins with a reference to the applicable code 
provisions. This is followed by a short statement of facts, and then by 
a conclusion of fact and law. A full analysis of either the facts or the 
law is rarely found, which makes a detailed comparison with the 
American judicial decision very difficult. The interpretations ren-
dered by the Council of Grand Justices are no exception. Still, the 
extremely abstract quality of those decisions was mitigated somewhat 
after the majority opinions of the Council, as well as any separate 
opinions, were presented to the public after 1958. The separate 
opinions have been particularly useful, because they often provide a 
detailed study of the facts and law and sometimes reveal valuable 
information about the internal functioning of the Council. 
B. Selected Decisions 
1. Ex Post Facto Doctrine 
Of the thirty-nine constitutional interpretations, three have 
related to the ex post facto principle. According to article two of the 
Criminal Code, "an act is punishable only if expressly so provided by 
the law in force at the time of its commission." In addition, the same 
article further provides that if the laws at the time of the trial are 
different, the law most favorable to the offender shall apply. 
Nevertheless, the application of this principle has been limited to 
ordinary criminals as a result of these three interpretations. Those 
criminals who commit a crime of a political nature will be prosecuted 
with the heavier punishments specified in the Statute for Punishment 
of Rebellion, even though it was promulgated after their acts were 
committed. Not only will such criminals be more severely punished, 19 
19. For example, article 100!1) of the Criminal Code provides that a person who 
"undertakes to destroy the national polity, seize state territory, change the Constitu-
tion by illegal means or overthrow the government" may be punished with imprison-
ment for not less than seven years. But article 2( 1 l of the Statute for Punishment of 
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but they will also be tried by a military court as the result of the state 
of siege declared over the whole territory of the Republic of China on 
May 20, 1949.20 
The term "state of siege" is used rather than "martial rule." The 
difference lies essentially in the divergent attitudes between a 
common and civil law system toward the origin of this emergency 
measure. The former emphasizes the suspension of the rule of law, 
whereas the latter seems to regard the emergency as an effective 
threat against public safety and order. In short, the criterion in 
deciding the extent of seriousness influenced by the emergency is 
different in these two systems. As a result, the prerequisite for 
imposing martial rule in the United States is either that the civilian 
courts are closed or they can no longer perform their function 
properly.21 This condition does not apply to a state of siege, under 
which the civilian courts may still function and only those crimes 
against national security, the constitution, and the public safety and 
order are under the jurisdiction of military courts. The civil and 
military powers within the government work side by side in a spirit of 
cooperation and do not have to be substituted one for the other as in 
the case of a common law country.22 Another major difference should 
not be ignored. The executive and/or the legislature in civil law 
countries has the final word as to whether an emergency situation 
Rebellion makes capital punishment mandatory for the same offense. Although 
according to article 100(2) of the Criminal Code, a person who "prepares or conspires to 
commit the above offense" is punishable with imprisonment for not less than six 
months and not more than five years, article 2(3l of the Statute for Punishment of 
Rebellion proscribes for the same offense a penalty of imprisonment for not less than 10 
years. 
20. This proclamation automatically carried into operation the whole body of 
Martial Law. Article 8 specifically provides that during the period of enforcement of 
Martial Law the military organ may try, by itself, certain offenses including those 
against the internal and external security of the state and those against public order 
and public safety. 
21. Traditionally, the fact that civil courts are open has precluded the use of 
martial law. However, the doctrine has undergone a revision, because the nature of 
modern war has changed; it is still possible for the civil courts to open even in the 
actual fighting zone, and whether the function of the courts is obstructed should be the 
real criterion. See Warren, Spies, and the Power of Congress to Subject Certain Classes 
of Civilians to Trial by Military Tribunal, 53 AM. L. REV. 195, 201 (1919!. Robert 
Rankin also cited a list of supporting articles on this point; see R. RANKIN, WHEN 
CIVIL LAW FAILS 181-84 (1939). 
22. For details, see C. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP 86-87 
<1948). 
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has arisen; the courts assume this function under the common law. 
"Politically speaking, this means that a political body, an admittedly 
partisan organ, has the ultimate authority in continental jurisdic-
tions whereas a non-partisan authority, which presumably tries to be 
non-partisan, has the last word in Anglo-American jurisdiction."23 
All these features of the state of siege have appeared in the 
Republic of China since 1949. The President has the power to initiate 
the state of siege, although such power is subject to confirmation by 
the Legislative Yuan. The latter by resolution may ask the President 
to terminate the state of siege. The regular court provides no check 
upon the declaration of the state of siege either at the time of the 
proclamation or after the disturbing conditions have been allayed. 
The structure and functions of government and the way of life of the 
people are left almost unaffected by the state of siege. Citizens who 
mind their own business may hardly know that a state o( siege has 
been declared. Moreover, non-military personnel are subject to a 
military trial only if they commit one of three types of crimes: 
sedition and espionage; theft or unauthorized sale or purchase of 
military equipment and supplies; or stealing or damaging public 
communication equipment and facilities. These restrictions upon the 
enforcement of military trial are expressly provided in article 2 
known as the "Measures Governing the Classification of Cases to be 
Tried by the Military Judicial Organs Themselves and Those Which 
are to be Turned Over to the Courts in the Region of Taiwan during 
the Period of State of Siege."24 Significantly, the scope of the military 
judicial organs' involvement has gradually been reduced with a series 
of revisions in 1954 and in April and September of 1967.25 A fair 
consideration of the state of siege in the Republic of China should 
never fail to take account of these special "Measures." 
It is understandable that a military court has been assigned to 
impose heavier punishments for crimes of sedition or espionage since 
the threat of war from the People's Republic of China has never 
ceased. Furthermore, subversives were always being sent to Taiwan 
23. C. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY 
240 (1941l. 
24. There would be more than one hundred kinds of crime to be tried by military 
courts if the government strictly followed the provisions of Martial Law. 
25. For a fairly detailed investigation of the causes of these revisions, see I. Wang, 
The Delimitation of Criminal Jurisdiction among Military and Civilian Judicial Organs 
in the Region of Taiwan during the Last Twenty Years, in FA-LIN-YUEH-KAN 
ERH-SHIH-CHOU-NIEN CHI-NIEN-LUN-WAN-CHI (Symposium in Honor of Twen-
tieth Anniversary of China Law Monthly) 423-37 (8. Yu ed. 1970). 
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to undermine its strength in the hope that it would fall under the 
control of the Chinese Communists. No government in a similar 
mortal struggle ever dealt less severely with rebels. 26 The right of 
self-preservation of any country is paramount. Nevertheless, the 
necessity of refusing application of the ex post facto doctrine in cases 
covered by the Statute for Punishment of Rebellions is another 
question which needs to be carefully examined. 
In both Interpretation 68 and 80 the military courts decided that 
the defendants joined the Communist Party only for a short period 
and disassociated themselves from it by either severing their 
connection or even by joining the Nationalist army. Furthermore, the 
defendants were also cleared from having any kind of relationship 
with the Communist Party since 1949 when the Nationalist Govern-
ment resettled itself in Taiwan. The facts in the case resulting in 
Interpretation 129 went further. Defendants were punished for their 
membership in the Communist Children Regiment when they were 
only thirteen years old. The punishment is hardly acceptable in light 
of article 18 of the Criminal Code, which provides: "An act committed 
by a person who has not completed the fourteenth year of his age is 
not punishable." 
A consistent issue in these three Interpretations was the 
continuous nature of the crimes. For those people who had once joined 
the Communist Party, regardless of the duration of their membership 
and regardless of their age when they joined, there were only two 
grounds for exemption from later criminal prosecution: either by 
surrendering themselves to the authorities or by possessing other 
facts proving that they had definitely disassociated themselves from 
any subversive organizations supported by the Communists. These 
two criteria have not been given equal weight. The record clearly 
shows that inactivity for ten or more years does not constitute 
convincing proof of disassociation from the Communist Party. Even 
joining the Nationalist army was not enough. What other more 
significant action could one take to prove he no longer works for the 
Communists? There thus seems to have been only one viable 
alternative available to those defendants, namely, to give themselves 
26. President Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus at the outbreak of the 
Civil War, and his action was later approved by both the Congress and the Supreme 
Court. During the first World War, various treason laws such as the Espionage Act of 
1917, the Sedition Law of 1918, and provisions in the Selective Service Act and the 
Trading with the Enemy Act were promulgated. For these statutes, see 12 STAT. 326, 
40 STAT. 217, 553, 76, 411. 
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up to the law if they wished to be assured that they would not be 
punished in the future. 
The Statute of Punishment of Rebellion does not require that 
those surrendering defendants be exempted from punishment; rather 
it gives the prosecutor full discretion to prosecute or not. During the 
trial the judge also may, in his discretion, reduce or remit the 
punishment based on the relevant facts of a particular case. Since 
surrendering oneself to the authorities does not necessarily ensure a 
favorable result, a person once involved with the Communist Party 
may be reluctant to expose himself to the government. If the 
involvement was rather minor and of short duration - in other 
words, if the individual neither engag.ed in any active role nor 
contributed substantially to the Communist Party - then any past 
criminal conduct may be treated leniently. It is natural that such an 
individual simply wants to forget about these unfortunate incidents 
and tend to his present life. The danger he or others like him might 
pose to the present government is negligible as he has had no relation 
at all with the Communists for decades. In addition, the possible 
harm done during his past, short involvement can hardly be 
ascertained. The defendants in Interpretation No. 129 could hardly 
have been expected to have had actual knowledge about the nature of 
Communism when they joined at thirteen years of age. It is quite 
possible that theirs was merely a group action with other children, 
ordered either by their parents or teachers. The question of voluntary 
participation may also be applied to the other two Interpretations in 
light of those defendants' involvement for a short period of time and 
their later inactivity. 
Accordingly, the doctrine under which middle-aged people may 
still be sent to prison for political indiscretions committed during 
their tender years - a doctrine upheld by the Council of Grand 
Justices - has its inherent risks and for practical purposes is 
unnecessary. Its effect as a deterrent to the spread of subversive 
actions of the Communist Party is open to serious challenge. 
On the other hand, the threat of government prosecution in the 
indefinite future against those persons may give them no alternative 
but continual cooperation with the Communist Party. Because the 
consequences of being punished by the Statute for Punishment of 
Rebellion may prove to be very severe, other kinds of criminals may 
also use this threat as a form of blackmail to seek an individual's 
cooperation when his past record is revealed to them. 
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The opinion of the Council was vehemently attacked by a 
dissenting opinion in the case of Interpretation No. 129.27 Its 
argument mainly lies in the exemption of criminal culpability for 
individuals under fourteen years of age. Whether the ex post facto 
doctrine should be applied to the political case was not mentioned at 
all. 
One objection to retroactive laws is that they fail to provide fair 
warning. Only if an individual is warned that his contemplated acts 
are punishable can society expect him to refrain from acting. A 
related objection is that such laws frustrate a reliance upon existing 
law. The essential unfairness of retrospective legislation has long 
been recognized. Retroactivity was condemned in both the Corpus 
Juris of Justinian and the canon law, and such condemnation formed 
the basis of the principle phrased in modern European law in the 
words nulla poena sine lege. 26 The feeling was so strong that two 
future justices of the American Supreme Court29 among the Framers 
even went further by proposing that the prohibition against ex post 
facto laws was unnecessary: "there was no lawyer, no civilian who 
would not say that ex post facto laws are void in and of themselves."30 
Moreover, it is believed that the ex post facto clause of the United 
States Constitution embraces all retrospective laws or laws governing 
or controlling past transactions, whether they are of civil or a 
criminal nature."31 However, the Supreme Court soon construed the 
constitutional language in a much more restricted sense. In the 1798 
case of Calder v. Bull/2 the high bench established that the ex post 
facto clause only reached laws that are criminal in nature. Although 
this restrictive application was challenged at times,33 it has been 
followed by practically all of the courts. 
27. When both the Nos. 68 and 80 were decided, different opinions were not 
allowed to be published. Therefore, there is no way to know if different opinions were 
ever raised in conference. 
28. SeeM. RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 425 <1927l. 
29. They were Oliver Ellsworth and James Wilson. 
30. Brant, The Madison Heritage, in THE GREAT RIGHTS 13, 32 <E. Cahn ed. 
1963). 
31. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES§ 1339 <189ll; Field, Ex Post Facto in the Constitution, 20 MICH. L. REV. 315 
<1922); Crosskey, The True Meaning of the Constitutional Prohibition of Ex post-Facto 
Laws, 14 U. CHI. L. REV. 539 <1947). But there is some evidence to suggest that "the 
terms 'ex post facto' related to criminal cases only; that they would not consequently 
restrain the states from retrospective laws in civil cases." Quoted in E. DUMBAULD, 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 194 n964l. 
32. 3 Dall. 386 (1789). 
33. Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet. 380 (1829l; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213 
<1827). 
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An answer to the question of whether a particular statute 
involves criminal or penal matters so as to fall within the ban against 
ex post facto laws has never been easy. Test oaths prescribed after the 
Civil War, whereby office holders, teachers, or preachers, were 
required to swear that they had not participated in the revolt, were 
held invalid as an attempt to punish those individuals for past 
offenses.34 However, statutes authorizing the deportation of a resident 
alien because of his prior membership in the Communist Party have 
been construed as involving a civil remedy and not a criminal 
punishment. The highest tribunal in a leading 1924 case, Mahler v. 
Ebby/5 held that deportation was neither a criminal proceeding nor 
punishment; it was simply a refusal of government to harbor persons 
it does not want, no matter how harsh the consequence may be for the 
individual concerned. 
The reasoning has been criticized throughout the history of the 
United States. James Madison attacked it in speaking of the first 
Alien and Sedition Act proposed in the United States: 
if a banishment of the sort described be not a punishment, and 
among the severest of punishments, it will be difficult to imagine 
a doom to which the name can be applied. 36 
Others, such as Justices Brewer, Brandeis, Black, and Douglas, have 
also been unable to accept the views of different majorities of the 
Supreme Court. Justice Brandeis expressed it most succinctly when 
he said that deportation may deprive a man "of all that makes life 
worth living."37 Justice Douglas also spoke of it as "punishment in the 
practical sense."38 Although the majority of the Supreme Court was 
still unwilling to depart from the rule that deportation is not penal,39 
it is apparent that the Court thought it was a bad rule when the 
severity of deportation was fully considered. Thus, Justice Frankfur-
ter, speaking for the majority, admitted: "And since the intrinsic 
34. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (18671; ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 
(1867). 
35. 264 u.s. 32. 
36. As quoted in the dissenting opinion of Justice Field, Fong Yue Ting v. U.S., 
149 u.s. 698, 759 (1893). 
37. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (19221. 
38. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 600 (19521. 
39. In a 1953 decision, the high bench said: "It would be an unjustifiable reversal 
to overturn a view of the Constitution so deeply rooted and so consistently adhered to." 
Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1953). 
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consequences of deportation are so close to punishment for crime, it 
might fairly be said also that the ex post facto clause even though 
applicable only to punitive legislation, should be applied to deporta-
tion."40 
Since the regulation of an alien's entry and presence has been 
traditionally vested in the Congress, other branches of government 
deferred strongly to this policy. This may explain why the protection 
given aliens by the Constitution has not been guarded by the courts 
with the vigor and clarity that a citizen might expect. As for the 
ordinary American citizen, punishment based solely on his or her 
membership once in the Communist Party has been rejected by the 
Supreme Court. In Scales v. U.S.:' Mr. Justice Harlan speaking for 
the majority stated that only that person who was an "active" 
member of a subversive group with knowledge of its illegal advocacy 
and had a specific intent to bring about a violent overthrow of the 
government may be punished. In other words, merely "a nominal, 
passive, inactive or purely technical" membership cannot be deemed 
sufficient to convict. 42 
The element of active membership was arrived at on the grounds 
that (1) the penalty imposed by the statute was too heavy for 
Congress to have intended to punish mere passive members and (2) 
Congress would have imposed an objective standard of membership as 
fixed by the law itself, rather than allow it to vary with the standards 
of membership as subjectively viewed by the organization.43 By 
rejecting the defendant's contention of first amendment guarantees, 
the Court found that a sufficient and significant form of aid and 
encouragement to the illegal acts in the required elements of active 
membership in addition to knowledge of illegal advocacy and specific 
intent were sufficient to permit the imposition of a criminal sanction. 
It is apparent that what the Court has done is to define the 
Internal Security Act of 1950 in such a way as to avoid more difficult 
problems of constitutionality. It would seem that conviction for the 
mere act of becoming a member in such an organization might raise 
the constitutional problem under the First Amendment. However, the 
40. ld. 
41. 367 u.s. 203 (1961). 
42. Id., at 220. 
43. Id., at 222. It is also helpful to avoid conflict with the Internal Security Act of 
1950 § 4(0, 64 Stat. 992, 50 U.S.C. § 783(f) (1958), which provides: "Neither the holding 
of office nor membership in any Communist organization by any person shall constitute 
per se a violation of subsection (a) or subsection (c) of this section or of any other 
criminal statute." 
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distinction between active and nominal membership may be not at all 
clear. "Active" can indicate a degree of activity ranging from fulltime 
work on the organization or on behalf of it, to attending meetings, or 
merely paying dues. The government stated in its brief that: 
Even though the activity be expanded along lines not otherwise 
illegal, . . . active support of any kind aids the organization in 
achieving its own illegal purpose. The solicitation of membership, 
the contribution of financial assistance, or the handling of public 
relations all help the organization and therefore indirectly 
promote its objectives. . . . Any activity which contributes to the 
ultimate success of the undertaking bears its share of responsibil-
ity for that outcome.44 
As the importance of a government's self-preservation is fully 
recognized, use of certain means to control the advocates of violent 
overthrow is clearly justifiable. The Chinese Communists occupying 
the mainland since 1949 have never abandoned the ultimate goal of 
bringing Taiwan within the domain of the mainland. Regardless of the 
fact that the term it used has changed from "liberate" to "unify," the 
posibility of mainland China's employing armed force to achieve its 
aim has been real. Before the mainland acquires the capability to 
launch a fatal attack on Taiwan, she will not hesitate to take any 
actions which can create internal problems of which she may take 
advantage. Taught by the painful lesson of losing the mainland and 
facing a continuing threat of infiltration and subversion from an 
oppressive Communist China, the Republic of China in Taiwan has 
every reason to believe that Communism is a real menace to its 
security, and that some extraordinary actions could be justified under 
this special condition. It is clear that laws must be strong and 
effective to enable the government to protect iself from the dangerous 
Communist Party. At the same time, we must be careful lest, in an 
effort to safeguard the government and its principles, we do not 
blindly destroy them. It is necessary to pass laws and to render 
judgments which do not "take on the character of ex post facto laws, 
but which are nevertheless strong enough to accomplish the purpose 
of self-preservation. 
In addition, it is clear that the decision on membership of the 
Communist Party will probably have a negligible effect as a 
44. Quoted in Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 115 
<196ll. 
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deterrent. Most of those people who might otherwise bear the effects 
of the decision are idealists, and an idea cannot be suppressed simply 
by legislation or judgment. Such people will join the Communist 
Party and remain in it unless and until their illusions concerning it 
are shattered. Only education, not the force of government, can 
accomplish this. On the other hand, to those ex-Communists who 
have rejected Communism for a number of years and who now lead an 
honorable and worthy life, the present Interpretations make no 
provision for forgiveness; such people may now lose their jobs, their 
friends, their homes, and maybe even their wives and children simply 
because they once were members of the Communist Party, whether or 
not they knew of its illegal purpose when they joined. By these 
Interpretations a person can express no political opinions without 
spending the rest of his life in dread of punishment. He can join no 
organization of any type, no matter how harmless or legal at the time 
of joining, without being forever afraid that some day in the far 
distant future, past membership in that organization will be grounds 
for prosecution. 
According to the dissenting opinion of Interpretation No. 129, 
after more than ten conferences, the Grand Justices had originally 
decided upon the following criterion: there had to be proof of the 
ex-Communist's knowledge that the Party had an evil purpose or of 
his agreement with any such purpose that it might have had and 
proof that he joined the Party voluntarily.45 This reasoning was 
finally rejected. It reflects, however, a more balanced argument and 
should serve as the direction to be followed in the future. 
2. Freedom of the Press 
According to the Publication Law, the administrative agency 
may impose an "injunction" or withdraw a license from a particular 
publication when a violation occurs. In addition, it may issue a 
warning, levy a fine, confiscate, and take other measures. 46 This 
administrative injunction may last no longer than one year and has 
to be confirmed first by the Government Information Office of the 
Executive Yuan.47 The Information Department of the Taiwan 
Provincial Government or Taipei Special Municipality has full 
discretion for other less serious administrative penalties. Since every 
45. See SZU-FA-YUAN TA-FA-KUAN HUl-l CHIEH-SHIH-HUI-PIEN <The Col-
lection of Interpretations Made by the Council of Grand Justices of the Judicial Yuan) 
316 (1977). 
46. Art. 36. 
47. Art. 403(3). 
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new magazine and newspaper has to be registered at its local 
government and confirmed by the provincial or Taipei special 
municipality government before its issuance, the responsibility of 
enforcing the Publication Law naturally falls to those agencies. The 
license is issued by the Government Information Office of the 
Executive Yuan upon confirmation. Thus, only this highest govern-
ment agency is entitled to withdraw the license of a publication. 
Among the grounds for issuing an administrative injunction are 
those crimes which incite a person to commit offenses against the 
internal or external security of the state48; interference with public 
functions, voting, or public order'9; and offenses against morals or 
religion. 50 Except for those violations relating to the national security, 
others have to be rated as serious enough to warrant administrative 
action.61 There are only two conditions in which the license may be 
withdrawn: if someone commits a crime against national security and 
is thus sentenced, and it can be shown that his criminal act was 
influenced by a publication, or; if the major content of the publication 
is punishable for offending against morals and its publishers have 
already received three administrative injunctions but continue the 
violation.62 
Considering the possible undersirable result of empowering an 
administrative agency to restrict the freedom of the press which is 
guaranteed explicitly by the Chinese Constitution/3 the Control Yuan 
asked the Council of Grand Justices to interpret these related 
provisions of the Publication Law. The Council avoided the central 
question of whether they are in conflict with the freedom of press or 
48. Offenses against the internal security of the state are the crimes stated in 
article 100(1) of the Criminal Code which appeared in note 19. Offenses against the 
external security of the state include those of a person who "communicates with a 
foreign state or its agent with intent that such state or another state begin war with 
the Republic of China"; "communicates with a foreign state or its agent with intent to 
subject territory of the Republic of China to such state or another state"; "discloses or 
delivers a document, plan, information, or other thing of a secret nature concerning the 
defense of the Republic of China" to a foreign country and others; see art. 103-15, the 
Criminal Code. 
49. Criminal Code, art. 135-41 for the offenses of interference with public 
function; art. 142-48 for the offenses of interference with voting; and art. 149-60 for 
the offenses of interference with public order. 
50. Offenses against morals were provided for in art. 221-36 of the Criminal Code. 
Art. 246 is the provision concerning the offenses against religion. 
51. Art. 40(3)(4!, Publication Law. 
52. Art. 41. 
53. Art. 11 provides: "The people shall have freedom of speech, teaching, writing, 
and publication." 
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not; instead, it skillfully laid the constitutional groundwork for the 
administrative injunction and for the withdrawal of a license. The 
"necessity conditions" contained in article 23 of the Constitution 
were cited to give sanction to these administrative actions. This 
article provides that: "All the freedoms and rights enumerated in the 
preceding articles [including freedom of the press] shall not be 
restricted by law except by such as may be necessary to prevent 
infringement upon the freedom of other persons; to avert an 
imminent crisis; to maintain social order; or to advance the public 
welfare." As for the method of restricting the freedom of the press, the 
Council simply indicated there is no limitation provided in the 
Constitution. Furthermore, access to the Administrative Court also is 
granted for possible infringement of the peoples' right, and this 
protection is considered adequate by the Council. 
Chapter 2 (articles 7-24) of the Chinese Constitution sets forth an 
impressive array of constitutional rights, freedoms, and ideals. 
Article eight guarantees personal freedom54; article ten deals with the 
freedom of travel and settling residency; article eleven guarantees 
freedom of speech, teaching, writing and publication; article fourteen 
establishes freedom of assembly and association; article sixteen 
grants the rights of presenting petition, lodging complaints, or 
instituting legal proceedings. All of these guarantees are, however, 
explicitly counterbalanced by the possible restrictions under specific 
54. It provides: "Personal freedom shall be guaranteed to the people. Except in the 
case of flagrante delicto as provided by law, no person shall be arrested or detained 
otherwise than by a judicial or a police organ in accordance with the procedure 
prescribed by law. No person shall be tried or punished otherwise than by a law court 
in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. Any arrest, detention, trial, or 
punishment which is not in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law may be 
resisted. When a person is arrested or detained on suspicion of having committed a 
crime, the organ making the arrest or detention shall in writing inform the said person 
and his designated relative or friend of the grounds for his arrest of detention, and 
shall, within 24 hours, turn him over to a competent court for trial. The said person, or 
any other person, may petition the competent court that a writ be served within 24 
hours on the organ making the arrest for the surrender of the said person for trial. The 
court shall not reject the petition mentioned in the preceding paragraph, nor shall it 
order the organ concerned to make an investigation and report first. The organ 
concerned shall not refuse to execute, or delay in executing, the writ of the court for the 
surrender of the said person for trial. When a person is unlawfully arrested or detained 
by any organ, he or any other person may petition the court for an investigation. The 
court shall not reject such a petition, and shall, within 24 hours, investigate the action 
of the organ concerned and deal with the matter in accordance with law." This is the 
most lengthy provision in the Constitution. Its detailed prescription reflects the heavy 
emphasis which its drafters placed upon it. 
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necessary conditions provided in article 23 as mentioned above.65 
There can be no doubt that the Chinese Constitution was based on 
respect for the individual. But one must bear in mind that this 
emphasis need not imply nor does it manifest itself in the term of 
individualism as understood in the United States. "Almost all modern 
nations at least pay lip service to guarantees of human rights. But 
there are significant differences in what people mean by freedom in 
different cultural, political and academic worlds and in the ways they 
integrate freedom and consciousness of rights with law and public 
interest consciousness. These cultural factors, in turn, affect enforce-
ment policy and judicial thought and behavior patterns."56 
Traditionally, as we mentioned in Chapter II, the Chinese people 
have stressed social concerns, rather than individualism.57 This 
remains true today. "Opposition to the public good or to group 
consensus in favor of assertion of individuality is viewed as unprinci-
pled and reprehensible egotism. Freedom traditionally, and also 
literally, meant the freedom to behave as one pleased without 
considering others and was thus abhorred by the general public."58 
This conception of freedom continues to affect the contemporary 
Chinese perception of the relationship between the values of law and 
the individual. The fulfillment of one's duties according to one's place 
in the status hierarchy under Confucian teaching, rather than the 
recognition of the rights and fulfillment of the goals of the individual 
person, was pervasive and imperative. Indeed, there was no word for 
a "right" existing in the Chinese language until the intercourse with 
55. The imposition of legal restraints upon the constitutional rights of the 
individual is not limited to the Chinese Constitution. Basic Law for the Federal 
Republic of Germany, art. 2, provides: "Everyone shall have the right to the free 
development of his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or 
offend against the constitutional order or the moral code." For other similar 
restrictions, see art. 5(2), art. 9(2), art. 18. Article 12 of the Constitution of Japan 
provides: "The freedom and rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall 
be maintained by the constant endeavour of the people, who shall refrain from any 
abuse of these freedoms and rights and shall always be responsible for utilizing them 
for public welfare." As for the enumerated civil rights, their exercise may also be 
limited for the public welfare. For example, art. 22 provides: "Every person shall have 
freedom to choose and change his residence and to choose his occupation to the extent 
that it does not interfere with the public welfare." 
56. Been, The Public Welfare Standard and Freedom of Expression in Japan, in 
the CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN 209-210 <D. Henderson, ed. 1968). 
57. At 35-38. 
58. Been, Freedom of expression in Japan with Comparative Reference to the 
United States, in COMPARATIVE HUMAN RIGHTS 99, 101 <R. Claude ed. 1976). 
What he said about the Japanese culture on this point also applies to Chinese culture. 
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the West in the late nineteenth century. "In such a context, 
self-realization is achieved by fulfilling duties to others with a 
correlative expectation that others will do likewise. This mutual 
awareness is of diffuse, interpersonal responsibilities, rather than of 
clearly and narrowly defined duties, as in American law."59 Even 
though the West recognizes the notion of "duty," it does so in a 
somewhat negative way; "to do something because it is a duty is often 
thought to indicate that the action is not done freely, but because one 
has to."60 
Under this traditional influence it is not surprising to find that 
even though all the constitutionally guaranteed rights were enumer-
ated together, these rights are still not as significant as the four 
specific necessary conditions in article 23. Surely this provides a safe 
shield for the government from attacks made by civil rights groups.61 
Almost without exception, any specific restrictive statute would be 
held constitutional if it were challenged in the Council of Grand 
Justices. It is, of course, admitted that the Council should not, under 
the guise of judicial review, usurp legislative power and that, 
accordingly, in some areas it should not examine a legislative choice 
of means. There is, however, a vast difference between the latter type 
of judicial self-restraint and the abstention from judicial review that 
has characterized the Council of Grand Justices. 
It is recognized that one of the basic principles of the Western 
idea of the rule of law is that one whose legal rights have been 
violated by an administrative action may challenge the legality of 
that action in a court of justice. But the Chinese Constitution 
explicitly distinguishes administrative actions from civil and criminal 
suits, and an Administrative Court has thus been established.62 
The Republic of China is not the first country with a separate 
administrative court; this separation originated in France. Before the 
revolution, France had an unhappy history of judicial interference 
59. ld., at 102. 
60. Id., at 104. 
61. The public welfare clauses in the Japanese Constitution have often been 
utilized by the Japanese Supreme Court as the counterbalancing weight on the scale 
against the specific constitutional freedom at issue, and their use is concluded by 
Professor Masami Ito as a "panacea for curing the alleged unconstitutionality of the 
law." See The Rule of Law: Constitutional Development in LAW IN JAPAN 205, 
229-30 <A. von Mehren ed. 1963). 
62. Article 77 provides: "The Judicial Yuan ... shall have charge of civil, 
criminal, and administrative cases .... " The Organic Law of the Judicial Yuan 
further elaborated this by providing in art. 7: "Judicial Yuan shall establish Supreme 
Court, Administrative Court. . . " 
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with administrative process in general and the obstruction of 
necessary administrative reforms in particular. Judges attempted to 
conserve their own privileges and prerogatives. This succeeded in 
fixing in the French mind a deep-rooted antipathy for judicial 
expansion and a strict interpretation of the theory of separation of 
powers. This resulted in the establishment of a specialized adminis-
trative court independent of the regular judicial hierarchy and 
possessed of the exclusive power of adjudication with respect to 
administrative acts.63 Several other European countries including 
Germany, Italy, and Austria, have adopted a similar system since 
that time. In short, this separation has prevailed in civil law 
countries. As the judicial system of the Republic of China was heavily 
influenced by the pre-war Japanese system, which in turn was 
modeled after the German, it is not surprising that an independent 
administrative court was established. 
In addition to the existence of such attitudes as revulsion and 
distrust on the part of the administrators toward the judiciary, there 
also are some fundamental differences between administrative and 
regular civil or criminal adjudication. The nature of administrative 
adjudication is such that it cannot be separated from the public power 
of the bureaucracy. Furthermore, the exercise of administrative 
power sometimes involves broad discretion. Hence, situations may 
arise when it becomes necessary to bend private interests in favor of 
public interest. When such a necessity arises, it is not always 
apparent to regular judges. Therefore, it is claimed that administra-
tive suits should be heard by those who are intimately versed in 
matters of administration.64 
Since administrative agencies carrying out measures by virtue of 
their official function were under the authority of the Constitution 
and the law, lawyers from civil law countries further argued that the 
agency's executive efficacy would be penalized as a result of 
subordination to judicial functionaries, especially if administrative 
63. For detail, see B. SCHWARTZ, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE 
COMMON LAW WORLD 1-18 (1954). As for the desirability of introducing certain 
French standards of administrative control in the United States, see Cake, The French 
Conseil d'Etat - An Essay on Administrative Jurisprudence, 24 AD. L. REV. 315-24 
(1972). Indeed, the Task Force of the Second Hoover Commission in the United States 
urgently suggested some form of administrative court system for the United States 
federal government; see H. ABRAHAM, supra note 12, at 269. 
64. When the United States recognized the merit of the administrative court 
system, the Court of Claims was established in 1855 and the Tort Claims Act of 1946 
was passed which, under certain circumstances, made the government responsible for 
the actions of its servant being tried in a specialized court. 
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measures were placed under the control of a judiciary charged with 
the duty of deciding whether a particular administrative action was 
legal or illegal, proper or improper.65 
A characteristic of the Chinese tradition also contributes to the 
adoption of a separate administrative court system. Historically, 
when citizens pressed for relief from infringement of their rights by 
public officials, or when they sought to restore their rights or to 
defend their interests, almost the only recourse open to them was to 
draw up a petition. Through the system of memorials, the people's 
requests were heard and decided by a responsible public agency or by 
its superior through internal administrative supervision. This process 
provided an opportunity for the administrative agency to correct its 
mistake and thus avoided the possibility of embarrassment resulting 
from a public trial. In fact, since both administrative and judicial 
functions were exercised by local magistrates alone, it was simply 
impossible to bring suit against the government in court. This initial 
internal proceeding today has been formally incorporated into a 
. statute. Before presenting a suit to the Administrative Court, one 
generally has to make an administrative appeal and re-appeal to the 
competent higher authorities.66 
There is no doubt that through this procedure the burden of the 
Administrative Court has significantly been reduced. However, it 
may also be attended with some undesirable results. Under this 
system the challenged administrative act is reviewed by the very 
administrative agency which issued the particular administrative act, 
or by its supervising administrative authority. In either case, the 
reviewing agency can hardly be expected to make an unbiased 
decision. 57 Moreover, the appeals andre-appeals are generally handled 
65. See B. ITO, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE EMPIRE 
OF JAPAN 120-21 (1978). 
66. In addition to appeals grounded in a dissatisfaction with the decision of 
re-appeal, a person is also entitled to bring action to the Administrative Court if the 
competent authority hearing his re-appeal fails to make a decision within three months 
after the institution. This is significant in view of the prevalent problem of case delay 
in the court; see Art. 1 (1), The Law of Administrative Proceedings. A similar procedure 
also exists in West Germany. A prospective plaintiff has to follow a "remonstrance" 
procedure, or ·an "appeal" (Widerspruchl to the administration before applying to an 
administrative court, and this takes place before higher administrative authorities; see 
Z. NEDJATI & J. TRICE, ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL SYSTEMS OF ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW 46 (1978). 
67. Taking the period of 1970-1973 for example, the percentage of dismissed 
appeals initiated by people was always above 70 percent. The percentage even goes 
higher than 80 percent in the re-appeal decision. These data were provided by the 
Committee of the Review of the Administrative Appeal in the Executive Yuan. 
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by ordinary administrative officials who have not necessarily had 
proper legal training, and regular trial procedure is not carefully 
followed. The people are not assured the right to be heard, although 
the reviewing agency might conduct an oral trial in its own 
discretion. 
The Administrative Court also has some defects. First, although 
security of tenure was provided for judicial judges directly in the 
Chinese Constitution, there was no similar provision for Administra-
tive Court judges, who were covered only by statute. Consequently, 
the position of an administrative judge could be altered merely by 
changing the law. Second, since only one Administrative Court has 
been established, it has the function of hearing an administrative suit 
only once. Individuals' rights can hardly be expected to receive 
adequate protection. Third, since the creation of the Administrative 
Court was influenced by a strong bureaucratic tradition (this 
assumption can be substantiated by the cases of Germany and 
pre-war Japan), the administrative judges were favorably disposed 
toward the executive and not inclined to protect the rights of the 
people. In other words, the Administrative Court, as it turned out, 
frequently served as a part of the bureaucracy that explained, 
defended and justified the legality of administrative dispositions to 
the people. Accordingly, its underlying purpose, that of providing 
relief from the exercise of administrative power which infringed upon 
the rights and liberties of the people, has been largely ignored by the 
Administrative Court. This may be evidenced by the fact that the rate 
of dismissal has never been below 80 percent since 1959.68 The 
bureaucratic mentality of judges of the Administrative Court is the 
major factor underlying the proliferation of like members. The ratio 
of persons with administrative background often surpassed those with 
judicial background. Moreover, in terms of career advancement, it is 
suggested that the assignment of judicial officers or high-ranking 
administrative officials to the Administrative Court has generally not 
been looked upon with favor. Therefore, the caliber of the Administra-
tive Court cannot be compared favorably to that of the Supreme 
Court. 
Since the major function of the Administrative Court is in 
practice to justify the legitimacy and lawfulness of the administrative 
authority's initiatives rather than to assure citizens' rights, the 
responsibility imposed upon it to protect those constitutional civil 
68. See Chen, The Administrative Adjudication over the Past Twenty Years, in 
FA-LIN-YUEH-KAN ERH-SHIH-CHOU-NIEN CHI-NIEN LUN-VAN-CHI, supra note 
25, at 415, 416. 
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rights can hardly be expected to have been met. The remedy for this 
inadequacy lies not in the abolition of the system of administrative 
adjuciation and the transferring of its jurisdiction to a regular court, 
as in the case of the United States, but in the meaningful 
improvement of its structure and procedure. If all those who handled 
the administrative cases had sufficient legal training in addition to 
their administrative experience and if the procedures were conducted 
with more judicial flavor, such as the extensive use of oral argument 
and amending the single-instance system in favor of a two-instance 
system in the Administrative Court, the output might possibly be 
different. 
About two years before the Interpretation No. 105 made by the 
Counsel of Grand Justices, the United States Supreme Court first 
held that, by virtue of the first amendment itself, courts are the only 
body competent to decide whether an administrative action is 
constitutional. Central to this case was whether a judicial or 
administrative determination on the restriction of the freedom of the 
press was desirable. The facts of the case, Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Day,69 can be summarized as follows: a publisher of magazines 
consisting principally of photographs of nude and semi-nude males 
and intended for homosexuals brought an action for injunctive relief 
against the Postmaster General who had ruled that the magazines in 
question were non-mailable under the Comstock Act.70 The district 
court gave summary judgment for the Postmaster General, and the 
court of appeals affirmed on the ground that the magazines were 
obscene and contained advertisements for obscene materials. 
In a six-to-one decision, the Supreme Court set aside the post 
office's action. There was, however, no opinion of the Court. Mr. 
Justice Brennan, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice 
Douglas, concluded that the administrative procedure through which 
the publications were declared nonmailable was not authorized by 
Congress,71 and a contrary conclusion would raise, inter alia, the 
69. 370 u.s. 478 (1962). 
70. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1958), which provides: "Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, 
indecent, filthy or vile article, matter, thing, device, or substance ... [and an 
advertisement of such matter] is declared to be nonmailable matter and shall not be 
conveyed in the mails or delivered from any post office or by any letter carrier .... " 
The statute goes on to prescribe criminal penalties for violation. The statute's popular 
name derives from Anthony Comstock, the Victorian reformer who was mainly 
responsible for ita passage in 1873. 
71. Several scholars supported this rationale even before the case was decided. See, 
e.g., Paul, The Post Office and Non-Mailability of Obscenity: An Historical Note, 8 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 44 (1961); Schwartz, Obscenity in the Mails: A Comment on Some 
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substantial constitutional question of "whether Congress, if it can 
authorize exclusion of mail, can provide that obscenity be determined 
in the first instance in any form except court,"72 without violating the 
First Amendment. 
The obvious implication of Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion is that, 
in order for the Postmaster General to ban an article from the mails, 
it would be necessary for there to be an action in court against the 
publication in question, and only upon a judicial determination of 
obscenity could an administrative restriction be imposed. Apparently, 
this also holds true for any other administrative agency. In addition, 
since we can find nothing in the rationale of Manual Enterprise to 
suggest that its principle is confined to the area of obscenity, political 
speech should be treated similarly. As a matter of fact, the necessity 
for a disinterested judicial judgment is even greater in this area. 
The preference for judicial evaluation rests in the inherent 
institutional differences between courts and administrative agencies 
no matter how judicial the administrative proceedings may be. There 
are several reasons for this attitude. First, the security of tenure, in 
principle at least, frees judges from direct political pressure. Judicial 
insulation encourages impartial decision-making. An administrative 
agency is rarely insulated as the court. Second, the role of the 
administrator is not that of the impartial adjudicator, but of the 
expert- a role which necessarily gives an administrative agency a 
narrow and restricted viewpoint. On the other hand, courts have a 
broader perspective resulting from their general jurisdiction. They 
deal daily with a wide variety of situations; their broad experience 
helps eliminate the deficiencies that come from single-mindedness. 73 
Third, an adversary proceeding in the court sharply reduces the 
chances of an erroneous injunction. At such a proceeding the judge 
will not only receive a more accurate description of the relevant facts, 
but his attention will also be directed to the relevant legal principles. 
Manual Enterprises has further significance. The plaintiff, before 
litigating in the lower federal court, had already been given an 
evidentiary hearing before the Judicial Officer of the Post Office 
Department. It might be claimed that this internal administrative 
supervision almost amounted to the appeal procedure in the Chinese 
administrative process. After that, the differences begin. In contrast 
Problems of Federal Censorship, 106 U. PENN. L. REV. 214 (1957!; Zuckerman, 
Obscenity: In the Mails, 33 SO. CAL. L. REV. 171 C1960l. 
72. 370 U.S. at 497-98. 
73. Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARV. L. REV. 518, 522-23 
(1970). 
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to the American practice in which the plaintiff may have as many as 
three opportunities to argue his case before a comparatively impartial 
regular court, the Chinese plaintiff can only present his complaint to 
a higher administrative agency and finally to the Administrative 
Court, which always reflects a strong pro-government attitude. The 
protection provided under the American system is far more complete 
than that under the Chinese. Of course, the dissatisfied plaintiff in 
China still can as a last resort file his case with the Council of Grand 
Justices. But his chance of success is not very bright in view of the 
Council's rigid procedure as well as the extreme conservatism 
evidenced by its record. 
In addition to the constitutionality of the administrative proce-
dure involved in Interpretation No. 105, the administrative tempo-
rary injunction and withdrawal of license employed by the Chinese 
government to regulate the business of publication has additional 
significance. Both were used to prevent a magazine's further publica-
tion because of previous performance. Do they amount to "prior 
restraint" of the freedom of the press? Or do they merely constitute 
subsequent punishment? What is the real difference between them? Is 
the freedom of the press absolute? If not, under what condition may a 
"prior restraint" be imposed without violating the Constitution? 
These questions are analyzed in the following paragraphs. 
It is well settled that one necessary condition of the democratic 
process is the free interchange of ideas. The right to communicate 
ideas is as important in a democracy as any other civil right -
whether the communication taking place is in spoken or written form. 
"Democratic government," wrote Bryce, "rests upon and requires the 
exercise of a well-informed and sensible opinion by the great bulk of 
the citizens."74 This can be further evidenced by the fact that a 
censored press has always been the hallmark of the despot. On the 
other hand, one cannot help asking if this freedom is absolute. If not, 
what limits are to be placed on publications? 
There are, in general, two ways in which governments may deny 
freedom of the press. One is by prior legal limitations which prohibit 
or otherwise effectively restrain speaking or publication. A system of 
prior limitations is essentially a system of censorship, by license or 
otherwise, that operates before the fact. The other method is by legal 
proceedings that punish persons for speech or a publication which is 
alleged to violate statutory standards. In short, this is the distinction 
between censorship of speech and punishment for the abuse of speech. 
74. I.J. BRYCE, MODERN DEMOCRACIES 109 <19211. 
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These two methods have commonly been referred to as "prior 
restraint" and "subsequent punishment." 
Because some characteristics of prior restraint make it more 
dangerous to freedom of the press than subsequent punishment, the 
practice of prior restraint has always been viewed unfavorably. As 
Thomas J. Emerson indicated, "under a system of subsequent 
punishment, the communication has already been made before the 
government takes action; it thus takes its place, for whatever it may 
be worth, in the market place of ideas. Under a system of prior 
restraint, the communication, if banned, never reaches the market 
place at all."75 In other words, in both cases the social interest in the 
advancement of truth is involved; subsequent punishment affords an 
opportunity to distinguish between that which contributes to the 
policy of open communication and that which in no way contributes to 
it. The imposition of prior restraint necessarily shuts out the true as 
well as the false. Because prior restraint is purported to be done 
indiscriminately and is not limited to particular cases which are the 
subject of· complaint, the possibility of abuse is much greater 
and the area affected also will be more extensive. Furthermore, it is 
easier to impose prior restraint, for it requires only an administrative 
decision which can often be made behind a screen of informality and 
partial concealment, whereas subsequent punishment is a time-
consuming, expensive, and public process involving compliance with 
the protective safeguards of criminal prosecution. Last, but not least, 
the danger posed by prior restraint is that the force contained within 
this system may drive it toward unintelligent, overzealous, and often 
absurd administration. The ability and personality of those persons in 
charge of administering prior restraint may be best summarized in 
the words of Milton: 
If he be of such worth as behooves him, there can not be a more 
tedious and unpleasing journey-work, a greater loss of time 
levied upon his need, than to make the perpetual reader of 
unchosen books and pamphlets . . . . we may easily foresee what 
kind of licensers we are to expect hereafter, either ignorant 
imperious, and remiss, or basely pecuniary.76 
Moreover, the nature of the administrators' work is to find something 
to suppress; they cannot be expected to act as disinterested judges. 
75. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMPORARY 
PROBLEMS 648, 657 !1955). 
76. J. MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 20-21 (E. Rhys ed. 1927). 
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Their careers depend upon the record they make. It thus is quite 
natural that they view anything with a high degree of suspicion. This 
unhealthy attitude is certainly not conducive to protecting the 
freedom of the press. 
Although the danger of prior restraint has generally been 
recognized, the rule against it did not develop in the West until the 
seventeenth century.77 Prior to that time the Crown in England 
exercised the prerogative of licensing the press. Seditious and 
heretical books were prohibited, and licenses were required for 
printers, importers of books, and booksellers. The number of master 
printers was limited, and they were licensed and bonded. 78 In 1695 the 
last enactment providing for official censorship of the press carne to 
an end. Although the licensing law has not since been renewed, the 
law against seditious libel and blasphemy remained unaffected and 
has been applied as a basis for subsequent punishrnent. 79 Because the 
American colonies were established during the period when England 
practiced the licensing system, it is not surprising to learn that 
Americans adopted the main features of the English censorship 
system in their early history. However, these laws were abolished 
completely in the first half of the eighteenth century.80 
The press's freedom from licensing then carne to assume the 
status of common law or natural right. Blackstone stated concisely in 
1791 that 
The Uberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free 
state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon 
publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter 
when published. Every free man has an undoubted right to lay 
77. For an historical development of this licensing law, see 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, 
HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 360 (1924). It is interesting to note, however, that 
the popular feeling against the curtailment of a free press was not generated by a 
realization of the importance of the freedom of press. It was generated by "the petty 
grievances, the exactions, the jobs, the commercial restrictions, the domiciliary visits 
which were incidental to it" and which resulted in the struggle for the freedom of press. 
4 T. MACAULAY, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND 13 (1879). 
78. For details, see G. PATTERSON, FREE SPEECH AND A FREE PRESS 17-51 
(1939); Holdsworth, Press, Control and Copyright in the 16th and 17th Centuries, 29 
YALE L.J. 841 (1920). 
79. See Harvey Kelley, Some Constitutional Aspects of Statutory Regulation of 
Libels on Government, 15 TEMP. L.Q. 453, 454-62 !1941); Shientag, From Seditious 
Libel to Freedom of the Press, 11 BROOKLYN L. REV. 125 !1942>. 
80. PATTERSON, supra note 78, at 104-15; Vance, Freedom of Speech and of the 
Press, 2 MINN. L. REV. 239, 247 (1918). 
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what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this is to 
destroy the freedom of the press; but if he publishes what is 
improper, mischievous or illegal, he must take the consequence of 
his own temerity.81 (Emphasis added). 
This theory was also adopted by the United States, which incorpo-
rated it into the first amendment. However, this concept of freedom of 
press evidently implied the possibility of subsequent punishment of 
publications, which generated some concern among scholars. It has 
been termed too narrow in that it offered no protection from a 
reckless criminal prosecution instituted against a harmless publica-
tion. As one writer said, "a death penalty for writing about socialism 
would be as effective suppression as censorship."82 Accordingly, for the 
sake of greater certainty, some have gone further by favoring a 
licensing system; under such a system a publisher could be informed 
in advance of what is permitted and what is forbidden, thus obviating 
the danger of criminal or similar sanctions in the event that his 
interpretation of the law is erroneous.83 Nevertheless, when we 
consider the public interest in the long run, this argument that 
prefers prior restraint to subsequent punishment is obviously unde-
sirable. 
The danger of allowing excessive subsequent punishment to 
endanger freedom of the press has clearly been recognized by the 
United States Supreme Court. In Schenck v. U.S., 84 the Court 
somewhat modified Blackstone's definition by declaring that "It may 
well be that the prohibition of laws abridging the freedom of speech is 
not confined to previous restraints, although to prevent them may 
have been the main purpose .... "85 
Although the doctrine that no previous restraint of publication 
can be imposed under the first amendment existed for a long time, it 
was not until1931 that the Supreme Court vigorously and effectively 
enunciated and gave substantive meaning to what had been hitherto 
merely a concept. The statute before the Court in Near v, Minnesota, 86 
the so-called Minnesota Gag Law,S7 provided that 
81. B.L. COMM. 151-52. 
82. Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (1942). 
83. See Emerson, supra note 75, at 659. 
84. 249 u.s. 47 (1919). 
85. ld., at 51. 
86. 283 u.s. 697 (1931). 
87. MINN. STAT. {Mason, 1927) §§ 10103-1 to 10123-3. 
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Any person who . . . shall be engaged in the business of 
regularly or customarily producing, publishing or circulating, 
having in possession, selling or giving away (a) an obscene, lewd 
and lascivious newspaper, magazine, or other periodical, or (b) a 
malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or 
other periodical, is guilty of a nuisance, and all persons guilty of 
such nuisance may be enjoined. . . ." 
The articles published by the appellant, a newly established weekly 
paper called The Saturday Press, charged that a Jewish gangster was 
in control of gambling, bootlegging, and racketeering in Minneapolis, 
and that law enforcement officers and agencies were not energetically 
performing their duties. The charges were made in a crude and 
distasteful manner. The state court, after finding that the publica-
tions constituted a "nuisance" within the statute, first temporarily 
restrained the defendants from further publishing and later perpe-
tually enjoined them from issuing "any publication whatsoever which 
is a malicious, scandalous or defamatory newspaper, as defined by 
law."88 
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the majority, analyzed 
the operation and effect of the statute and concluded that it 
effectively amounted to censorship. He pointed out, "The statute 
provides for no punishment, except in case of contempt for violation of 
the court's order, but for suppression and injunction, that is, for 
restraint upon publication."89 Adopting Blackstone's theory that this 
freedom of the press means "principally, although not exclusively, 
immunity from previous restraints or censorship," Justice Hughes 
recognized that he who abused the right was responsible criminally 
for the public and civilly for the private wrong. "The fact that 
the liberty of the press may be abused by miscreant purveyors of 
scandal does not make any the less necessary the immunity of the 
press from previous restraint in dealing with official misconduct. 
Subsequent punishment for such abuse as may exist is the appropri-
ate remedy, consistent with the constitutional privilege."90 
The four dissenting Supreme Court Justices, speaking through 
Mr. Justice Butler, characterized the decision as giving to the 
freedom of the press "a meaning and a scope not heretofore 
recognized." It was contended that there was no authorization of 
administrative control in advance, but only prescription of an 
88. 283 U.S. at 706. 
89. Id., at 712. 
90. ld., at 720. 
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equitable remedy, enjoining the continuance of a business. Since the 
publisher was held liable and punished only when he continually 
committed some prior misconducts, the statute, theoretically, could 
hardly be said to set up prior restraint instead of subsequent 
punishment. 
This aspect of Near v. Minnesota appears also in the Chinese 
system as articulated in its Publication Law. An administrative 
temporary injunction and the withdrawal of a license have historical-
ly been applied only after a questionable publication had appeared. 
Issuance of such orders was thus based on the past performance of a 
particular newspaper or periodical. However, when we consider the 
actual operation of these procedures and their resulting effect on the 
press, they must be labeled as serious prior restraints. Punishment 
was summarily dispensed by administrative officials without any 
other of the protections provided in ordinary criminal cases. The 
situation is better in the United States, because a judge assumes the 
responsibility. But even in the United States there is no jury trial and 
other procedural safeguards are also absent. Therefore, it is natural 
that "under such circumstances any publisher seeking to avoid prison 
would, in sheer self-protection, have to clear in advance any doubtful 
matter with the official w,elding such direct, immediate, and 
inimpeded power to sentence. The judge would, in effect, become a 
censor. "91 
The importance lies in the fact that, though there is no restraint 
before the publication is issued, there are prior restraints as to future 
issues. Such restraints are not directed at a particular wrongful 
passage. but at the entire life of the newspaper or periodical. They 
tend to suppress protected as well as unprotected speech. Thus, the 
severity in the traditional concept of prior restraint also appears in 
the case of subsequent restraints. Accordingly, the power to enjoin 
subsequent issues of a periodical because of misconduct in previous 
issues in effect becomes a prior restraint of the sort forbidden by the 
First Amendment in the United States. 
Although freedom from prior restraint through censorship now is 
part of the freedom of the press, this general principle of freedom may 
have to give way in the United States in certain special circum-
stances. In some exceptional cases, prior restraint would have been 
recognized. Plato emphasized the need of protecting the masses from 
unpleasant truths and the "immoral" lies of poets.92 In American 
91. Emerson, supra note 75, at 654. 
92. See Sigler, Freedom of the Mails: A Developing Right, 54 GEO. L.J. 30 (1965). 
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constitutional history, Mr. Chief Justice White wrote in 1918: "It 
suffices to say that, however complete is the right of the press to state 
public things and discuss them, the right, as every other right enjoyed 
in human society, is subject to the restraints which separate right 
from wrongdoing."93 Mr. Chief Justice Hughes in Near v. Minnesota 
also pointed out that the protection even as to prior restraint is not 
absolutely unlimited.94 Obscenity, the security of the community from 
incitements to acts of violence, the overthrow of the government by 
force, and certain other obstructions and publications during time of 
war were listed as instances where prior restraint could be imposed. 95 
These four exceptional situations are almost comparable to those 
enum·erated offences that warrant the imposition of prior restraint 
provided in article 32 of the Chinese Publication Law. 
When comparing the Chinese practice with that of the United 
States, we must bear in mind that until 1949, China had been a 
country without the concept of freedom of the press, similar to 
England before 1695 and the United States before the First Amend-
ment in 1781. In 213 B.C. the so-called "First Emperor of the Chin 
Dynasty," Shi Hwang-ti, burned nearly all the books in China in 
order to wipe out old ideas and old loyalties. When crude wooden 
blocks were invented for reproducing manuscripts in China about 868 
A.D., six hundred years before Gutenberg, the Chinese dynasties 
captured the press and used it for their own purpose. The most 
notorious case happened in the Ching dynasty, the last dynasty in 
Chinese history. It determined to rewrite a "good" history, created an 
index of "bad" history books, and murdered seventy historians for 
compiling an honest non-Manchu story of the past. One of the most 
ruthless literary inquisitions occurred in 1776, the year the Declara-
tion of Independence was created in the United States. A Chinese 
emperor, Chien-lung, staged a national literary bonfire.96 According-
ly, the freedom of the press was a recent doctrine introduced by 
westerners along with other democratic ideas into China. The period 
of its taking root and further growth has been so short that it is 
difficult to reap its fruit. The consciousness of this constitutional right 
has been developed neither among the public officers nor among the 
people. 
93. Toledo Newspaper Co. v. U.S., 24 U.S. 402, 419-20 (1918). 
94. 283 U.S. at 716. 
95. ld. 
96. See generally, Y. LIN, A HISTORY OF THE PRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION 
IN CHINA (1936). 
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Another fact that should not be ignored is that the Republic of 
China at Taiwan has always declared itself to be at war against the 
People's Republic of China. In addition to the futile invasion on 
October 25, 1949, there have been two extensive artillery barrages on 
Quemoy, an offshore island off the mainland, in 1958 and 1960, 
respectively. Until recently Communist China conducted even-day 
firings on this and other nearby islands. Although there have been 
several peaceful offers by the Chinese Communists to unify Taiwan 
with the mainland, the use of force never has been excluded. 
Therefore, the possibility of violence has tainted all the peaceful 
gestures of the People's Republic. In view of the geographical 
proximity to the mainland and of the fact that, by their own 
admission, the Communists have sent saboteurs and other agents to 
Taiwan97 (it is understandable that entering a relatively open society 
in Taiwan is much easier than vice versa) to aid in a Communi~t 
takeover, the government of the Republic of China can justify its 
imposition of some restraints upon the freedom of the press even 
though it is not engaged in an actual war. After all, self-preservation 
is as much the first law of the nature of governments as it is of the 
nature of individuals.98 Destruction of a government might result in 
the loss by its citizens of all individual rights and liberties. Since the 
Chinese Communists have always been considered the epitome of 
political despotism, the Taiwan government remains ever cautious, 
viewing the unification of China with its untoward results to be 
conceivable.99 Therefore, the strict distinction between war and peace 
has been blurred in Taiwan. After all, the older definition of armed 
97. After the so-called re-opening of China in 1971, the Chinese Communist Party 
and the State Council respectively established "The Taiwan Office" and "The Taiwan 
Unit," and branch offices were also formed in coastal Fukin and Kwangtung Provinces 
as well as in Hong Kong and at the PRC's Embassy in Japan. The main plausible 
purpose for these units is to speed efforts to topple the ROC government and bring 
Taiwan back under Communist control. See Chen, Pekings' Attitude Toward Taiwan, 
17 ASIAN SURVEY 903-18 (1977). 
98. Along with the American participation in World War I came the Espionage 
Acts of 1917 and 1918. However, they have elicited much criticism. For texts, see 40 
Stat. 217, 553. For a detailed analysis of the background of these statutes and the cases 
under their influence, see E. HUDON, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN 
AMERICA 44-68 (1963); CHAFEE, supra note 82, at 36-107. 
99. Tibet is a vivid precedent. After granting local autonomy and promising not to 
alter the existing political system in 1951, Communist China cracked down ruthlessly 
on the resistance movement only eight years later; some even referred this suppression 
as a crime of genocide. See INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, TIBET 
AND THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC 10-63 (1960). 
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invasion has become obsolete in an age of jet bombers and nuclear 
bombs. It may be too late to restrict people's freedom for the 
protection of national security after a full-scale war has broken out. 
Because the Republic of China is confronting not an internal 
democratic movement of socialists and pacifists who believe in social 
change by persua~ion, but a tightly organized external power which 
has no intention of confining its efforts to a democratic process, some 
utterances have to be suppressed. However, action must be in 
proportion to the emergency. Also, it cannot be denied that there are 
strong incentives for administrative officials to suppress views in 
order to cover up mistakes or discourage hostile inquiries. Therefore, 
while recognizing the necessity of imposing some kind of prior 
restraint upon the freedom of the press, a strong and independent 
system of judicial review has to be established as a brake on the 
possible excessiveness of the administrative authority. 
3. Immunity of Legislative Speech 
The Council of Grand Justices rendered an important decision 
dealing with the immunity or privilege of a legislator's speech in 
1967. It read as follows: "There was no provision in the Constitution 
to safeguard the speech made by local councilmen at their session. 
The Interpretation No. 3735 rendered by Judicial Yuan did not 
contravene the Constitution." The Constitution specifically provided 
the protection of freedom of speech for members of the National 
Assembly,100 Legislative,!Ol and Control Yuans. 102 But all of these 
bodies are national agencies. The reason for the omission of local 
bodies has not been spelled out. A tragedy occurred in 194 7 and 
resulted in Interpretation No. 3735 made by the Judicial Yuan (the 
Council of Grand Justices had not been established at that time). It 
was begun by a rejected proposal of a councilman in Sui County, 
Hupei Province, to a woman teacher. Bearing a grudge against her, 
he uttered in the county council that she was an unlicensed prostitute 
in order to discredit her. Angered and ashamed by this groundless 
accusation, the woman teacher committed suicide and left a post-
humous letter stating the true facts as well as hoping that the 
100. Article 32: "No delegate to the National Assembly shall be held responsible 
outside the Assembly for opinions expressed or votes cast at a meeting of the 
Assembly." 
101. Article 73: "No member of the Legislative Yuan shall be held responsible 
outside the Yuan for opinions expressed or votes cast in the Yuan." 
102. Article 101: "No member of the Control Yuan shall be held responsible outside 
the Yuan for opinions expressed or votes cast in the Yuan." 
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councilman responsible would be put on trial for slander. Based on 
the application from the Hupei provincial government, the Judicial 
Yuan decided in Interpretation No. 3735 that the challenged 
statements must bear a relation to legislative matters before the 
meeting; otherWise the speaker could be held liable for libel or 
slander. 
Since the Interpretation was issued before the promulgation of 
the current Constitution and since both the current Organic Laws of 
the Provincial Assembly and County Council have provided explicitly 
that "No member shall be held responsible outside for opinions or 
votes cast at session,"103 a problem arises in determining the precise 
scope of this legislative immunity at the local level. The facts 
surrounding the present decision of the Council of Grand Justices are 
somewhat similar to those of Interpretation No. 3735. A councilman 
in the Taitung County Council interpellated the county government 
about the fact that a personnel official-in the Taitung Health Bureau 
had coerced a woman subordinate for an appointment. The accused 
person filed suit against the councilman for libel. The Control Yuan 
received the petition from the Taitung County Council and referred it 
to the Council of Grand Justices for a decision. 
The doctrine of legislative immunity had its origin in the 
Parliament's struggle for supremacy over the King of England during 
the 16th and 17th centures.104 Members of Parliament often found 
themselves confined to the Tower of London for what they had said in 
Parliament. After one king was beheaded and another was exiled to 
France, the privileges of speech or debate were guaranteed for 
members of Parliament in the English Bill of Rights of 1689, which 
provided: "That the Freedom of Speech, and Debates of Proceedings in 
Parliament, ought not be impeached or questioned in any Court or 
Place out of Parliament."105 Although the existence of the parliamen-
tary privilege of freedom of speech and debate was never again 
103. Article 33 of the Organic Law of Taiwan Provincial Assembly; article 40 of the 
Organic Law of County Council in Taiwan Province. 
104. For detailed historical background, see E. MAY, THE LAW, PRIVILEGES, 
PROCEDURES AND USAGE OF PARLIAMENT 67-115 (1976); Z. CHAFEE, THREE 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION 6-83 <1956); Cella, The Doctrine of 
Legislative Privilege of Freedom of Speech and Debate: Its Past, Present and Future as a 
Bar to Criminal Prosecutions in the Courts, 2 SUFFOLK L. REV. 1, 3-16 (1968); 
Reinstein & Silverglate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86 HARV. 
L. REV. 1113, 1120-44 (1973); Yankwich, The Immunity of Congressional Speech -Its 
Origin, Meaning and Scope, 99 U. PENN. L. REV. 960 (1951). 
105. CHAFEE, id., at 7. 
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seriously questioned in England, its proper scope and application 
were issues in numerous cases that followed. In the case of Stockdale 
v. Hansard, the English court set forth a classic description of the 
scope of the parliamentary privilege of freedom of speech and debate 
as it had developed: 
By consequence, whatever is done within the walls of either 
assembly must pass without question in any other place. For 
speeches made in Parliament by a member to the prejudice of any 
other person, or hazardous to the public peace, that member 
enjoys complete impunity .106 
This frequently quoted dictum was reinforced by the deicision in Ex 
Parte Wason. 101 As Mr. Justice Lush of the Court of Queen's Bench 
stated: "I am clearly of the opinion that we ought not to allow it to be 
doubted for a moment that the motives or intentions of members of 
either House cannot be inquired into by criminal proceedings with 
respect to anything. they may do or say in the House."'08 Accordingly, 
it is safe to conclude that the immunity conferred by this privilege 
against libel and slander is absolute without any qualification in 
England. 
Since this principle was so firmly rooted, the drafters of the 
American Constitution adopted it in article I, section 6, without much 
debate. 109 The language contained in thi's clause restricts the 
privilege to "any Speech or Debate in either House," which, taken 
literally, would appear only to immunize those statements made on 
the floor of the Congress. However, the immunity of legislators has 
not been confined by the courts to acts performed on the floor of the 
chamber concerned. James Wilson, a member of the Convention's 
Committee on Style, represented the prevailing view that 
in order to enable and encourage a representative of the publick 
to discharge his publick trust with firmness and success, it is 
indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of 
speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of 
106. 112 Eng. Rep. 1112, 1156 <Q.B. 1839). 
107. 4 Q.B. 573 (1869). 
108. /d., at 577. 
109. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 177 (1966); Reinstein & Silverglate, 
supra note 104, at 1138-40. 
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every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of that 
liberty will occasion offence."110 (Emphasis added) 
The first and leading American decision interpreting the pri-
vilege is Coffin v. Coffin.m In this case, Chief Justice Parsons of the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court construed the defendant legislator's 
defamatory statements, which were made in a private conversation 
about matters not then before the House, as outside the legislative 
function. The defendant was therefore not entitled to the defense of 
privilege. Justice Parsons, however, declared unequivocally a rather 
broad doctrine of legislative immunity: 
I will not confine it to delivering an opinion, uttering a speech, or 
haranguing in debate; but will extend it to the giving of a vote, to 
the making of a written report, and to every other act resulting 
from the nature, and in the execution of the office.112 
The first speech or debate clause case to reach the Supreme Court 
was Kilbourn v. Thompson in 1881.113 The defendant sued several 
members of the House of Representatives and the House Sergeant at 
Arms for his imprisonment resulting from his refusal to produce 
certain documents before a congressional investigation committee. 
Citing Coffin as the most authoritative case, the Court enunciated the 
scope of the privilege as extending "to things generally done in a 
session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business 
before it,"114 even declaring that ordering Kilbourn's imprisonment 
had exceeded the authority of the House.115 
It would seem, then, from the Court's definition of the scope, that 
the speech or debate privilege had been given a somewhat expansive 
reading. However, its scope was further extended into an absolute one 
in the first half of the century by the American court. In 1931, 
Cochran v. Couzens116 was decided by the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia and the Supreme Court declined to take 
review. 117 It held that defamatory words uttered by a United States 
110. 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 421 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967). 
111. 4 Mass. 1 (1808). 
112. Id., at 27. 
113. 103 u.s. 168 (1880). 
114. ld., at 204. 
115. ld., at 189. 
116. 42 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1930). 
117. 282 u.s. 874 (1930). 
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Senator on the floor of the Senate in the course of a speech, but not in 
the course of debate, whose subject matter did not concern any matter 
under inquiry by the Senate, were nevertheless absolutely privileged 
under article I, Section 6 of the Constitution and could not be made 
the basis for an action of slander in any court. The Court of Appeals 
stated: 
It is manifest that the framers of the Constitution were of the 
view that it would best serve the interests of all the people if 
members of the House and Senate were permitted unlimited 
freedom in speeches and debates. us (Emphasis added) 
Because the issue before the Chinese Council of Grand Justices 
related to a local legislative body, it is important to explore its 
counterpart in the United States. All but seven state constitutions 
provide immunity for state legislators similar to that of article I, 
section 6.u9 Absolute privilege has not applied solely at the federal 
level; courts have held it applicable both to the state12() and local 
legislatures.121 In a 1951 decision, Tenney v. Brandhove(22 the 
Supreme Court first considered the clause in the context of a suit filed 
against state legislators. The plaintiff, who was summoned as a 
witness before a state legislative committee, brought suit for damages 
against the members of the committee charging that the defendants 
were conducting the hearing to harass the plaintiff and deprive him 
of his freedom of speech. At issue was whether the legislative 
protection afforded a member of the California legislature constituted 
defense to a suit brought under the Civil Rights statute. 123 
The Court held that an immunity much like that explicitly given 
to Congressmen by the Constitution also existed implicitly for state 
legislators.124 The Court was even more specific in establishing certain 
prohibited grounds for imposing liability upon legislators: "The claim 
118. 42 F.2d at 784. 
119. See G. BLAffi, AMERICAN LEGISLATURES 138 (1967). 
120. Van Riper v. Tumulty, 26 N.J. Misc. 37, 56 A.2d 611 (1948). 
121. Larson v. Doner, 32 Ill. App. 2d 471, 78 N.E.2d 399, 401 (1961). However, some 
early cases suggested that a qualified immunity existed in some local legislative bodies 
below the state legislature, such as city councils, boards of supervisors, etc.; Greenwood 
v. Cobbey, 26 Neb. 449 (1889); Henry v. Moberly, 6 Ind. App. 490 (1892), and others. 
See generally, Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Legislative and Executive 
Proceedings, 10 COLUM. L. REV. 131 (1910). 
122. 341 u.s. 367 (1951). 
123. 42 u.s.c. §§ 1983, 1985(3) (1970). 
124. 341 U.S. at 372-75. 
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of an unworthy purpose does not destory the privilege."125 Therefore, 
one can go further and state that the privilege in question is an 
absolute one, which shields the legislator from liability for damage 
done by his acts and statements, made or done in his official capacity, 
even though they are knowingly wrong or false and motivated by 
personal malice on his part. Although since 1972 in three almost 
consecutive cases, United States v. Brewster/26 Gravel v. United 
States/21 and Doe v. McMillan,t28 the Supreme Court substantially 
limited the scope of the legislative privilege as it was previously 
thought to exist, the integrity of the absolute immunity of congres-
sional speech within both Houses from libel or slander seem not yet to 
have been directly challenged or curtailed by the Court. 129 The 
precedents that established absolute privilege in state and local 
legislatures are also intact. 
The justification for giving legislators absolute immunity from 
libel or slander actions is essentially the fear that honest speech 
might become the basis of liability. Exaggeration or vehemence of 
language may furnish evidence of ill will whose appearance suffices 
to prove malice sufficient to support an action. Moreover, a jury may 
find that an absence of reasonable grounds for belief in the truth of a 
statement, however genuine that belief may have been, satisfies the 
requirement of malice.130 Thus, broad definitions of malice and the 
difficulty of controlling juries necessitate an absolute immunity from 
libel and slander actions. 
On the other hand, still recognizing that the underlying reason 
for so drastic and rigid a rule is the overbalancing of the individual 
injury by the public necessity, it would be preferable that some legal 
125. Id., at 377. 
126. 408 u.s. 501 (1972). 
127. 408 u.s. 606 (1972). 
128. 412 u.s. 306 (1973). 
129. Under these cases, many activities normally performed by Congressmen were 
excluded from protection: members of Congress can no longer independently acquire 
information about the activity of the executive branch, nor report such information to 
their constituents without risking criminal prosecution. Not only the legislators, but 
also many commentators vehemently denounced the Supreme Court for its decisions; 
see Ervin, The Grauel and Brewster Cases: An Assault on Congressional Independence, 
59 VA. L. REV. 175-95 (1973); Cleveland, Legislative Immunity and the Role of the 
Presentative, 14 N.H.B.J. 139-55 (1973); Cella, The Doctrine of Legislative Privilege of 
Speech or Debate: The New Interpretation as a Threat to Legislative Coequality, 8 
SUFFOLK L. REV. 1020-95 (1974); Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 104, at 
1148-71. 
130. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 453 (1956). 
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recourse be available to the individual when a congressman wrong-
fully sullies his reputation. 
Since the fundamental purpose for legislative immunity was to 
allow the legislator to discharge freely his responsibilities to his 
constituents without fear of executive interference or accountability 
before a possibly hostile judiciary, it was not intended for the personal 
benefit of the legislator. The privilege exists to protect the interest of 
citizens in good legislation. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated, 
"legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge 
of their legislative duty, not for their private indulgence but for the 
public good."131 Of course, telling lies on the floor of the Congress does 
not promote the interest of the citizen, but the loss of the privilege 
would, it is argued, paralyze the legislature. 132 Therefore, a compro-
mise should be sought to protect the exercise of the legislative 
function on the one hand and personal interest on the other. 
Moreover, the privilege serves as an additional safeguard to assure 
separation of powers and the coequal status of Congress. In con-
struing the doctrine of legislative immunity and in defining its scope, 
the courts must reconcile the control of the aberrant conduct of 
individual legislators with the appropriate measure of respect that 
should be accorded a coordinate branch of the government. 133 
As the basic purpose of the freedom of legislative activity is the 
interest of good government, it can hardly be argued that statements 
which the legislator had reason to believe not to be true are conducive 
to the proper conduct of legislative business. It seems inconsistent 
with justice that we insist that no man be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law and that just compensation shall 
be awarded for private property taken for public use, but then permit 
a man's often regarded most precious property, his good reputation, to 
be taken from him wrongfully without allowing him one iota of legal 
redress. Furthermore, it is admitted that slander by a legislator 
carries more opprobrium than slander by an ordinary citizen. 134 To 
consider every malicious slander uttered by a citizen who is a 
131. Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951). 
132. The overriding importance of this privilege is stated by Story, who asserted 
that the "other legislative privilege would be unimportant or ineffectual without the 
great and vital privilege of freedom of speech or debate." See Note, "They shall not be 
Questioned .... " 3 STAN. L. REV. 486, 489-90 (1957!. 
133. Note, The Scope of Immunity for Legislators and Their Employees, 77 YALE 
L.J. 366, 385-86 (1967). 
134. See Oppenheim, Congressional Free Speech, 8 LOYOLA L. REV. 1, n. 3 
(1955-1956). 
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representative as within his privilege because it was uttered within 
the walls of the legislative chamber, would render the legislature a 
sanctuary for calumny. 
Most scholars argue that the privilege of legislative immunity 
which is a bar to a legislator's civil or criminal action in a given case 
does not mean necessarily that he will not be punished for his 
transgressions, because, at least in the United States, the legislature 
has the power to reprimand or expel misbehaving members. 135 
Although the power to punish members is broad, congressional 
self-discipline for misconduct has been rare and, as a practical matter, 
cannot be relied upon to vindicate those injured by legislative 
malfeasance. Congress in this aspect has been notoriously slow and 
exceedingly reluctant to apply its own palliatives to instances of 
legislative slander. It is said that Congress has only tried eighteen 
times to purge itself of its "unhealthy" elements and most of them 
involved Southern Congressmen during the days immediately preced: 
ing the Civil War.136 Since the legislative body has not been too much 
concerned over ordinary vituperation, it is not surprising to find that 
there are almost no cases of either a Senator or Representative being 
actually disciplined for saying anything about anybody.137 As late as 
1954, the Senate did condemn one of its members for insulting 
language about fellow members. But the charges against the same 
Senator for grossly insulting a general in the United States Army 
failed to pass the Congress. This clearly indicated that an outsider 
receives less protection via legislative self-discipline than does the 
legislature's members. 138 
Moreover, the suitability of the legislature's making such a 
determination is highly questionable. The late Dean Roscoe Pound, 
after carefully researching and evaluating what he called "examples 
of legislative justice," concluded: "it may be said without hesitation 
that in action it exhibits all the bad features of justice without law."139 
The absence of procedural safeguards and appellate review makes a 
135. U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 5. See generally, Cella, supra note 104, at 37-41. 
136. Oppenheim, supra note 134, at 27. 
137. See CHAFEE, supra note 104, at 88-89. 
138. The only successful case punishing a member for words doing injury to a 
non-member is the case of Theodore Bilbo; see Smelser, Legislative Investigation: The 
Problem in Historical Perspective 29 NOTRE DAME LAW 163, 190 (1954). 
139. He illustrated the following features: (1) was unequal, uncertain, and 
capricious; (2) was often influenced by personal solicitation, lobbying, and even 
corruption; (3) has always been highly susceptible to the influence of passion and 
prejudice; (4) has often been affected by the preponderance of purely partisan or 
political motives as grounds for decision; and (5) has been disfigured very generally by 
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trial by the legislature itself a more effective method of harassment 
than prosecution by the executive in a judicial forum. 140 Of course, it 
is conceivable that its undesirable nature becomes more obvious when 
the constitutional rights of a private citizen, not its own member, 
have been affected. 
Since the judiciary in any country, particularly in the United 
States, has always borne the institutional responsibility for protect-
ing individuals against unconstitutional violations of their rights by 
all branches of the government, judicial review of unconstitutional 
legislative action should not be foreclosed whether that action takes 
the form of a statute or the conduct of an individual congressman. 141 
The historical development of the speech or debate privilege also 
evidences that it was developed toward protection against executive-
motivated actions rather than private action. Nor does the latter 
generally represent so great an intrusion upon legislative function. 142 
Therefore, the Court's attitude toward private action, on the one 
hand, and executive-motivated action, on the other, could be different. 
In this context, it is an unwarranted, simplistic view that all 
cases of libel or slander must be unredressed merely because the 
defendant is a legislator and accordingly that a petition from the 
private citizen who seeks to guard his privacy, his good name, and his 
cherished rights from the reckless advance of his legislators must be 
ignored. With the legislature at today's level of development, the 
original purpose of this legislative immunity securing the precarious 
situation of elective assemblies in the face of a powerful executive 
branch (often combined with the judiciary) is hardly compelling. The 
reason that it still exists is not to favor members in their private 
capacity, but to ensure the smooth running and complete independ-
ence of the legislature. Therefore, it should be related primarily to the 
exercise of legislative duties. 
In the classic case, Coffin v. Coffin, 143 mentioned before, the 
Massachusetts Court clearly laid out the groundwork for a less 
generous view of immunity: "When a representative is not acting as a 
member of the house, he is not entitled to any privileges about his 
fellow-citizens; nor are the rights of the people affected if he is placed 
the practice of participation in argument and decision by many who may not have 
heard all the evidence and participation in the decision. See Pound, Justice According 
to Law, Part II, 14 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7-12 (1914). 
140. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 520 (1972). 
141. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 104, at 1175. 
142. Id., at 1172-73. 
143. 4 Mass. 1 (1808). 
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on the same ground, on which his constituents stand."144 Accordingly, 
an action against a state legislator on the grounds that his challenged 
statement bore no relation to legislative matters before the chamber 
and thus did not pass the test of official conduct or official duty was 
upheld. 
The Supreme Court also defined the scope of the speech or debate 
privilege in Kilbourn v. Thompson, 145 mentioned previously, as 
extending only "to things generally done in a session of the House by 
one of its members in relation to the business before it."146 (Emphasis 
added.) Only with the case of Cochran v. Couzens141 was the protection 
of privilege exteqded by the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia to its utmost by closing the door to any challenge based on 
relevancy or pertinency. 
This approach has been used by other democratic countries. 
Article 26 of the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic provides: 
"No member of Parliament may be prosecuted, sought, arrested, 
detained or tried as a result of the opinions or votes expressed by him 
in the exercise of his function."148 The Italian Constitution has a 
similar provision: "Members of Parliament may not be proceeded 
against for opinions expressed or votes given in the exercise of their 
duties."149 The Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany goes 
even further by imposing a clear restriction upon legislative pri-
vilege: "A deputy may not at any time be prosecuted or subjected to 
disciplinary action or otherwise called to account outside the Bundes-
tag for a vote cast or a statement made by him in the Bundestag or 
any of its committees. This shall not apply to defamatory insults."150 
This was designed to prevent the misuse of parliamentary immunity 
as often happened in the Weimer Republic. However, a majority vote 
that the deputy involved should stand trial has to be secured from the 
B undestag. 151 
Certainly the independence of the legislature would not be 
impaired by a requirement that when a legislator slanders an 
individual, his statement must in some way be related to and justified 
by his legislative role. It is unreasonable to argue that legislative 
144. ld., at 28. 
145. 103 u.s. 168 (1880). 
146. ld., at 204. 
147. 42 F.2d 783 (1930). 
148. See generally, D. PICKLES, THE FIFTH FRENCH REPUBLIC 89 (1960). 
149. Art. 68. 
150. Art. 46. 
151. SeeR. NEUMANN, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL 
REPUBLIC 127-28 (1966). 
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privilege should inhere in a legislator even when he is not acting as a 
legislator or not engaged in activities related to his legislative duties. 
The purpose of the application of a relevancy test, with liability 
depending upon the relationship between actions and a valid 
legislative purpose, would require legislators to proceed with greater 
caution when individual rights are at stake without impairing the 
independence of the legislature. 
Therefore, the decision of the Council of Grand Justices not to 
place the legislative immunity of the local legislator on an absolute 
basis can hardly be seriously challenged. We first note that state-
ments made outside the chamber of the local legislature are not 
protected by immunity according to the related Organic Laws. 152 Only 
those statements made in the session are protected. Interposing a 
relevance test as a condition precedent to the exercise of legislative 
privilege was the real significance of this decision. Of course, 
determining whether a statement is connected with the business of 
the legislature may not be easy, since the difference between related 
and unrelated is hard to define. A statement may appear unrelated 
superficially, but may nevertheless be indirectly related to the subject 
matter of the session. Therefore, a broad construction of the scope or' 
legislative acts covered by the privilege should be followed. It is not 
warranted to hold a restrictive view that only in a matter technically 
before the legislature can the assertion of privilege come into play. 
"To make any legislative language or conduct before or after a matter 
under direct and immediate consideration on the floor unprivileged is 
to close off from immunity a wide area of legitimate, defensible, and 
necessary legislative activity."153 
Although the decision of the Council of Grand Justices was 
justified, the Control Yuan, which had asked for this interpretation 
for the Taitung County Council, reacted angrily; it was contrary to its 
expectation. A section of five members of the control Yuan was thus 
formed to study the materials relating to the legislative privilege of 
speech. They even went so far as to call on Kuan-shen Hsieh, the 
President of the Judicial Yuan. The opinions of both sides were so 
divided that no compromise was possible. 154 As a matter of fact, the 
president was not a member of the Council, nor did he have the right 
to vote during the conference. His influence is rather limited as we 
152. See note 103 and the accompanying text. 
153. Cella, supra note 104, at 30. 
154. For details, see Chou, The Division of the Control Power and Judicial Power, 19 
CHENG-CHIH PING-LUN (China Political Review) 10, 11 <1967). 
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mentioned before.155 Based on the recommendation of the section, the 
Control Yuan reached a resolution calling for the Council of Grand 
Justices to reconsider its previous decision.156 Since the Council has 
full discretion in reviewing the application for decision, it was obvious 
that it was not persuaded, because it never entertained this question 
again. 
Eleven years later in December 1978, this question again became 
headline news. Following unprecedented gains in the local election on 
November 19, 1977, several prominent anti-Kuomintang candidates 
successfully made their way to the Taiwan Provincial Assembly'57 as 
well as the county executive and equivalent mayoral positions.'58 
During an educational interpellation on June 5, 1978, Yueh-chiao Su 
Huing, a newly elected but long-time anti-Kuomintang assembly-
woman, used some harsh language, such as "lousy," "incapacitation," 
"mental abnormality" against Kuo-chen Feng, Principal of tht:l 
Provincial Taichung College of Nursing, about the punishments 
suffered by two offshore students in that school. Another assembly-
woman, An Chiang, immediately intervened by defending and 
encouraging Principal Feng. Su Huing then denounced Chiang as a 
"tramp." Although Su Huing apologized to Chiang for using abusive 
language, the latter did not accept the apology. After six months both 
Chiang and Feng brought action against Su Huing.'59 
Since this dispute has not yet been legally resolved, comments 
before the court reaches its decision must be cautious. However, based 
on the principle approved by the Council and the attitude of broad 
construction towards the legislative privilege of freedom of speech, it 
155. See Chapter IV at 88-89. 
156. See CHIEN-CHA-YUAN KUAN-PAO (Gazette of the Control Yuan), no. 636, 
at 6845 (1967). 
157. Though the central government has always been cautious not to allow the 
Provincial Assembly out of its control, the latter, nevertheless, has broad legislative 
power; see Cooper, Political Development in Taiwan, in CHINA AND THE QUESTION 
OF TAIWAN 46 (H. Chiu ed. 1979). Its purpose is to polish the stagnant image existing 
in the Legislative Yuan resulting from the withholding of re-election for over such a 
long period. 
158. Among the seventy-seven members of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly, twenty 
are non-Kuomintang (the so-called Independent Person) people. Four of twenty county 
magistrates' positions and city mayors also fell into their hands. Although the 
percentage of their occupation (20-25%) did not constitute a serious threat to the 
Kuomintang rule, it is significant because the Kuomintang nominees have always 
controlled over ninety percent of the seats in local elections since 1949. For a detailed 
analysis, see Jacobs, Taiwan 1978, 19 ASIAN SURVEY 20-24 (1979). 
159. The whole story was narrated in Cheng, A Suit Between Three Women, 
SHIH-PAO-CHOU-KAN (China Sunday Time), Jan. 28, 1979. 
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seems safe to conclude that Su Huing's speech should receive 
sympathetic consideration from the court. 160 Although her language 
was improper, even abusive to some people, it was uttered incidental-
ly in the course of debate which related to a matter then before the 
Provincial Assembly. It is quite natural that some people tend to be 
emotional and have difficulty in controlling their temper. This is an 
ethical and personal matter. Following the result of the previous case 
ofYu-chiao Huang is highly advisable in this connection. Huang, also 
a non-Kuomintang freshwoman in the Provincial Assembly, scolded 
the Speaker, Houn-van Ts'ai, over a procedural matter on November 
22, 1978 calling him an "s.o.b." A political compromise was reached 
and Huang was disciplined by the Assembly itself. Therefore, the 
legal procedure is not the only alternative in the case of disputation 
between legislators. After all, since local elections are regularly 
held/61 and the press is free to criticize the behavior of legislators, 
there is always the final assessment of the voters. If the public feels 
that a legislator has abused his privilege to an intolerable extent, his 
or her re-election may be sacrificed; a recall is also possible even 
before the expiration of the election term. 
C. The Effect of Unconstitutionality 
We now turn to the final phase of our analysis, which concerns 
the different effects of judicial review under the American and 
Chinese systems. After seven years' deliberation, the Council of 
Grand Justices on August 15, 1960 rendered Interpretation No. 86, 
holding that both the high courts and district courts shall be under 
the supervision of the Judicial Yuan. Because of the then-current 
judicial structure only the Supreme Court was under the jurisdiction 
of the Judicial Yuan, and these two lower courts were components of 
the Ministry of Justice, which in turn was a part of the Executive 
160. On the basis that Su Ruing had proposed to make an apology to Feng and 
Chiang and that she had shown a cooperative as well as repentant attitude during the 
trial, she received a four month prison sentence for the crimes of public insult and 
insulting a public official pursuant to arts. 140, 309 of the Criminal Code. However, the 
sentence may be commuted to a fine at the rate of NT.27 ($.75) for each day of 
imprisonment (art. 41 of Criminal Code), China Times, January 19, 1980. The fine was 
considered not to be a burden for her. The sentence has been further reduced to two 
months when the case concluded. LIEN-HO-PAO (United Daily), July 24, 1980. 
161. The term for an assemblyman is four years. In addition, it should be noted that 
since the voter turnout is generally high for local elections, political participation is 
rather intense and enthusiastic among local residents. The undemocratic practice often 
attached to the Republic of China by some foreigners is far from true in this respect. 
A CoMPARATIVE Srunv oF JuDICIAL REviEW 145 
Yuan.162 Since the arrangement not only impaired the integrity of the 
judicial system but also made judges in the lower courts susceptible to 
possible political influence, criticism of it was vigorous. The decision 
of the Council doubtless was a clear answer to this abnormality in the 
judicial system and required related statutes to be amended accord-
ingly. Recognizing that its effect was far-reaching, these concerned 
governmental departments immediately organized a task force to 
undertake the work of amendment, but they produced nothing and, 
surprisingly, the old system still remains in operation almost twenty 
years later. Since this was the first (in fact, the only) case declaring 
statutes unconstitutional in the Republic of China, several questions 
need to be answered. Does the decision bind all future litigants or 
only those immediately before the Council? Is the newly defined 
constitutional structure to be applied retroactively or prospectively? If 
the answer is the latter, when does it become effective, the day of the 
promulgation of decision or some fixed days later? Will the nature of 
a case, for example whether it is civil or criminal, affect the decision? 
The theory of constitutional litigation in the United States, 
namely, that constitutional issues are dealt with only insofar as they 
are relevant to the disposition of a concrete case or controversy, 
determines also the effect of adjudication upon a statute that is 
invalid. This basic nature of constitutional litigation makes it clear 
that review of the constitutionality of a statute takes place only when 
judgment in a concrete case occurs. No statute becomes the object 
of review aside from a real case. Since a constitutional 
issue arises only when it is relevant to the disposition of a case 
between opposing parties, the result of the finding that a statute is 
valid or invalid gives rise to no special form of decree relating to the 
statute itself. In other words, the constitutionality concerns itself only 
with the parties to the case but not with the statute itself. Therefore, 
according to the classic theory of American constitutional law, a court 
in finding invalidity does not repeal or annul the statute but simply 
refuses to take the statute into account. The statute remains on the 
books and may in effect be reviewed later if the decision finding it 
162. The Ministry of Justice has shifted back and forth several times between the 
Judicial and Executive Yuan. Originally, it belonged to the Judicial Yuan. A change 
took place in January 1932 when it was placed under the jurisdiction of the Executive 
Yuan. From October 1934 onwards, it reverted back to the Judicial Yuan. In December 
1942, it was again placed under the Executive Yuan. The Ministry of Justice is 
comprised of four divisions, a secretariat, and a number of committees. For details, see 
CHINA YEARBOOK 102-3 (1977). 
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invalid is later overruled or if other elements enter later to validate 
the statute. 
The Chinese system is based on quite the opposite theory, which 
is modeled on Austria's Constitutional Court. Under this system, the 
decision of the Council invalidates the statute not only for the 
concrete case but generally for all future cases. In other words, when 
a statute is judged to be unconstitutional, it is invalidated for 
everyone just as if it had been abrogated by a subsequent statute. 
Articles 171 and 172 of the Chinese Constitution expressly provide 
that unconstitutional acts (statutes as well as administrative ordi-
nances) shall be null and void. The theory of general nullity is clearly 
adhered to in respect of the effect. In short, when a statute is declared 
invalid, the decision makes it impossible for that law to be enforced 
thereafter. It becomes dead, inoperative for all purposes everywhere. 
Superficially, these two systems are diametrically opposite each 
other. However, these theoretical views do not govern in practice. 
When the court adjudicates a statute's constitutionality, it obviously 
has decided more than the constitutional issue presented by the 
parties to the suit and in .reality has determined the issue of 
constitutionality in such a manner that the decision would be binding 
should the issue afterwards arise in other cases between entirely 
different parties. Because of the force of the principle of stare decisis, 
the invalidation of a statute by the Supreme Court of the United 
States not only binds the judicial tribunal that ruled on the 
constitutionality but also binds the other courts, and all other 
branches of the government.163 
A further question may be raised about the retroactive effect of 
an unconstitutional statute as to past actions of individuals and of 
administrative and judicial officers in reliance on the statute. This is 
the area where a somewhat more substantial difference between the 
common and civil law systems can be found. Basically, there have 
existed two opposing theories, the retroactive and prospective. The 
former has been characterized as the Blackstonian theory. According 
to it, a judge's duty is not to "pronounce a new law, but to maintain 
and expound the old one."164 The court's function, therefore, is to find 
163. SeeR. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 295-96 
(1941). 
164. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 69 (1769). Another famous state-
ment made by Blackstone on the next page is as follows: "For if it be found that the 
former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared, not that such a sentence 
was bad law, but that it was not law." (Emphasis in original). 
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the law as it existed when the controversy ai'ose and to declare it as 
being the controlling principle in the case. In this context, by 
invalidating a statute as unconstitutional, the court does not annul 
but merely declares the preexisting nullity of the unconstitutional 
statute. In short, the statute has been void ab initio. 165 The latter has 
been characterized as the Austinian theory.166 Arguing that law is 
constantly evolving, John Austin maintained that judges do more 
than discover law; they make it interstitially by filling in with 
judicial interpretation of the vague, indefinite, or generic statutory or 
common law terms.167 Implicit in the Austinian approach is the 
admission that when a case is overruled, the earlier decision was, of 
necessity, wrongly decided. All the decisions are valid law until 
overruled, and all cases decided on the basis of an overruled decision 
are not to be disturbed. Retroactivity is abandoned in favor of 
prospectivity. 
The United States is an outstanding example of the application of 
the ex tunc (retroactivity) doctrine. The Supreme Court in Norton v. 
Shelby County declared unequivocally that "an unconstitutional act is 
not a law; it confers no right; it imposes no duties, it affords no 
protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation as though it 
had never been passed."168 Mr. Justice Holmes was one jurist among 
those who supported this principle. In 1910, he wrote, "I know of no 
authority in the court to say that in general state decisions shall 
make law only for the future. Judicial decisions have had retrospec-
tive operation for near a thousand years."169 
Such pronouncements and their frequent reiteration throughout 
the years by many courts would lead one to believe that they express 
a universally accepted rule of law. A study of the decisions, however, 
readily discloses that some courts adopted a different rule where 
effect of the unconstitutionality only begins at the time the statute is 
165. For this theory, see 0. FIELD, THE EFFECT OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
STATUTE 3-4 (1935). 
166. In addition to John Austin, Jeremy Bentham also attacked Blackstone 
severely; see J. BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 546 (1962). Even 
one of Blackstone's editors, William G. Hammond, indicated that "no . . . passage of 
Blackstone has been the object of more criticism and even ridicule than this." See W. 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 213 (W. Ham-
mond ed. 1890). 
167. For his criticism of Blackstone's retroactive theory, see J. AUSTIN, LEC-
TURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 2:634, 1:36 (1885). 
168. 118 u.s. 425, 442 (1886). 
169. Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910). 
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invalidated. A retreat from traditional retroactive application began 
with the legislative divorce170 and municipal bond171 cases where the 
injustice of complete retroactivity is obvious.172 Chicot County Drain-
age District u. Baxter State Bank was the leading case.173 The Supreme 
Court said: 
The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. 
. . . These questions are among the most difficult of those which 
have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is 
manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement 
of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be 
justified.174 
These departures clearly reflect the inherent defects of the 
principle of retroactivity. If a statute is pronounced unconstitutional 
from its inception, it should therefore always have been disregarded. 
Such a conclusion would throw everything into confusion. It may 
have existed for a considerable time and have become the legal basis 
for numerous transactions; it simply cannot be reversed without great 
hardship to individuals and danger to the legal and social stability of 
the community. It is recognized that retroactive overruling has been 
unfair to persons who justifiably relied upon previous judicial 
decisions. As Mr. Justice Cardozo, the major opponent of the 
principle, stated, it "frustrates the reasonable expectations of well-
intentioned men."176 Another major demerit is that the Blackstonian 
theory has done much to stifle progress in the law. If the courts 
understand that new rules would have full retroactive impact on all 
prior decisions despite possible extensive reliance on the old rule and 
burdens on the administration of justice, they would be inhibited from 
170. Bingham v. Miller, 17 Ohio 445 (1848). 
171. Gelpecke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall) 175; see Thayer, The Case of 
Gelpecke v. Dubuque, 4 HARV. L. REV. 311 (1891); Reed, The Rule in Gelpecke v. 
Dubuque, 9 AM. L. REV. 381 (1875). 
172. For details, see Note, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the 
Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907, 916-21 (1962). 
173. 308 u.s. 371 (1940). 
174. ld., at 374. 
175. Cardozo, Address Before N.Y. State Bar Association, 55 PRO. N.Y. STATE 
BAR ASS'N, 263,294 (Jan. 22, 1932); see also B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE 
JUDICIAL PROCESS 146-49 (1921). 
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announcing new rules, thereby perpetuating the life of obsolescent 
legal rules. 176 
In the criminal procedure area, there have been a series of cases 
where the acceptance of the technique of the opposite theory, 
prospective overruling, has been in evidence since 1965.m Although 
the Supreme Court has greatly expanded the scope of the constitu-
tional commands which govern criminal decisions, it has sought to 
limit the effects of those new constitutional decisions by embracing 
the practice of prospective decision-making. Beginning with Linklet-
ter v. Walker/78 the Supreme Court held that the rule enunciated in 
Mapp v. Ohio/79 which excludes illegally seized evidence from state 
criminal trials, would not be applied retroactively to convictions that 
had become final before the date of the Mapp decision. In Johnson v. 
New Jersey/80 the convictions of two prisoners based upon confessions 
which would have been invalid under Escobedo v. Illinois181 and 
Miranda v. Arizona182 standards were still upheld by the Supreme 
Court, because their trial began before the date of those decisions. 
This was a shift from a finality of conviction rule to a trial date rule. 
However, it did not end here, and a further limit on the impact of 
newly articulated constitutional principles was imposed in Stovall v. 
Denno. 183 Stovall held that the right to counsel rule at post-indictment 
confrontations for identification purposes, which was derived from 
United States v. Wade184 and Gilbert v. California/85 applied only to 
confrontations which took place after the Wade and Gilbert decisions. 
Again the Court shifted from a trial date rule to the date of the 
176. See generally, Spruill, The Effect of an Overruling Decision, 18 N.C.L. REV. 
199, 213-14, 218 (1940); Stimson, Retroactive Application of Law - A Problem in 
Constitutional Law, 38 MICH. L. REV. 30, 47-56 (1939); Comment, 16 CIN. L. REV. 
71, 72 {1942). 
177. However, the seed of change was planted by Mr. Justice Frankfurter's 
concurring opinion in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20, as early as in 1956. See P. 
KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT 189-90 
{1970). 
178. 381 u.s. 618 (1965). 
179. 367 u.s. 643 (1961). 
180. 384 u.s. 719 (1966). 
181. 378 u.s. 478 (1964). 
182. 384 u.s. 436 (1966). 
183. 388 u.s. 293 (1967). 
184. 388 u.s. 218 {1967). 
185. 388 u.s. 263 (1967). 
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alleged violation as the criterion for determining who may take 
advantage of those new procedural protections. 186 
The violation date rule has become the prevailing standard. The 
Supreme Court applied it to a number of cases which expanded 
procedural rights and improved the method of conducting trials. 187 
However, the new restriction imposed upon the traditional retroactive 
effect also has its weaknesses. Most of all, it creates situations where 
some "similarly situated defendants" have the benefit of the new 
decision while those benefits are denied to others.186 Employing the 
violation date rule will even result in different standards for the 
protection of constitutional rights being applied to defendants tried at 
the same time in the same courthouse for the same offense. Although 
the Supreme Court maintained that the parties involved are chance 
beneficiaries at an insignificant cost for adherence to sound principles 
of decision-making, 189 it is, according to some commentators, a 
significant departure from the demand of equal justice that similarly 
situated individuals be treated similarly.190 Furthermore, this new 
rule puts a premium on delayed or protracted criminal prosecution as 
any court quickly bringing cases into a legal proceeding hinders a 
prisoner's chance of success in the future. 191 This clearly conflicts with 
the constitutional mandate of giving an accused the right to a speedy 
trial. 192 
In addition to the timing employed to limit the retroactive effects 
of unconstitutional overruling, the Court has produced the following 
conceptual framework within which the determination of retroactiv-
ity will be made in those above-mentioned cases193: 
186. For details, see Johnson, Forward, The Supreme Court of California, 1967-68, 
56 CAL. L. REV. 1612 (1968). 
187. E.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1967); Williams v. United States, 
401 u.s. 646 (1971). 
188. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258 (1969). 
189. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301 (1967). 
190. See, e.g., Rossum, New Rights and Old Wrongs: The Supreme Court and the 
Problem of Retroactivity, 23 EMORY L.J. 381, 404 (1974); Comment, Partial 
Retroactivity: A Question of Equal Protection, 43 TEMP. L.Q. 239 (1970). 
191. The case of Linkletter is the best evidence of this situation. Linkletter's offense 
had been committed nine months after Mrs. Mapp's offense occurred. Since his 
Louisiana conviction became final a year before Mapp was decided by the Court, 
Linkletter became a victim of the new rule as a result of Louisiana's speedy handling of 
its caseload. 
192. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
193. There has been generated a substantial amount of commentary resulting from 
these cases; see Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 
51 VA. L. REV. 201 (1965); Haddad, Retroactivity Should be Rethought: A Call for the 
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The certain guiding resolution or the question implicates (a) the 
purpose to be served by the new standards; (b) the extent of the 
reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards; (c) 
the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive 
application of the new standards. 194 
Among these three criteria, the purpose to be served by the new 
rule is the foremost consideration. The Court analyzes the purpose of 
a new rule in terms of two aspects of procedural process. The first 
aspect is that of ensuring the reliability of the guilt-determining 
process. The second aspect is that of ensuring respect for the dignity 
and integrity of the individual. If the primary purpose of the new rule 
is to remedy some aspect of the criminal trial which "substantially 
impairs its truth-finding function and so raises serious questions 
about the accuracy of guilty verdict in past trials,"195 the Court will 
give the rule full retroactive effect. Belonging to this category were 
the requirement that counsel be furnished at the trial,196 the time 
when the accused is asked to plead, 197 the rule requiring proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt, 198 the double jeopardy rule, 199 and the ruling 
concerning the death penalty. 200 Conversely, if the purpose of the new 
rule is to halt illegal procedures which in themselves have no bearing 
on the reliability of the truth-determining process at the trial, the 
retroactive effect will not be applied since a new trial could not erase 
the violation to the individual defendant's right which had already 
occurred. The purpose to be served in this case is merely to protect the 
privacy of the individual or to improve police standards. In other 
End of the Linkletter Doctrine, 60 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY 427 (1969); Mishkin, 
The Supreme Court 1964 Term -Forward: The High Court, The Great Writ, and the 
Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56 (1965); Ostrager, Retroactivity 
and Prospectivity of Supreme Court Constitutional Interpretations, 19 N.Y.L.F. 289 
(1973); Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process: A Reply to Professor 
Mishkin, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 719 (1966); Comment, Linkletter, Shott and the 
Retroactivity Problem in Escobedo, 64 MICH. L. REV. 832 (1966). 
194. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1969). 
195. Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971). 
196. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). It has been followed without 
exception in every later case to reach the Court; Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473 (1972); 
Berry v. City of Cincinnati, 414 U.S. 29 (1973). 
197. Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5 (1968). 
198. Ivan v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203 (1972). 
199. Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505 (1973). 
200. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968); Aikens v. California, 406 U.S. 813 
(1972); Walker v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 936 (1972). 
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words, when individual dignity and integrity are involved, the 
retroactive application is not necessarily justified. This group in-
cludes search through electronic surveillance201 or in connection with 
an unlawful arrest,202 police questioning leading to a confession,203 or 
the use of incriminating reports filed by the accused. 204 Only when the 
purpose of the rule does not clearly favor either retroactivity or 
prospectivity will the Court apply a balancing test in which the 
second and third criteria come into play. The necessity and desirabil-
ity of the new rule will be balanced against the extent to which courts 
and law enforcement officers have justifiably relied on the old rule, 
and the extent of the burden which would be imposed on the 
administration of justice by retroactive application.206 
What is most notable when considering these cases in which 
retroactivity was an issue is that retroactive application is by no 
means a matter of course. Rather, the trend is toward prospective 
application. It seems apparent that the Court feels there are not 
many areas of constitutionally guaranteed rights remaining that so 
affect the truthfulness of the fact-finding process that retroactive 
application is required. Two cases may be cited here. The ruling that 
serious state criminal trials must be decided by jury was made wholly 
prospective,206 and the right to counsel at the preliminary hearing was 
denied retroactive application.207 Both seem to have involved the 
constitutional protections essential to a fair trial. 
The merits of prospective application were first recognized in the 
1920 Austrian Constitution, which provided that the judgment of 
annulment of an unconstitutional statute became effective on the day 
of publication of this decree. 208 Therefore, this statute was thought to 
have been valid until it was pronounced unconstitutional by the 
Constitutional Court. In other words, the unconstitutional statute 
was not null or void, but merely voidable. Accordingly, the legal effect 
which the law had produced was valid. However, the legal result of 
the application of this theory was that the decision of the Constitu-
tional Court should not have any effect upon the vary case pending 
before it. Recognizing this absurdity, the Austrians made a signifi-
201. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969). 
202. Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971). 
203. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970). 
204. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971). 
205. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 728 (1966). 
206. De Stefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968). 
207. Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278 (1972). 
208. Art. 140(3). 
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cant modification in 1929 adding an exception by granting retroactive 
effect only on the very case over which the issue of constitutionality 
had arisen. 209 
The remarkable feature of the Austrian system is that its 
Constitutional Court can, if it deems necessary, prolong the validity 
of the statute for some duration of time. It has the discretionary 
power to order that the statute be annulled on a fixed date 
subsequent to the publication of its judgment. The period of 
prolongation is limited to no more than six months in the case of an 
administrative ordinance210 and one year for a statute.211 Since the 
legislature will be able to enact a statute which is in harmony with 
the Constitution and which takes the place of the one that was 
abolished during this period, the advantage of avoiding a legal 
vacuum is obvious. 212 
The benefit of the Austrian practice of postponing the effective 
date of an unconstitutional ruling was clearly recognized in West 
Germany and Italy. Both countries have developed techniques to 
accomplish the same result without formally declaring that the 
relevant statute is actually unconstitutional. The period following 
which an enactment will be unconstitutional is not necessarily 
limited to six months or one year.213 The so-called "admonitory 
decision" is the practice that the Constitutional Courts in these two 
countries follow. Instead of declaring a statute unconstitutional, the 
Courts of these countries let it be known that unless the legislature 
takes action to repeal or amend it in the near future, the statute will 
209. As a writer of the Austrian Constitution, Hans Kelsen, admitted, "this 
retroactive force ... was a technical necessity because without it the authorities 
charged with the application of the law {that is, the judges of the Supreme Court and of 
the Administrative Court respectively) would not have had an immediate and 
consequently sufficiently cogent interest to cause the intervention of the Constitutional 
Court. . . . It is necessary to encourage them to present these requests by attributing 
in case of annulment a retroactive effect." See Kelsen, Judicial Review of Legislation, 4 
J. POL. 183, 196 {1942). 
210. Art. 139{2). 
211. Art. 140. Turkey and Yugoslavia have similar provision, with only a six 
month period for both ordinance and statute; see art. 152(2) of the Turkish Constitution 
and art. 245 & 246 of the Yugoslav Constitution. 
212. In view of the limited period of time, the criticism that the decision on the 
timing was not the interpretation of a constitutional norm, but a political decision, 
should not be taken seriously; see Geck, Judicial Review of Statutes: A Comparative 
Survey of Present Institutions and Practices, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 250, 284 (1966). 
213. It is said that West Germany indeed considered emulating the Austrian 
system literally, but finally abandoned this idea, see Rupp-Brunneck, The Federal 
Constitutional Court, 20 AM. J. COMP. L. 387, 395 {1972). 
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become unconstitutional.214 In practice, almost every appeal has had a 
fruitful result. Soon after the decision or at least within the stated 
time, the relevant legislative bodies will have repealed or amended 
the questionable provisions or will have replaced it with a new one 
conforming to the Constitution.215 Some have denounced this novel 
function as interference with the legislative branch by the Constitu-
tional Courts on the basis of political considerations.216 In view of the 
nature of judicial review which empowers the court to safeguard the 
inviolability of the Constitution against all powers, including the 
legislative branch, and of the fact that decisions as to whether a 
statute is constitutional may often have far-reaching political 
importance, the criticism is ill-founded. 
Since the Chinese Constitution has not provided an effective date 
for an overruling on grounds of unconstitutionality by the Council of 
Grand Justices, we must wait to see what answer practice will 
provide. As for the choice of retroactive or prospective effect, Chinese 
students of its Constitution almost unanimously support the latter 
mainly in consideration of the legal order and of the faith people 
place in it. 217 The advantage of these three European civil law 
countries' practice of prolonging the validity of an unconstitutional 
statute was acknowledged by some of them and at least by one 
well-known constitutional scholar, C.T. Lin, a three-term Grand 
Justice, who strongly suggested following the Austrian practice.218 
214. It is noteworthy that Italian courts have devised several methods of achieving 
this objective. They include a recommendation, a kind of peremptory exhortation 
sometimes inserted in opinions; a binding suggestion, suggesting the criteria to which 
a future law must conform if it is not to be void for unconstitutionality; and the 
suspension of publication of a judgment. For details, see Vigoriti, Italy: The 
Constitutional Court, 20 AM. J. COMP. L. 404, 406-11 (1972). 
215. Several important instances in West Germany have been illustrated in 
Rupp-Brunneck, supra note 213, at 392-99. As for the Italian cases, see id., at 408-11. 
216. Rupp-Brunneck, id., at 400. 
217. See Kuan, Several Questions about the Exercise of Power of Judicial Review, 41 
FA-LIU-PIN-LUN (China Law Review) 8:3-8 (1975); Lin, A Problem in the Application 
of the Organic Law of the Council of Grand Justices, 10 FA-LIN-YUAN-KAN (China 
Law Monthly) 2:3-5 (1959); Shih, How to Interpretate the Constitution, 17 FA-HSUEH-
TSUNG-KAN <China Law Journal) 15-16 (1960). 
218. See C. LIN, CHUNG-HUA-MING-KUO HSIEH-FA CHU-TIAO-SHIH-YI (A 
Detailed Study of Articles of the Chinese Constitution) 81-82 (1975). Quoting the 
suggestion made by Lin, another student of constitutional law, C. Gen, implied his 
support in The Study of System of Judicial Review in Our Country, 5 KUO-LI-CHENG-
CID-TA-HSUEH HSUEH-PAO (National Chengchi University Journal) 271, 304-5 
(1962). Perhaps due to the lack of information, nobody pays any attention to the 
admonitory function of the Constitutional Courts in Italy and West Germany. 
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Because this system not only avoids the undesirable confusion of 
sudden interruption of the continuing legal order, a result of an 
unconstitutional decision, but also offers both breathing space and 
freedom to maneuver, its adoption should be given serious considera-
tion. It is also important that the Council should declare the statute 
in question inoperative during the period of legislative deliberation, 
regardless of whether it was formally declared unconstitutional, and 
should suspend its effective date for a limited period as in the 
Austrian practice or direct a strong appeal to the legislature to 
correct it as in Italy and West Germany. Otherwise, it seems unjust 
that a statute should still be applied after its constitutionality had 
been placed in serious doubt by the competent authority. 
Because judicial review in the Republic of China has not yet been 
firmly established and recognized, the Council of Grand Justices is in 
a position to play a leading role in shaping the proper function of this 
crucial system. Therefore, in pronouncing a statute unconstitutional, 
it should go further by fixing a date for such a pronouncement to be 
in effect, rather than vaguely stating that "the statute in question 
should be amended to conform with the Constitution" as in the case of 
Interpretation No. 86. Otherwise, an undesirable result could follow 
when the legislature and executive branches delayed, intentionally or 
unintentionally, their required amendment work. In such a case the 
Council would merely stand still, unable to resort to anything. 
Not only for those countries who have adopted the prospective 
principle, but also for the Americans and Germans who have followed 
the retroactive theory, the question of the prior validity of an 
unconstitutional statute is a thorny one in practice. As indicated 
earlier, Austria departed from the pure ex nunc maxim by giving the 
concrete case which gave rise to the request for the unconstitutional 
ruling; so too have the United States and West Germany. The 
modifications made during the last decade by the Supreme Court in 
the area of criminal procedure are significant enough to have 
warranted a comparatively detailed examination in preceding para-
graphs. West Germany also made efforts to solve the problems 
stemming from retroactivity as follows. If a statute involves a civil 
case, it shall remain in effect despite the invalidation of the now 
unconstitutional statute; but if the judgment has not yet been 
enforced, it cannot now be enforced. In cases where the judgment has 
been enforced by the executive or the party has already voluntarily 
paid, there is no restitution claim permitted. In short, what has been 
enforced stays enforced, and what has not been paid cannot be 
collected. But the picture is entirely different in a criminal case. A 
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final criminal sentence based on a voided statute is always open to 
review.219 Anyone convicted under a statute that has now been held 
unconstitutional, regardless of when the conviction became effective, 
has a right to a new trial, presumably even if he has long since been 
released from jail after having completed his sentence. Because of the 
great interest of the individual and society in personal liberty and 
freedom in the criminal case, the different treatment of retroactivity 
in regard to criminal laws is warranted. In this respect, retroactivity 
is rather absolute in West Germany as compared with the gradual 
restrictions imposed by the United States Supreme Court. 
The necessity of allowing retroactivity as to the very case which 
generated the request for considering the constitutionality of a 
statute has not been fully appreciated in the Republic of China. When 
the Legislative Yuan was deliberating over the Organic Law of the 
Council of Grand Justices, the opinion of the Committee of Judicial 
Affairs, which is responsible for the legislative draft, was that the 
original case should benefit from this unconstitutional overruling and 
the Law of Civil and Criminal Procedure should be amended 
accordingly. 220 
However, this proposal was killed on the floor for a variety of 
reasons. Some based their opposition on the principle of ex post facto. 
Others suggested that this would create a trial of a fourth level and 
thus disrupt the legal structure. The most significant attack on this 
required amendment procedure was based on its conflict with the 
underlying nature of retrial in both civil and criminal procedure. 
Only by finding new evidence or discovering new facts which had not 
been taken into account in the original final judgment could the 
action of retrial be instituted according to the Law of Civil 
Procedure221 and Criminal Procedure.222 Since the decision of whether 
a statute is unconstitutional is related to the review of the 
constitutionality of a statute, it is thus an abstract legal interpreta-
tion and has nothing to do with factual setting. Although this 
attitude represented the narrow outlook of the legislators, it pre-
219. Law Concerning the Federal Constitutional Court, § 79, cited in Cappelletti & 
Adams, Judicial Review of Legislation, European Antecedents and Adaptations, 79 
HARV. L. REV. 1223, n.47 0966). 
220. See LI·FA-YUAN-KUAN-PAO (Gazette of the Legislative Yuan), 21st, lOth 
sess. 51 (1958). 
221. Art. 496. 
222. Art. 420. 
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vailed in the course of debate and finally prevented the passing of the 
desirable amendment. 223 
The adoption of pure prospectivity doubtless diminishes the 
incentive to apply for a consideration of constitutionality since the 
party itself cannot expect to realize any benefit from the unconstitu-
tional overruling. This may have contributed to the scarcity of 
applications to the Council in the past. 
223. See LI-FA-YUAN-KUAN-PAO (Gazette of the Legislative Yuan), 21st, 13th 
seas. 12-13; 14th seas. 10-11; 16th sess. 52-61 (1958). 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
Our review of the record of the Council of Grand Justices has 
clearly shown that its role in the Chinese political system has been 
one of restraint. It has some visibility and prestige, but neither is 
especially high. Its relatively low visibility may be desirable, 
however. Employing a strategy of restraint in its early period has laid 
a firm foundation for its later development. Since the system of 
judicial review ·is a political institution transplanted in a foreign 
context, it definitely needs time to take root. It is wise to be cautious 
in the beginning, for excessive exercise of this novel judicial power 
might well result in its destruction. 
This may partially explained why the Council of Grand Justice 
has generally taken a position of flexible application of the Constitu-
tion in the light of special circumstances created by the Government 
of Republic of China's removal to Taiwan in 1949, thus serving the 
legitimizing function of judicial reviews suggested by Justice 
Cardozo.' However, in a few cases, it did try to exercise its function of 
checking the power of the executive and the legislative branch of the 
government. 
Admittedly, American judicial history has amply shown that the 
legislature, composed of the people's representatives, has made not a 
few oppressive enactments under which people have suffered. It has 
also recorded how the judicial branch has protected individual rights, 
the rights of minority groups in particular, more than the other 
coordinate branches of the government through the system of judicial 
review. Therefore, in the exercise of the power of judicial review, the 
courts are generally pictured as a buffer and redeemer for the citizen 
in his eternal battle against the state. 
1. Perhaps it was Mr. Justice Cardozo who initially theorized the legitimizing 
functions of judicial review; see B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL 
PROCESS 102-3 (1921). Two Yale law professors, Charles Black and Alexander 
Bickel, were the most prominent supporters of this argument; see C. BLACK, THE 
PEOPLE AND THE COURT 223 (1960); A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS 
BRANCH 29 (1962). This function also appeared in the Constitutional Courts of West 
Germany and italy; see Kommers, Judicifll Review in Italy and West Germany, 20 
JAHRBUCH DES OFFENTUCHEN RECHT DER GEGENWART 111, 131 !1971). 
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Since it began to function fully in 1952, the Council of Grand 
Justices has only once declared in a decision that some statutes are 
unconstitutionaJ.2 It goes without saying that this extremely low 
figure of unconstitutionality surprises some people in view of the 
rapid extension of the boundaries of governmental activities in recent 
years. Politicians in the government are inclined to say that the 
reason why the Council has refrained from declaring laws unconstitu-
tional is simply that the legislature and executive organs in the 
government have been scrupulous of the people's fundamental 
liberties. They further maintain that many appeals have obviously 
relied on flimsy arguments and have been mainly made for delaying 
purposes. However, we submit from the preceding discussion that the 
Council has not been in the forefront of the fight for the realization of 
civil liberties in the Republic of China. While the Council has 
generally paid lip service to the Principle of Chapter II (Rights and 
Duties of the People) of the Constitution, it has not struck any 
resounding blows for their effective implementation.3 Does this mean 
that total responsibility should fall on the Council? How is this 
attitude of self-restraint on the part of the Council to be explained? 
Perhaps the answer lies partly in the weight of tradition. Before 
the establishment of the Council of Grand Justices, no court had the 
power to rule on the constitutionality of a statute or an administra-
tive ordinance. Also, the tradition of civil law which emphasizes the 
highly technical and conceptual approach has always permeated the 
2. Interpretation No. 86, rendered on August 15, 1960. This record can be 
compared with that of Japan. Not until 1973 did the Supreme Court of Japan make the 
first clear decision of unconstitutionality (Patricide Case), though it did on two 
borderline cases hold governmental actions unconstitutional in 1953 (Sadagami v. 
Japan) and 1962 (Nadamura v. Japan). This case has further significance since it also 
overturned the 1950 judgment upholding its constitutionality. Of course, the number of 
decisions invalidating le~slative acts cannot be the only criterion to test an· efficient 
exereise of judicial review. Even in the United States, where the exercise of judicial 
review has been considered successful, the Supreme Court invalidated acts of Congress 
only twice during its first seventy-five years of existence. Moreover, among the one 
thousand cases involving unconstitutional decisions, nine hundred were state statutes 
and only about one hundred federal statutes have been invalidated for unconstitution-
ality. See H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 280 (1975). This clearly 
buttresses the oft-quoted Holmes dictum: "I do not think the United States would come 
to an end if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think that the 
Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of the 
several states." See 0. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295-96 Cl920). 
3. It is interesting to note that Professor Nathanson arrived at the same 
conclusion about the Supreme Court of Japan, Human Rights in Japan through the 
Looking Glass of the Supreme Court Opinwns, 11 HOWARD L. J. 318, 323 (1965). 
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judiciary. In this context, the reluctance to undertake unaccustomed 
socio-political examinations appropriate to constitutional adjudication 
is quite understandable. As a result, the Council has often confined 
itself to taking judicial notice of the stated object of statutes and has 
refrained from scrutinizing them in detail, preferring an interpreta-
tion which will support the constitutionality of an act, if more than 
one interpretation is posible. In addition, the succeeding appoint-
ments of Grand Justices by the same Kuomintang which has been in 
power for these thirty years has also made the decision that a statue 
or an administrative order is unconstitutional only remotely possible. 
Several remedies are suggested here. Lawyers should be re-
cruited for membership in the Council. The qualifications for a Grand 
Justice enumerated in the Governing Law do not include experience 
of practicing law. This absence doubtlessly reflects the low status of 
lawyers and the legal profession in traditional Chinese society. A 
lawyer had customarily been called a "litigation trickster" or 
"litigation stirrer" - a name hardly likely to uphold the lawyer's 
social standing or to inspire bright young persons to join the 
profession. Although this picture has gradually altered as a result of 
recent industrialization and urbanization that produced enormous 
changes in Taiwan's social life and her law and which have in turn 
increased the demand for legal counseling, the lawyer still has a long 
way to go. Reserving a fixed number of seats in the Council for 
lawyers would definitely contribute significantly to their own efforts 
to raise their status. After all, lawyers are legal experts who are 
presumed to devote many years to the protection of the rights of the 
people. It is thus absolutely necessary to have them in the Council as 
Grand Justices who bear the responsibility of protecting human 
rights. However, as compensation for the sometimes great financial 
sacrifice of lawyers, the salary of the Grand Justices should be 
reasonably adjusted and, more importantly, the symbolic significance 
of the Council should be further strengthened in order to make 
appointment worthwhile despite the possible sacrifice it entails. 
The Council's other function is to unify the conflicting interpreta-
tions of statutes or administrative orders made by government 
agencies that do not necessarily relate to the Constitution. This has 
become the major work of the Council; judicial review directly related 
to the Constitution has been relegated to a position of secondary 
importance. Since no such function has been assigned in other 
countries' Constitutional Courts, the wisdom for retaining it in the 
Council is open to question. Its sole function should be limited to the 
task of interpretations directly related to the Constitution. 
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Other problems are of a technical and procedural nature. Since 
the required quorum for passing an unconstitutional decision is 
extremely high, a disproportionate weight is attached to the minor-
ity's veto power; this severely impedes the proper exercise of judicial 
review. The number required for a quorum and for concurrence 
should be relaxed somewhat. In view of the far-reaching consequence 
of an unconstitutional decision, a simple majority would not be 
sufficient and the two-thirds standard seems a desirable compromise. 
The condition imposed by the Council itself which states that only 
after the principles or syllabus of the case have been decided (which 
do not necessarily accompany the supporting opinion~) can a different 
opinion be submitted within five days also needs to be reconsidered. 
Not only is the period unreasonably short, but it is unlikely that a 
sensible and justifiable concurring or dissenting argument can be 
reached before reviewing the full text of the majority's supporting 
opinion. The effect of unconstitutionality should also be extended 
retroactively to the concrete case which raised the question of . 
constitutionality. Otherwise, without the incentive of personal be-
nefit, it is unlikely that anyone would bring an application to the 
Council. 
However, we have to admit that the success of the system of 
judicial review cannot merely depend upon the Council itself. The 
Council cannot do what the society itself must do and fails to do. In 
other words, the ability of the Grand Justices to influence the course 
of constitutional development depends largely on the political and 
legal environment in which judicial review operates. 
Not only the general public but also public officials lack sufficient 
knowledge about the function and the procedure of the Council of 
Grand Justices. This may have been the major impediment to the 
sound development of a system of judicial review in past generations. 
Several explanations can be given. 
The system of judicial review is absolutely novel to the tradition-
al Chinese conception of law and government. The doctrine of rule of 
law which underlies this system is also foreign to it. Throughout their 
history, the people governed not so much by formal law as by a sense 
of morality and reason. Morality, not justice, was considered the end 
of government. The law was considered merely a tool for the 
enforcement of morality. In short, law was subordinate to morality. 
Hence, we can hardly expect the Chinese to have developed an 
adequate tradition of respect for law. As the basic purpose of judicial 
review is to keep government functions within their constitutional 
limit, the absence of a respect for law on the part of those who govern 
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makes this goal difficult to achieve and at the same time increases 
the possibility of public apathy on the part of the governed whenever 
their constitutional rights are violated. 
The Chinese preference for mediation in various extra-legal 
bodies rather than the formal legal procedure to settle disputes also 
contributes to the absence of a consciousness of their legal rights. In 
the process of mediation, not only have custom and morality been the 
guiding principles, but also each side has been urged to make certain 
concessions. Thus, parties' rights often have been compromised in 
order to reach an harmonious result. 
Another factor which has prevented the development of judicial 
review in the Republic of China is the traditional and peculiar 
relation between the Chinese rulers and the Chinese people. General-
ly, the Chinese were not bothered by the government so long as their 
legal share of taxes was paid and, on the other hand, they did not care 
much about the ruler as long as he did not intolerably misuse his 
power. Whenever any ruler overstepped his authority, he could be 
ousted by the people on the familiar ground that he lost the mandate 
from Heaven. But the people never attempted to change their 
governmental system by revolution until the twentieth century. In 
other words, their interest was exclusively centered on the personal 
character of the ruler who held the reins of authority. As a result, 
when they overthrew a ruler, they never wished to govern them-
selves! Not only did national politics seem very remote to the 
Chinese people, but even the work of local government did not 
interest them, though they may have had some experience in family 
matters or even village social affairs. This attitude of indifference to 
politics carries weight among the Chinese of today who still desire not 
to govern themselves but rather to be well-governed. Therefore, when 
any new institution is forced on them, it comes as something 
4. A famous Chinese politician and academic observed: 
Lincoln's definition of democratic government "of the people, by the people, and for 
the people" is in part within the thinking of Chinese philosophers. "Of the people, 
and for the people," are essential to their thought. But "by the people," is a thought 
left untouched. That is, they believed throughout in the principles that the country 
is the common possession of the people, and the politics exist solely for the sake of 
their common advantage. But they neither studied the method nor even seem to 
have accepted the theory that government must be "by the people." And therein 
lies the fundamental weakness of China's political thinking. There is no point in 
speaking of the people as the foundation of the country, and then denying them all 
powers of participation in politics. 
See C. LIANG, HISTORY OF CHINESE POLITICAL THOUGHT DURING THE 
EARLY TSIN PERIOD 10 (1930). 
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unfamiliar and artificial. It does not naturally and promptly engage 
popular interest and sympathy but is regarded with indifference. 
Since judicial review was imported - no trace of this system 
having been found in Chinese tradition - a period of transition and 
adaptation is understandably necessary. We have to bear in mind that 
the present status of the American judiciary and its competence in 
the exercise of the power of judicial review is based upon a long 
history of 176 years. The Council of Grand Justices, with only 28 
years of history, is still relatively inexperienced in exercising the 
delicate duty of judicial review. It is unreasonable to expect the 
Council of Grand Justices to have attained as noble a status in the 
Chinese political process within such a short period as that of the 
United States Supreme Court in the American political process in 
view of the totally different conditions which have influenced their 
respective development. Not only were a fully developed legal 
literature of common law and a people brought up on belief in the law 
and its courts absent in the Republic of China, but also her legal 
education and organized bar association have needed improvement 
for years. 
Moreover, the exigencies created by the continuing threat from 
the other side of the Taiwan Strait have also narrowed the boundaries 
of judicial policy-making by the Council. It is understandable that the 
right of self-preservation of the Republic of China has always been 
given precedence. In fact, when we consider the fact that Taiwan is a 
small island with a large and dense population, we have to admit that 
any disturbance - economic, social, or political - will spread 
rapidly, and it becomes imperative for the government to nip all 
problems in the bud before they become unmanageable. At times, 
overreaction to danger is a common national response. The violation 
of human rights of American citizens of Japanese ancenstry during 
World War II can be cited as a clear example. 
However, the political environment is undergoing change as the 
Republic of China enters its third decade of existence in Taiwan. 
Although the declared political ideology and the framework of the 
government have changed little since 1949, pragmatism has been 
emphasized and a change in substance which is taking the form of 
internal reforms is occurring. The failure of the Republic of China on 
the mainland obviously taught those now residing in Taiwan a 
painful lesson and made them realize that reform was desperately 
necessary. This trend spread more speedily after 1972 when Ching-
kuo Ciang assumed the premiership. In subtle ways he has revolutio-
~ized politics in Taiwan by functionally adjusting it to both internal 
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and external problems. More young people are recruited into the 
government, and the government itself has been made more honest 
and responsive to the public. Most of all, corruption which has always 
been attached to the government of Nationalist China has become 
less prevalent.6 
Without this efficient political reform, the impressive record of 
Taiwan's economic growth simply could not have been achieved. On 
the other hand, the rapid economic growth also has had an 
undeniable impact upon the political development. People are the 
major beneficiaries when the function of government is made more 
efficient and free from corruption and red tape in order to maintain 
economic growth. Moreover, the fruit of economic growth has not been 
limited to businessmen alone. The economic disparity often accom-
panying rapid economic growth in other developing countries did not 
appear in Taiwan.6 Her equitable income distribution has obvious 
significance: It broke the barriers between different social groups, 
whether they existed for a long time or have emerged out of the 
economic development. 
The rising standard of living in Taiwan has also facilitated a 
rapid expansion in education. It is estimated that from 1954 to 1974 
the percentage of the population in secondary schools increased 
almost five times and the percentage in institutions of higher 
learning has increased nearly twelve times. At present, more than 
one-fourth of the population in the Republic of China are students -
more than in England.7 But success in raising living standards and 
providing greater educational opportunities may pose some problems 
for the government. When food and reasonably secure jobs can be 
taken for granted, other needs make themselves felt. The high 
literacy rate also makes the average Chinese able to be better 
informed about his political institutions. In addition, the self-
government practiced in local governments has habituated the people 
to the idea that government is a matter to be discussed, and that its 
operation is subject to the criticism of the governed. Under these 
5. For an excellent examination, see R. CLOUGH, ISLAND CHINA 33-68 
(1978). 
6. See Chinn, Distributional Equality and Economic Growth: The Case of Taiwan, 
26 ECON. DEVELOPMENT & CULTURAL CHANGE 65-79 <1977). It was even said 
that there is now a more equal distribution of income in Taiwan than in either the U.S. 
or Japan; N.Y. Times, April 12, 1977. 
7. Appleton, The Social and Political Impact of Education in Taiwan, 6 ASIAN 
SURVEY 703-20 <1976l. 
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circumstances, the conditions required for more complete democracy 
have been met, and indeed the demand for more open and democratic 
political institutions on the national level was voiced. One major 
target was in the judicial area, which included the termination of the 
state of siege and the transfer of higher and district courts back to the 
Judicial Yuan according to Interpretation No. 86.8 
The government at first did not pay enough attention to this new 
trend. After unceasingly monopolizing political power without any 
serious internal challenge for thirty years, it has accustomed itself to 
the status quo. However, a series of diplomatic setbacks since 1971 
has weakened the authority of the government and the ruling party. 
After decades of political stability, economic prosperity, and interna-
tional recognition, the survival of the government of the Republic of 
China as a politically autonomous entity was threatened. Facing an 
unfavorable international condition, the government considered it 
imperative to make further thorough reforms in order to accommo-
date internal demands and improve its image abroad. A series of 
political reforms has been put into effect.9 However, none of them 
have directly related to the judicial system in general and judicial 
review in particular. 
The diplomatic deterioration reached its climax on December 15, 
1978 when the United States abruptly severed diplomatic relations 
with Taiwan. Immediately after this unfortunate incident, several 
task forces were established to undertake the responsibility of 
studying further political reforms. One of the major suggestions of 
these task forces was the implementation of the Interpretation no. 86 
rendered nineteen years ago by the Council of Grand Justices, to 
transfer both higher and district courts back to the jurisdiction of the 
Judicial Yuan. After few months deliberation, the government 
formally announced that the high and district courts will be 
transferred back to the Judicial Yuan within a year. 10 
8. However, the potential influence of those favoring a more complete democracy 
upon contemporary politics should not be overstated. Businessmen, for example, are 
concerned mainly with the efficiency and responsiveness of government rather than 
political ideology and principles. The public in general is influenced by traditional 
cultural factors in which some authoritarian practices are not regarded as undemocra-
tic where individualism is considered less necessary, sometimes even undesirable. For 
details, see Cooper, Political Development in Taiwan, in CHINA AND THE QUESTION 
OF TAIWAN 76, 55, 72, 73 (H. Chiu ed. 1979). This attitude is also shared by 
contemporary young students in Taiwan. See CLOUGH, supra note 5, at 58. 
9. Cooper, supra note 8, at 66-69. 
10. CHUNG-YANG.JIH-PAO <Central Daily News) April 5, 1979. 
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This judicial reform undoubtedly is welcome news; after almost 
two decades' delay, the government has finally realized its duty to 
implement the decision of the Council and has firmly established the 
principle that government, like the people, also has an obligation to 
obey the law. Notwithstanding the lateness of its implementation, it 
is still a desirable improvement from the standpoint of judicial 
independence. It is definitely beneficial not only for the people but 
also for the government itself. Through genuine reform efforts a new 
image of the government emerges and its power in fact is further 
consolidated in the long run. After all, the rule of law cannot be 
achieved instantly. It is a process of evolution which may take several 
generations as in the western experience, and the important question 
to ask about the Republic of China, therefore, is not whether it is 
under the doctrine of the rule of law but whether it is moving toward 
that goal. 
Finding that the government under internal and external 
pressure is committing itself to the rule of law, we also detect 
increasing evidence of growing popular awareness of the system of 
judicial review. Although often not well-informed, and generally not 
enthusiastic, some people do value their right to file a constitutional 
application with the Council, among other reasons, as affording them 
an opportunity to protest against a government violation. The 
decisions rendered by the Council since 1976 are all the result of 
individuals' applications. Therefore, one of the major services which 
the Council has performed so far has been to play a limited role in 
educating a largely lethargic public on the importance of their 
constitutional rights. For the traditional non-litigiously minded 
Chinese, this educational role makes a major contribution to the final 
realization of the rule of law. 
On the other hand, evidence also indicates a willingness and 
readiness on the part of the Council of Grand Justices to review the 
constitutionality of legislative and executive actions. So, it too 
realizes that the political and social environment is changing and a 
new attitude about the function of judicial review is necessary. 
In summation, we can safely predict that the outlook for 
establishing an effective judicial review in Taiwan is favorable, since 
through all these years of diplomatic setbacks, both the government 
as well as the people fully realize that only through continuing 
political reforms can they reap the rewards of economic growth. The 
best defense in a long struggle against totalitarian advances is a 
determined effort toward democracy. The existence and the further 
development of judicial review is an important index that shows the 
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willingness of those who govern and are governed to submit to a 
government based on law. This is universally accepted as the final 
goal of any modernized democratic country. 
SELECTED BmLIOGRAPHY 169 
BffiLIOGRAPHY 
Chinese Sources 
I. Public Documents 
Chien-Cha-Yuan Kuan-Pao (Gazette of the Control Yuan) No. 636 
(1967). 
Li-Fa-Yuan-Kuan-Pao (Gazette of the Legislative Yuan) 20th, 4st 
sess. 50-58; 5th sess. 105-6; 21st, 12th, 14th, 16th sess. 
Szu-Fa-Yuan Ta-Fa-Kuan Hui-1 Chieh-Shih-Hut-Pien) The Collec-
tion of Interpretations made by the Council of Grand Justices of 
the Judicial Yuan), 1977. 
IT. Books and Periodical Articles 
Chen Kuo-Ch'eng, The Administrative Adjudication Over the Past 
Twenty Years in Fa-Lin-Yueh-Kan Erh-Shih-Chou-Nien Chi-Nien-
Lun-Van-Chi (Symposium in Honor of Twentieth Anniversary of 
China Law Monthly) 415-421 (S. Tu. ed. 1970). 
Gen chih-jen, The Study of System of Judicial Review in our Country, 
5 Kuo-Li Cheng-Chi-Ta-Hsueh Hsueh-Pao (National Chengchi 
University Journal) 271-314 (1962). 
Kuan Ou Several Questions About the Exercise of Power of Judicial 
Review 41 Fa-Liu-Pin-Lun (China Law Review) 8:3-8 (1975). 
Le Chien-Lun Chung-Kuo Chin-Pai-Nien Cheng-Chin-Shih (Political 
History of China in the Last Hundred Years), 1942. 
Li Chun, The Kung-Ssu-Lu of 1904 and Modernization of China 
Company Law 10, 11 Dheng Chi L. Rev. 171-222, 163-209 (1974). 
Lin Chi-Tung, Chung-Hua-Ming-Kuo Hsien-Fa Chu-Tiao Shih-Yi (A 
Detailed Study of Articles of the Chinese Constitution), 1975. 
--------- Chung-Hua-Ming-Kuo Hsien-Fa Shih-Lu (An 
Analytical Study of the Constitution of the Republic of China), 
1975. 
---------· A Problem in the Application of the Organic 
Law of the Council of Grand Justices, 10 Fa-Lin-Yuan-Kan (China 
Law Monthly) 2:3-5 (1959). 
Shih Shang-K'uan, How to Interpret the Constitution, 17 Fa-Hsueh-
Tsung-Kan (China Law Journal) 13-16 (1960). 
Tong Shih-fang, The Research on Making the Interpretation of the 
Constitutional System of Our Nation, 2 Hsien-Cheng-Shih-Tai 
(Constitutional Review) 4:52-56 (1977). 
Wang 1-Ch'eng The Delimitation of Criminal Jurisdiction Among 
Military and Civilian Judicial Organs in the Region of Taiwan 
170 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
During the Last Twenty Years in Fa-Lin-Yueh-Kan Erh-Shih-
Chou-Nien Chi-Nien-Lun-Wan-Chi (Symposium in Honor of the 
Twentieth Anniversary of Law Monthly) 423-37 (S. Yu ed. 1970). 
Yao, Jui-kuang, A Study on Some Problems Related to the Function of 
the Council of Grand Justices, 3 Hsien-Cheng-Shih-Tai (Constitu-
tional Review) 3:51-60 (1978). 
English Sources 
I. Books 
Abraham, Henry Julian, Justices and Presidents. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1974. 
--------- The Judicial Process (3rd ed.), New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1977. 
Austin, John, Lectures on Jurisprudence (5th ed.), London: J. 
Murray, 1885. 
Beard, Charles Austin, The Supreme Court and the Constitution. 
New York: MacMillian, 1912. 
Bickel, Alexander M., The Least Dangerous Branch. Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1962. 
Black, Charles Lund, The People and the Court. New York: 
Macmillian 1960. 
Blair, GeorgeS., American Legislatures. New York: Harper & Row, 
1967. 
Bodde, D. & Morris, C. Law in Imperial China, Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1967. 
Bryce, James, Modem Democracies. New York: Macmillian, 1921. 
Cappelletti, Mauro, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World. 
Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971. 
Cardozo, Benjamin Nathan, The Nature of the Judicial Process. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1921. 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Treaties and Agree-
ments with and Concerning China 1919-1929. Washington, 1929. 
Chafee, Zechariah, Free Speech in the United States. Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1942. 
--------- Three Human Rights in the Constitution of 
1787. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1956. 
Chang, Ching-Li, The Chinese Gentry. Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1955. 
Chen, Ying-Ching, Treatise and Agreements between the Republic of 
China and Other Powers 1929-1954. Washington: Sino-American 
Pub. Service, 1957. 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 171 
Ch'ien, Tung-Shing, The Government and Politics of China, Cam-
bridge, Mass,: Harvard University Press, 1967. 
China and the Taiwan Issue. New York: 
Praeger, 1979. 
The China Yearbook, 1912, 1914, 1916, 1925, 1926, 1951, 1953-54, 
1977. 
Chiu, Hung Dah ed., China and the Questions of Taiwan. New York: 
Praeger, 1973. 
China and the Taiwan Issue. New York: 
Praeger, 1979. 
Chii, T'ung-Tsu, Local Government in China and the Ch'ing, 1962. 
--------- Law and Society in Traditional China. Paris: 
Mouton, 1961. 
Clough, Ralph N., Island China. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1978. 
Corwin, Edward Samuel, The Doctrine of Judicial Review, Glouces-
ter, Mass.: P. Smith, 1914. 
--------- The "Higher Law" Background of American 
Constitutional Law. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1955. 
Dicey, Albert Venn, Introduction to the Study of the Constitution 
(lOth ed.), London: Macmillian, 1959. 
Dumbauld, Edward, The Constitution of the United States. Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1964. 
Duyvendark, Jan Julius Lodewijk, The Book of Lord Shang. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1928. 
Escarra, Jean, Chinese Law and Comparative Jurisprudence. Tient-
sin: La Librairie Francaise, 1926. 
Le Droit Chinois. Seattle: University of 
Washington, 1936. 
Field, Oliver Peter, The Effect of an Unconstitutional Statute. 
Minneapolis: the Universtity of Minnesota Press, 1935. 
Fishel, Westley, The End of Extraterritoriality in China. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1952. 
Franke, Wolfgag, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional 
Chinese Examination System. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1960. 
Friedrich, Carl Joachim, Constititional Government and Democracy. 
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1941. 
--------- The Impact of American Constitutionalism 
Abroad. Boston: Boston University Press, 1967. 
Fung, Yu-Lan, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy (D. Bodde ed.), 
New York: Macmillian, 1948. 
172 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN &ruoiEs SERIEs 
Haines, Charles Grove, the American Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy 
(2d ed.), Berkeley: University of California Press, 1932. 
---------The Revival of Natural Law Concepts. Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1930. 
Hart, Henry Jr., and Wechsler, Herbert, The Federal Courts and the 
Federal System. Brooklyn: Foundation Press, 1953. 
Henderson, Dan Fenno, Conciliation and Japanese Law, Tokugawa 
and Modern. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1965. 
Hertslet, Edward, Hertslet's China Treaties. London: Harrison and 
Sons, 1908. 
Hogg, Peter, Constitutional Law of Canada. Toronto: Carswell, 1977. 
Holdsworth, William Searle, History of the English Law. London: 
Methuene Co., 1924. 
Holmes, Oliver Wendell, Collected Legal Papers. New York: Har-
court, Brace and Company, 1920. 
Houn, Fu-Wun, Central Government of China 1912-1928. Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1957. 
--.,........------:-.--,. . Chinese Political Tradition. Washington: Pub-
lic Affairs Press, 1965. . 
Hsiao, Kung-Ch'uan, Rural China. Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 1960. 
Hsieh, Pao-Chao, The Government of China (1644-1911). Baltimore, 
1923. 
Hu, Hsien-Chin, The Common Descent Group in China and Its 
Functions. New York: Viking, 1948. 
Hedon, Edward Gerard, Freedom of Speech and Press in America. 
Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1963. 
Hudson, Geoffrey Francis, Europe and China. London: E. Arnold & 
Co., 1931. 
Hughes, Charles, The Supreme Court of the United States. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1928. 
International Commission of Jurists, Tibet and the Chinese People's 
Republic. Geneva, 1960. 
Ito, Hirobumi, Commentaries on the Constitution of the Empire of 
Japan. Westport, Conn.: Greewood Press, 1978. 
Jackson, Robert Houghwout, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy. 
New York: A.A. Knopf, 1941. 
Supreme Court in the American System of 
Government. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955. 
Jennings, William Ivor, The Law and the Constitution. London: 
University of London Press, 1959. 
SELECTED BmuoGRAPHY 173 
Johnson, Wallace Stephen, The T'ang Code. Princeton, N.J.: Prince-
ton University Press, 1979. 
Keeton, George Williams, The Development of Extra-Territoriality in 
China. London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1922. 
Kommers, Donald, Judicial Politics in West Germany. Beverly Hills, 
Calif.: Sage Publications, 1976. 
Koo, Vi Kyuin Wellington, The Status of Aliens in China. New York: 
Columbia University, 1912. 
Kurland, Phillip B., Politics, The Constitution, and the Warren 
Court. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970. 
Langbein, John H., Comparative Criminal Procedure: Germany. St. 
Paul: West, 1977. 
Legge, James, Chinese Classics. New York: Hurst, 1870. 
Levy, Leonard Williams, Judgments. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 
1972. 
Liang, Ch'z-Ch'ao, History of Chinese Political Thought During the 
Early Tsin Period. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1930. 
Liao, Wen-Kuei, The Complete Works 1>f Han· ·Fei· Tzu. London:· A. 
Probsthain, 1959. 
Lin, Yu-Tang, a History of the Press and Public Opinion in China. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1936. 
Liu, Hui-Chen, The Traditional Chinese Clan Rules, Locust Valley, 
N.Y.: J.J. Augstin Incorporated, 1959. 
Liu, Shih Shun, Extraterritoriality: Its Rise and Its Decline. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1925. 
May, Erskine, The Law, Privileges, Procedures and Usage of 
Parliament (19th ed. 1976). 
Mcilwain, Charles Howard, Constitutionalism of Ancient and Mod-
em. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1947. 
Meadows, Thomas Taylor, The Chinese and their Rebellions. Stan-
ford: Academic Reprints, 1953. 
Merryman, John Henry, The Civil Law Tradition. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1969. 
Morse, Hosea Ballou, International Relations of the Chinese Empire. 
London: Longmans Green and Co., 1910. 
Nedjati, Zaim M., and J.E. Trice, English and Continental Systems of 
Administrative Law. New York: North-Holland Pub. 1978. 
Neumann, Robert G., The Government of the German Federal 
Republic. New York: Harper & Row, 1966. 
Pan, Wei-Tung, The Chinese Constitution. Washington: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 1945. 
174 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN &rumEs SERIES 
Parker, Edward Harper, China: Her History, Diplomacy and Com-
merce (2d ed.). London: J. Murray, 1917. 
Patterson, Giles Jared, Free Speech and a Free Press. Boston: Little 
Brown and Company, 1939. 
Quigley, Harold S., and John E. Turner, The New Japan. Minneapo-
lis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956. 
Radin, Max, Handbook of Roman Law. St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1927. 
Rankin, Robert Stanley, When Civil Law Fails. Durham, N.C.: Duke 
University Press, 1939. 
Rohde, David W., and Harold J. Spaeth, Supreme Court Decision-
Making. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1976. 
Rossiter, Clinton Lawrence, Constitutional Dictatorship. Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1948. 
Sheehan, A.V., Criminal Procedure in Scotland and France. Edin-
burgh: H.M. Stationery Office, 1975. 
Sih, Paul Kwang Tsien ed., The Strenuous Decade: China's Nation-
Building Efforts 1927-1937. Jamaica, N.Y.: St. John's University 
Press, 1970. 
Tsao, Wen-Yen, The Constitutional Structure of Modem China. 
Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1947. 
Tung, William L., China and the Foreign Powers. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: 
Oceane Publications, 1970. 
--------- The Political Institutions of Modem China. 
The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1964. 
Tyau, Min-Ch'ien Tuk Zung, China's New Constitutional and Inter-
national Problems. Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1920. 
Van Der Sprenkel, Sybille, Legal Institutions in Manchu China. 
London: Athlone Press, 1962. 
Von Mehren, Arthur Taylor ed., Law in Japan. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1963. 
Warren, Charles, Congress, the Constitution, and the Supreme Court. 
Boston: Little Brown, and Company, 1935. 
---------The Supreme Court in United States History. 
Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1937. 
Whitney, Courtney, MacArthur: His Rendzevous with History. New 
York: Knopf, 1956. 
Wigmore, John Henry, A Panorama of the World's Legal System. 
Washington, D.C.: Washington Law Company, 1936. 
Wilkinson, Harvey, Serving Justice. New York: Charterhouse, 1974. 
Williams, Samuel Wells, the Middle Kingdom II. New York: C. 
Scribner's Sons, 1904. 
SELECTED BmuoGRAPHY 175 
Willoughby, Westel Woodbury, Constitutional Government in China. 
Washington: The Endowment, 1922. 
--------- Foreign Rights and Interests, Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1927. 
Yang, Mou-Ch'un, A Chinese Village. New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 1945. 
Yen, Rankling Lugine, A Survey of Constitutional Development in 
China. New York: AMS Press, 1968. 
ll. Periodical Articles 
Appleton, Sheldon, The Social and Political Impact of Education in 
Taiwan, 6 Asian Survey 703-720 (1976). 
Beard, Charles A., The Supreme Court- Usurper or Grantee? 27 Pol. 
Sci. Q. 1-35 (1912). 
Beer, Lawrence W., Freedom of Expression in Japan with Compara-
tive Reference to the United States, in Comparative Human Rights 
99-126 (R. Claude ed. 1976). 
--------- The Public Welfare Standard and Freedom of 
Expression in Japan, in The Constitution of Japan 205-238 (D. 
Henderson ed. (1968)). 
Bickel, Alexander M., The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 Harv. L. 
Rev. 40-79 (1961). 
Bishop, Crawford Morrison, American Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in 
China, 20 Am. J. Int'l L. 281-299 (1926). 
--------- Extraterritoriality in China and its Abolition, 
5 Chinese Soc. & Pol. Sci. Rev. 3:173 (1920). 
Brant, Irving, The Madison Heritage, in the Great Rights 13-39 (E. 
Cahn ed. 1963). 
Butcher, Barton, The Emperor's Attempt to Reform the Chinese 
Government in the Summer of 1898, 43 Pol. Sci. Q. 544-565 (1928). 
Buxbaum, David C., Some Aspects of Civil Procedure and Practice at 
the Trial Level in Tanshui and Hsinchu from 1789-1895, 30 J. 
Asian Stud. 255-279 (1970). 
Cappelletti, Mauro, and John Clarke Adams, Judicial Review of 
Legislation: European Antecedents and Adaptations, 79 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1207-1224 (1966). 
Cardozo, Address Before N.Y. State Bar Association, 55 Pro. N.Y. 
S. B. Ass'n. 263 (Jan. 22, 1932). 
Cella, Alexander J., The Doctrine of Legislative Privilege of Freedom 
of Speech and Debate: Its Past, Present and Future as a Bar to 
Criminal Prosecutions in the Courts, 2 Suffolk L. Rev. 1-43 (1968). 
--------- The Doctrine of Legislative Privilege of Speech 
176 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STuoms SERIEs 
or Debate: The New Interpretation as a Threat to Legislative 
Coequality, 8 Suffolk L. Rev. 1020-1095 (1974). 
Chen, King C., Peking's Attitude Toward Taiwan, 17 Asian Survey 
903-918 (1977). 
Cheng, Chi-Yu, The Chinese Theory of Criminal Law, 39 J. Crim. L. 
& Criminology 461-470 (1948). 
Cheng, Tien-hsi, The Development and Reform of Chinese Law, 1 
Current Legal Prob. 170-187 (1948). 
Cheng, F.T., Fragments of Chinese Law Ancient and Modern, 1 
Chinese Culture 1:1-14 (1958). 
Cheng, Sheldon, S.D., A Study on the Temporary Provisions of the 
Constitution of the Republic of China, 13 Chinese Culture 4:38-57 
(1972). 
Chinn, Dennis L., Distributional Equality and Economic Growth: The 
Case of Taiwan, 26 Econ. Development & Cultural Change 65-79 
(1977). 
Chiu, Hungdah, The United States Status of Forces Agreement with 
__ the Republic of China: Some Criminal Case Studies, 3 Boston 
College Int'l & Comp. L.R. 67-88 (1979). 
Cleveland, James, Legislative Immunity and the Role of the Presenta-
tive, 14 N.H.B.J. 139-155 (1973). 
Cohen, Jerome Alan, Chinese Mediation on the Eve of Modernization, 
54 Calif. L. Rev. 1201-1226 (1966). 
Cole, Taylor, The West German Federal Constitutional Court: An 
Evaluation After Six Years, 20 J. Pol. 278-307 (1958). 
Comment, Constitutional Changes in China, 5 Am. J. Int'l L. 200-204 
(1911). 
Comment, Linkletter, Shott and the Retroactivity Problem in 
Escobedo, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 832-855 (1966). 
Comment, Partial Retroactivity: A Question of Equal Protection, 43 
Temp. L.Q. 239-249 (1970). 
Cooper, John, Political Development in Taiwan, in China and the 
Question of Taiwan 46 (H. Chiu ed. 1979). 
Crosskey, William Winslow, The True Meaning of the Constitutional 
Prohibition of Ex Post-Facto Laws, 14 U. Chi. L. Rev. 539-566 
(1947). 
Currier, Thomas S., Time and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospec-
tive Overruling, 51 Va. L. Rev. 201-272 (1965). 
Deener, David, Judicial Review in Modern Constitutional Systems, 46 
Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1079-1099 (1952). 
Dennis, William, Treaty Regulating Tariff Relations Between the 
United States and China, 22 Am. J. Int'l L. 829-837 (1928). 
SELECTED BmLIOGRAPHY 177 
Dietz, Gotteried, America and Europe- Decline and Emergence of 
Judicial Review, 44 Va. L. Rev. 1233-1272 (1958). 
Emerson, Thomas 1., The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 Law & 
Contemporary Problems 648-671 (1955). 
Ervin, Jr., Sam J., The Gravel and Brewster Cases: An Assault on 
Congressional Independence, 59 Va. L. Rev. 175-195 (1973). 
Frankel, Marvin E., The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. 
Penn. L. Rev. 1031-1959 (1975). 
Frankfurter, Felix, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. Penn. L. Rev. 
311-317 (1955). 
--------- The Supreme Court in the Mirror of Justices, 
105 U. Penn. L. Rev. 781-796 (1957). 
---------and James M. Landis, The Supreme Court 
under the Judiciary Act of 1925, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 1-29 (1928). 
Freund, Paul A., A Supreme Court in Federation, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 
597-619 (1953). 
Field, Oliver P., Ex Post Facto in the Constitution, 20 Mich. L. Rev. 
315-331 (1922). 
Geck, Wilhelm Karl, Judicial Review of Statutes: A Comparative 
Survey of Present Institutions and Practices, 51 Cornell L.Q. 
250-304 (1966). 
Gen. Lewis, Some Characteristics of the Ancient Chinese Law, 48 
Asiatic Rev. 156-160, 233-240 (1952). 
Grant, J.A.C., Judicial Control of Legislation, 3 Am. J. Comp. L. 
186-198 (1954). 
Judicial Review of Legislation under the 
Austrian Constitution of 1920, 28 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 670-676 
(1934). 
Haddad, James B., Retroactivity Should be Rethought: A Call for the 
End of the Linkletter Doctrine, 60 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 
427-441 (1969). 
Herrey, John G., and Joseph J. Kelley, Jr., Some Constitutional 
Aspects of Statutory Regulation of Libels on Government, 15 Temp. 
L.Q. 453-492 (1941). 
Holdsworth, W.S., Control and Copyright in the 16th and 17th 
Centuries, 29 Yale L.J. 841-858 (1920). 
Hucker, Charles 0., The Traditional Chinese Censorate and the New 
Peking Regime, 45 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1041-1057 (1951). 
Itoh, Hiroshi, Judicial Decision-Making in the Japanese Supreme 
Court, 3 Law in Japan 128-161 (1969). 
Jacobs, Bruce, Taiwan 1978, 19 Asian Survey 20 (1979). 
Johnson, Philip, Forward, the Supreme Court of California, 1967-68, 
56 Cal. L. Rev. 1612-1632 (1968). 
178 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STuoms SERIEs 
Jones, William C., Studying the Ch'ing Code - the Ta Ch'ing Lu Li, 
22 Am. J. Comp. L. 330-364 (1974). 
Keeton, George W., The New Chinese Codes, 8 J. Comp. Leg. 3d ser. 
225-238 (1926). 
--------- The Progress of Law Reform in China - II, 
19, 20 J. Comp. Leg. 3d ser. 197-211 (1937), 210-221 (1938). 
Kelsen, Hans, Judicial Review of Legislation: A Comparative Study of 
the Austrian and American Constitution, 4 J. Pol. 183-200 (1942). 
Kommers, Donald P., The Federal Constitutional Court in the West 
German Political System, in Frontiers of Judicial Research 73-132 
(J. Grossman & J. Tanenhaus ed. 1969). 
--------Judicial Review in Italy and West Germany, 20 
Jahrbuch Des Offentlichen Recht Der Gegenwart 111-133 (1971). 
Lobingier, Charles Sumner, The Corpus Juris of New China, 19 Tul. 
L. Rev. 512-552 (1945). 
Loring, Charles, American Extraterritoriality in China, 10 Minn. L. 
Rev. 407-411 (1926). 
Luhman, Stanley, Mao and Mediation: Politics and Disputes Resolu-
tion in Communist China, 55 Calif. L. Rev. 1284-1359 (1967). 
McNelley, Theodore, The Japanese Constitution: Child of the Cold 
War, 74 Pol. Sci. Q. 176-195 (1959). 
McWhinney, Edward, Judicial Concurrence and Dissents: A Compa-
rative Wiew of Opinion-Writing in Final Appellate Tribunals, 31 
Canadian B. Rev. 595-625 (1953). 
Michael, Franz, The Role of Law in Tradition, Nationalist, and 
Communist China, 9 China Q. 124-148 (1962). 
Mishkin, Paul J., The Supreme Court 1964 Term -Forward: the 
High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 
79 Harv. L. Rev. 56-102 (1965). 
Mitchell, J.D.B., Sovereignty of Parliament- Yet Again, 79 L.Q. Rev. 
196-223 (1963). 
Monaghan, Henry P., First Amendment "Due Process", 83 Harv. L. 
Rev. 518-551 (1970). 
Nadelman, Kurt H., The Judicial Dissent, Publication v. Secrecy, 8 
Am. J. Comp. L. 415-432 (1959). 
Note, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the 
Federal Courts, 71 Yale L.J. 907-951 (1962). 
Note, The Scope of Immunity for Legislators and Their Employees, 77 
Yale L.J. 366-389 (1967). 
Note, They Shall Not Be Questiond . . ., 3 Stan. L. Rev. 486-496 
(1957). 
SELECTED BmuoGRAPHY 179 
Opponheim, Edward E., Congressional Free Speech, 8 Loy. L. Rev. 
1-34 (1955-1956). 
Ostrager, Barry Robert, Retroactivity and Prospectivity of Supreme 
Court Constitutional Interpretation, 19 N.Y.L.F. 289-308 (1973). 
Paul, James C.N., and Murray L. Schwartz, Obsenity in the Mails: A 
Comment on Some Problems ofFe<kral Censorship. 106 U. Penn. L. 
Rev. 214-253 (1957). 
Paul, James C.N., The Post Offu:e and Non-Mailability of Obsenity: 
An Historical Note, 8 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 44-68 (1961). 
Peake, Cyrus H., Recent Studies on Chinese Law, 52 Pol. Sci. Q. 
117-138 (1937). 
Plucknett, Theodore F.T., Bonham's Case and Judicial Review, 40 
, Harv. L. Rev. 30-70 (1926) . 
./Pound, Roscoe, The Chinese Civil Cod€ in Action, 29 Tul. L. Rev. 
277-327 (1955). 
-------- Justice According to Law, Part II, 14 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1-26 (1914) . 
./ Progress of the Law in China, 23 Wash. L. 
Rev. 345-362 (1948). 
Price, Ernest, Extraterritoriality in China, 11 Oreg. L. Rev. 264-282 
(1932). 
Quigley, Harold Scott, Extraterritoriality in China, 20 Am. J. Int'l L. 
46-68 (1926). 
Radin, Max, The Judicial Review of Statutes in Continental Europe, 
41 W.Va. L.Q. 112-130 (1934). 
Reed, The Rule in Gelpecke v. Dubuque, 9 Am. L. Rev. 381-410 
(1875). 
Reinstein & Silverglate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation of 
Powers, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1113-1182 (1973). 
Rossum, Ralph A., New Rights and Old Wrongs: The Supreme Court 
and the Problems of Retroactivity, 23 Emory L.J. 381-420 (1974). 
Rupp-Brunnedk, Wiltraut, The Fe<kral Constitutional Court, 20 Am. 
J. Comp. L. 387-403 (1972). 
Schwartz, Herman, Retroactivity, Reliability and Due Process: A 
Reply to Professor Mishkin, 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 719-767 (1966). 
Shientag, Bernard L., From Sedition Libel to Freedom of the Press, 11 
Brooklyn L. Rev. 125-154 (1942). 
Sigler, Jay A., Freedom of the Mails: A Developing Right, 54 Geo. L.J. 
30-54 (1965). 
Smelser, Marshall, Legislative Investigation: The Problem in Histori-
cal Perspective, 29 Notre Dame Law. 163-192 (1954). 
180 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN SruoiEs SERIES 
Spruill, Jr., James A., The Effect of an Overruling Decision, 18 N.C. 
L. Rev. 199-203 (1940). 
Stimson, EdwardS., Retroactive Application of Law- A Problem in 
Constitutional Law, 38 Mich. L. Rev. 30-56 (1939). 
Tao, Lung-sheng, The Sino-American Status of Forces Agreement: 
Criminal Jurisdiction over American Soldiers on Nationalist 
Chinese Territory, 51 B.U. L. Rev. 1-30 (1971). 
--------Reform of the Criminal Process in Nationalist 
China, 19 Am. J. Comp. L. 747-765 (1971). 
Teng, Chinese Influence on the Western Examination, 7 Harv. J. Asia 
Stud. 267-312 (1943). 
Thayer, James Bradley, The Case ofGelpecke v. Dubuque, 4 Harv. L. 
Rev. 311-320 (1891). 
Tyau, M.T.Z., Extraterritoriality in China and the Question of Its 
Abolition, Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 133-149 (1921-23). 
Vance, W.R., Freedom of Speech and of the Press, 2 Minn. L. Rev. 
239-250 (1918). 
Veeder, Van Vechten, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Legislative 
and Executive Proceeedings, 10 Colum. L. Rev. 131-146 (1910). 
Bigoriti, Vincenzo, Italy: The Constitutional Court, 20 Am. J. Comp. 
L. 404-414 (1972). 
Wada, Hideo, The Supreme Court of Japan as Adjudicating Agency 
and its Function, 23 Jahrbuch Des Offentlichen Recht Der 
Gegenwart 537-548 (1974). 
Wang, Chung-hui, Revision of the Chinese Criminal Code, 13 Ill. L. 
Rev. 219-233 (1918). 
Warren, Charles, Spies, and the Power of Congress to Subject Certain 
Classes of Civilians to Trial by Military Tribunal, 53 Am. L. Rev. 
195-228 (1919). 
Williams, Justin, Making the Japanese Constitution: A Further Look, 
59 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 665-679 (1965). 
Wing Mah N., Foreign Jurisdiction in China, 18 Am. J. Int'l L. 
676-695 (1924). 
Yang, Chung-sen, Career Judiciary in the Republic of China, 2 
Chenghi L. Rev. 122-159 (1970). 
Yankwich, Leon R., The Immunity of Congressional Speech - Its 
Origin, Meaning and Scope, 99 U. Penn. L. Rev. 960-977 (1951). 
Zuckerman, Harvey Lyle, Obscenity: In the Mails, 33 So. Cal. L. Rev. 
171-188 (1960). 
INDEX 181 
INDEX 
Administrative agencies, 123 
Administrative court: procedures of, 120, 
120 n.66. See also court 
Administrative injunction, 115, 116 
Admonitory decision, 153, 154 
Appeals, Chinese procedure, 23 
Austin, John, 147 
Blackstone, 127 
Blake, Odgers, 27, 28 
"Board of Punishment," 23 
Calder v. Bull, 110 
Career system: examinations 42, 42 
n.110. See judiciary selection 
Chicot County Drainage District v. Bax-
ter State Bank, 148 
Civil law, 13, 14 
Cochran v. Couzens, 135, 136, 141 
"Code of Six Chapters," 14 
Codes: civil, 35, 36, civil procedure, 37, 
38, 44, criminal, 32-34, history of, 14, 
15, Kung-Ssu-Lu, 31, Ta Ching Lu Li, 
15, 15 n.18, Tang, 14, 15 
Coffin v. Coffin, 135, 140, 141 
Commercial law, 36 
Committee on the Discipline of Public 
Functionaries, 42 
Communist party, membership in, 111-
114 
Confucianism, 12, 12 n.6, 13 
Confucius, 9 n.1, 11, 18 
Constitution: interpretation of, 80, 103, 
U.S. article III, 79, 80 
Constitutional court: description of, 5, 68, 
69, jurisdiction of, 86, 87, request of 
review by, 86, 87, standing, 87 
Constitutional law: early Chinese, 5, 6, 
development of Chinese, 6, 7 
Consultative council, 49, 50 
Control Yuan, 101 
Council of Grand Justices: constitutional 
issues, 84, description of, 7 n.7, 70, 
74-79, government agency standing be-
fore, 81, opinions of, 93-95, quorum of, 
89, 90, requests of, by individual, 102, 
103, requests of, by local administra-
tion, 101, standing before, 80, 84, 85, 
statistical survey of output of, 97-100, 
voting requirement of, 89, 90 
County magistrate, duties of, 21 
Court: administrative, 41, 118-124. See 
also administrative court, District, 32, 
40, High, 32, 40, Military, 107, Sup-
reme, 32, 40. See also constitutional 
court. 
Dicey, Albert van, 1 n.1 
"Draft Constitution of the Temple of 
Heaven," 53, 54, 67 
Dynasties: Chin, 11, 12, Han, 13, Tang, 
13 
"Eight Considerations," 20, 22 
Emperor Kang Hsi, 26 
Evidence, admissibility of, 38 . 
Executive Yuan, 99, 101, composition of, 
63 n.55 
Exhaustion of remedies, 87 
Ex post facto doctrine, 105, 110, 112 
Extraterritoriality, 28, 30, 59 
Family: in mediation, 24, 25, in penal 
system, 17, 18, 34, 35, political unit, 16, 
17, 31 
Freedom: of the press, 124-131, personal, 
116 n.54 
Fung Yu-Lan, 11 n.5 
Grand Bench, 88 
Grand Justices: qualifications of, 70, 76, 
selection of, 77, 78, tenure of, 73. See 
also Council of Grand Justices 
"Hundred Days Reform," 45, 45 n.1 
Imperial Law Codification Commission, 
30-34 
Inter-agency conflicts, see "Judicializa-
tion" 
Inter-governmental disputes, see Legisla-
tive Yuan 
Interpretation No. 80, 108 
Interpretation No. 86, 144, 145 
Interpretation No. 9, 84, 85 
182 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STuoiEs SERIES 
Interpretation No. 129, 108-110, 114 
Interpretation No. 122, 100-101 
Interpretation No. 68, 108 
Interpretation No. 3735, 132, 133 
Johnson v. New Jersey, 149 
"Judicialization": definition of, 81, de-
scription of, 81-84 
Judicial review: definition of, 1, 2, Euro-
pean origin of, 2 n.2, 3, origin of, 2, 3 
Judicial Yuan: composition of, 69, de-
scription of, 69, duties of, 69, Organic 
Law of the, 70 
Judiciary: education of, 43, qualifications 
of, 72, selection of, 42, 44, workload of, 
44,44 n.114 
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 135, 141 
Kuomintang, 53, 57-60, 77 
Lawyers: role of, 37, 71, 161, "Song 
Kuan," 44 
Legalisms, 11 
Legalists, 10, 11, 13 
Legal philosophy, Chinese, 9, 10 
Legislative Yuan, role of, 84 
Legislature: constitutional role of, 2, 4, 
immunity of, 133-144 
Li, 16 n.19 
Mahler v. Ebby, 111 
"Mandate of Heaven," 10 n.2 
Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 122, 123 
Mapp v. Ohio, 149 
Martial law, rule, see "State of Siege" 
Mediation, extrajudicial, 25, 26, 44 
Mencius, 12 
Milton, J., 125 
Ministry of Justice, 40 
National Assembly, 61, 63, 65 
Near v. Minnesota, 127-130 
"Nineteen Articles," 51 
Nine-year Program of Constitutional Pre-
paration, 46, 48 
Norton v. Shelby County, 147 
Parliament, 2 n.3 
Political questions, see "Judicialization" 
President: Chiang Kai Shek, 64, powers 
of, 63, 64 
Presumption of guilt, 22 
"Principles of Constitution," 46, 47 
Prior restraint, 124-130 
Procurator, 32 
Provisional assemblies, 48-50 
Publication law, 114 
Retroactivity, see ex post facto 
Reviewing Bench: conference of, 90, 91, 
description of, 88, secrecy of, 91, 92 
Rules concerning the conduct of business 
by the Council of Grand Justices, 88 
Rule of law, definition of, 1 n.1 
Scales v. U.S., 112 
Schenck v. U.S., 127 
Secretaries of law, 21, 21 n.34 
Self-government, Taiwan record of, 65 
Speech and debate clause, 133-136 
"State of Siege," 106-108 
Statute: constitutional validity of, 145, 
146, prospective invalidity of, 152-157, 
retroactive invalidity of, 147-152 
Statute for Punishment of Rebellions, 
105, 105 n.19, 108, 109 
Stockdale v. Hansard, 134 
Stovall v. Denno, 149, 150 
Su Huing, 143, 144, 144 n.160 
Taiwan Provincial Assembly, composi-
tion of, 143, 143 n.158 
Temporary Provisions for the Duration of 
Mobilization to Suppress the Rebellion, 
63, 64 
Tenney v. Brandhove, 136, 137 
Torture, use of, in penal system, 22 
United States as a constitutional model, 
3-5 
Wang Tu, 12 
Women: Chinese legal status of, 19, 20, 
36, as a Grand Justice, 78, 78 n.36 
Yuan Shih-Kai, 51, 54 
Occasional Papers/Reprints Series 
in Contemporary Asian Studies 
1977 Series 
No.1- 1977 
Chinese Attitude Toward Continental Shelf and Its Implication on 
Delimiting Seabed in Southeast Asia (Hungdah Chiu) 32 pp. 
No.2- 1977 
Income Distribution in the Process of Economic Growth of the 
Republic of China (Yuan-Li Wu) 45 pp. 
No.3- 1977 
The Indonesian Maoists: Doctrines and Perspectives (Justus M. van 
der Kroef) 31 pp. 
No.4- 1977 
Taiwan's Foreign Policy in the 1970s: A Case Study of Adaptation 
and Viability (Thomas J. Bellows) 22 pp. 
No.5- 1977 
Asian Political Scientists in North America: Professional and 
Ethnic Problems (Edited by Chun-tu Hsueh) 148 pp. Index 
No.6- 1977 
The Sino-Japanese Fisheries Agreement of 1975: A Comparison 
with Other North Pacific Fisheries Agreements (Song Yook 
Hong) 80 pp. 
No. 7 - 1977** 
Foreign Trade Contracts Between West German Companies and the 
People's Republic of China: A Case Study (Robert Heuser) 22 
pp. 
No.8- 1977* 
Reflections on Crime and Punishment in China, With Appended 
Sentencing Documents (Randle Edwards, Translation of 
Documents by Randle Edwards and Hungdah Chiu) 67 pp. 
No.9- 1977 
Chinese Arts and Literature: A Survey of Recent Trends (Edited by 
Wai-lim Yip) 126 pp. 
No. 10- 1977 
Legal Aspects of U.S.-Republic of China Trade and Investment -
Proceedings of A Regional Conference of the American Society 
of International Law (Edited by Hungdah Chiu and David 
Simon) 217 pp. Index 
$ 1.00 
$ 1.00 
$ 1.00 
$ 1.00 
$ 3.00 
$ 2.00 
$ 1.00 
$ 1.00 
$ 3.00 
$ 5.00 
Occasional Papers/ Reprints Series 
in Contemporary Asian Studies 
1977 Series 
No. 11- 1977 
Asian American Assembly Position Paper: I. A Review of U.S.-
China Relations 62 pp. 
No. 12- 1977 
Asian-American Assembly Position Paper: II. A Review of U.S. 
Employment Policy 24 pp. 
1978 Series 
No. 1 - 1978 (13) 
Indian Ocean Politics: An Asian-African Perspective (K.P. 
Misra) 31 pp. 
No. 2 - 1978 (14) 
Normalizing Relations with the People's Republic of China; 
Problems, Analysis, and Documents (Edited by Hungdah Chiu, 
with contribution by G. J. Sigur, Robert A. Scalapino, King C. 
Chen, Eugene A. Theroux, Michael Y.M. Kau, James C. Hsiung 
and James W~ Morley). 207 pp. Index 
No. 3 - 1978 (15) 
Growth, Distribution, and Social Change: Essays on the Economy 
of the Republic of China (Edited by Yuan-li Wu and Kung-chia 
Yeh) 227 pp. Index 
No. 4 - 1978 (16) 
The Societal Objectives of Wealth, Growth, Stability, and Equity in 
Taiwan (Jan S. Prybyla) 31 pp. 
No. 5 - 1978 (17)* 
The Role of Law in the People's Republic of China as Reflecting 
MaoTse-Tung's Influence (Shao-Chuan Leng) 18 pp. 
No. 6 - 1978 (18)-
Criminal Punishment in Mainland China: A Study of Some 
Yunnan Province Documents (Hungdah Chiu) 35 pp. 
No. 7 - 1978 (19) 
A Guide to the Study of Japanese Law (Lawrence W. Beer and 
Hidenori Tomatsu) 45 pp. 
$ 1.00 
$ 1.00 
$ 1.00 
$ 3.00 
$ 3.00 
$ 1.00 
$ 1.00 
$ 1.00 
$ 2.00 
Occasional Papers/Reprints Series 
in Contemporary Asian Studies 
1978 Series 
No.8- 1978 (20) 
The Pueblo, EC-121, and Mayaguez Incidents: Some Continuities 
and Changes (Robert Simmons) 40 pp. 
No. 9 - 1978 (21) 
Two Korea's Unification Policy and Strategy (Y ong Soon Yim) 82 
pp. Index 
1979 Series 
No. 1 - 1979 (22) 
Asian Immigrants and Their Status in the U.S. (Edited by 
Hungdah Chiu) 54 pp. 
No. 2 - 1979 (23)-
Social Disorder In Peking After The 1976 Earthquake Revealed By 
A Chinese Legal Document (By H\mgdah Chiu) 20 pp. 
No. 3 - 1979 (24) 
The Dragon and the Eagle - A Study of U.S. - People's Republic 
of China Relations in Civil Air Transport (Jack C. Young) 65 
pp. 
No. 4 - 1979 (25) 
Chinese Women Writers Today (Edited by Wai-lim Yip and William 
Tay) 108 pp. 
No. 5 - 1979 (26)* 
Certain Legal Aspects of Recognizing the People's Republic of 
China (Hungdah Chiu) 49 pp. 
No. 6 - 1979 (27) 
China's Nationalization of Foreign Firms: The Politics of Hostage 
Capitalism, 1949-1957 (Thomas N. Thompson) 80 pp. Index 
No. 7 - 1979 (28) 
U.S. Status of Force Agreement with Asian Countries: Selected 
Studies (Charles Cochran and Hungdah Chiu 130 pp. Index 
No. 8 - 1979 (29) 
China's Foreign Aid in 1978 (John F. Cooper) 45 pp. 
* Reprinted with revision (all other papers are original). 
** Translated from German with revision. 
$ 2.00 
$ 2.00 
$ 2.00 
$ 2.00 
$ 3.00 
$ 3.00 
$ 2.00 
$3.00 
$ 2.50 
$ 2.00 
Occasional Papers/ Reprints Series 
in Contemporary Asian Studies 
1980 Series 
No. 1 - 1980 (30) 
The Chinese Connection and Normalization (Edited by Hungdah Chiu) 
200 pp. Index 
No. 2 - 1980 (31) 
The Conceptual Foundations of U.S. China Policy: A Critical Review 
(James C. Hsiung) 17 pp. 
No. 3 - 1980 (32) 
Policy, Proliferation and the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty: U.S. 
Strategies and South Asian Prospects (Joanne Finegan) 61 pp. 
No. 4 - 1980 (33) 
A Comparative Study of Judicial Review Under Nationalist Chinese and 
American Constitutional Law (Jyh-pin Fa) 200 pp. Index 
* Reprinted with revision (all other papers are original). 
** Translated from German with revision. 
Forthcoming 
No.5- 1980 (34)* 
Certain Problems in Recent Law Reform in the People's Republic of China 
<Hungdah Chiu) About 35 pp. 
$ 5.00 
$ 1.00 
$ 2.50 
$ 3.50 
$ 1.50 
----------------------------------
ORDER FORM 
To Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian 
Studies, University of Maryland School of Law, 500 West 
Baltimore Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21201, U.S.A. 
Check One: 
0 Please Send: 
No. Author Title Copies 
0 Please start my subscription of the OPRSCAS: 
Starting issue -----
Subscription price is U.S. $10.00 for 8 issues (regardless of the 
price of individual issues in the U.S. and Canada and $12.00 
for overseas.) 
My check of U.S. $ is enclosed copy(s) 
of invoice/receipt required. (Institution/library may request 
billing before making payment) (Make check payable to 
OPRSCAS) 
Please send book to: 
Name/Corp./Library: 
Address: (Please include zip code) 
-----------------------------------

